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2. SUMMARY 
Researchers have long inquired about the “positive” (or “good”) effects of national 
attachment on in-group solidarity, and its potential “negative” (or “bad”) effects on out-
group derogation. Put simply, there is a concern that while national attachment may foster 
solidarity and trust, it could also increase out-group derogation through nationalism or 
anti-immigrant sentiments.  
In Chapter 2, I discuss the political theory of John Rawls and introduce a realist critique 
of his ideal theory of social justice. I argue that national attachment and how it operates in 
the real world are a potential factual constraint on Rawls’ theory. This theoretical prelude 
frames the empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 3-5), all of which study the 
effects of national attachment on social justice preferences. I describe this empirical 
perspective on national attachment and social justice as “Rawls for Realists.” 
In Chapter 3, I use observational data to investigate the relationship between national 
attachment and support of social justice principles. I show that national attachment 
increases support for redistribution, but only among individuals with lower levels of 
“Openness to Experience” (a core personality trait). To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first study to combine datasets on personality, national attachment, and redistribution. 
In Chapter 4, I use observational data to investigate the relationship between national 
pride and anti-immigrant sentiments. I show that, counter to common perceptions, 
national pride does not increase and may, in fact, even decrease anti-immigrant sentiments 
among nativists, the social group most opposed to immigration. I explain this by arguing 
that nativists perceive immigrants as a symbolic threat to their values and norms, and not 
as an economic threat. As national pride increases group esteem among nativists, it reduces 
the perception of symbolic threats. 
In Chapter 5, I analyse original experimental data from a survey experiment to explore 
the relationship between in-group commitment and out-group derogation. A first video 
treatment primes only national attachment; a second treatment primes national attachment 
and perception of threat. I show that only the second treatment increases anti-immigrant 
sentiments and nationalism, suggesting the centrality of perceived threat for out-group 
derogation. This perceived threat treatment also increases respondents’ belief in democracy 
but does not affect preferences for social justice. 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Both in academia and political practice, the role of national attachment in democracies is 
highly contested. On the one hand it is believed to be a necessary element to promote 
solidarity and trust, or even democratic beliefs, thus ensuring nothing less than the 
functioning of ethnically diverse democracies. This firm conviction usually manifests itself 
in the vague intention to foster national attachments, in “educating identity” in integration 
tests, in strengthening cultural orientation (e.g. the German debate about a “Leitkultur”) or 
in the burgeoning of public debates on national attachment. On the other hand, others 
argue that national attachment - as distinct to citizenship - is redundant for large-scale co-
operation. Moreover, many defend the view that national attachment in all its various 
forms bears the potential for dysfunctional nationalism, out-group derogation, and to 
transform democracies into systems of oppressive popular rule, Mill’s “tyranny of the 
majority”. Who is right, if yes why, and under which conditions? If both strands of thought 
appear to match with empirical evidence, national attachment might end up being a double-
edged sword that promotes both in-group cooperation and out-group derogation.  
In this dissertation, I investigate this relationship between national attachment and 
social justice preferences. Three stand-alone papers, Chapters 3, 4 and 5, form the core of 
this cumulative dissertation. The chapters look at said relationship from an empirical 
perspective. Chapter 2 provides a motivation for such an empirical investigation from the 
perspective of John Rawls’ philosophical work on the foundations of social justice. Before 
I present a short overview over the chapters in the remainder of this introduction, let me 
give some terminological clarification on ‘national attachment’, the concept at the heart of 
this dissertation. 
I use the concept of national attachment as an umbrella term for different identity 
dimensions. I differentiate between the cognitive, affirmative and evaluative dimensions of 
national attachment. First, the cognitive dimension refers to the content of national 
attachment, e.g. ethnic or civic forms (What characteristics matter to “truly” count as a co-
national?). 
Second, the affirmative dimension of national identity describes the salience of national 
attachment (How important is national attachment?).  
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Third, the evaluative dimension of national pride captures the emotionality of national 
attachment (To what extent is national attachment associated with positive feelings?). 
National pride is closest to what many authors call patriotism (Huddy and Khatib, 2007, 
p. 64), although recent research tends to differentiate between critical patriotism and 
uncritical patriotism, where the latter is defined as the “unwillingness both to criticise and 
accept criticism" of the nation (Schatz and Staub, 1997, p. 231; Schatz, Staub and Lavine, 
1999). I do not use measurements for the concept of critical patriotism in this dissertation 
for two reasons: First, critical patriotism is empirically highly correlated with national pride 
(Miller and Ali, 2014, p. 246). Second, both the concept as well as the measure that I use 
for national pride are more often and more coherently used in the existing literature.1 I also 
include the concept of nationalism, sometimes called chauvinism, as a control variable to 
better connect to the existing literature. It is often measured along a phrase “Overall, 
[Country x of respondent] is better than country y”. However, this and many similar 
measures of nationalism are problematic for two reasons: first, it remains unclear whether 
‘betterness’ refers to measurable dimensions such as living standards or to normative 
dimension, e.g. moral superiority; second, citizens of a country that actually ranks better in 
many measurable categories, e.g. living standards, would have to agree with the statement 
if they conceived it as a factual question. 
Let me now turn to the chapters of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I argue that empirical 
evidence on national attachment and group heterogeneity matters for Rawls’ theory of justice. 
In particular, I put forward that the degree to which national attachment and group 
heterogeneity shape citizens’ social justice preferences has an impact on the stability of the 
social justice principles proposed by Rawls. This call to consider more factual constraints 
in Rawls’ theory of social justice constitutes one form of a methodological realist critique, 
i.e., “Rawls for Realists” as I call it. It provides a theoretical framework and philosophical 
motivation for the three empirical main chapters of this dissertation.   
In substance, my argument in the empirical part of the dissertation is the following: The 
slow but changing character of national attachment and the cultural make-up of its citizenry 
                                               
 
1  Davidov (2009) tests the statistical equivalence, i.e. the invariance of measurement 
characteristics, of the two concepts across countries. He confirms that the distinction between 
national pride/constructive patriotism as well as uncritical patriotism/nationalism is empirically 
sound. However, this does not hold for scalar invariance, consequently making it problematic to 
compare means of the concepts across countries.  For all countries included in the analysis of this 
dissertation, both concepts patriotism and nationalism demonstrate metric and scalar equivalence 
over time (Davidov, 2011). 
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from an exclusive ethnic to more inclusive forms of national attachment is less of a 
problem for progressive individuals who have lower salience of national attachment or 
have an inclusive understanding of national attachment, rather welcoming change. Feeling 
at ease with this transition, however, cannot be granted for a substantial proportion of 
modern societies that still embraces an exclusive form of national attachment with a high 
salience in this particular group identity. In this context, the relationship between national 
attachment and attitudes on social justice, democratic beliefs, as well as anti-immigrant 
sentiments strongly depends on the form of national attachment as well as individual-level 
characteristics. In particular for nativists, citizens who feel more attached to their nation 
(the second, affirmative dimension), or the lower educated, national attachment has a 
stronger impact on such attitudes. Moreover, I bring forward the hypothesis that core 
personality predicts whether national attachment matters for social cohesion. Let me give 
a short overview over each of the empirical chapters individually. 
In Chapter 3, I show, based on observational data, that national attachment increases 
support for redistributive policies. This is, however, only the case for individuals with lower 
levels of “Openness to Experience” (a core personality trait). To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first time that a study combines datasets on national attachment, personality and 
redistribution. 
In Chapter 4, I focus on the relationship between national pride and anti-immigrant 
sentiments. Again, based on observational data, I show that national pride, counter to what 
is commonly assumed, does not increase and potentially even decreases anti-immigrant 
sentiments among nativists, the social group that is most against immigration. My 
explanation for this is that nativists perceive immigrants as a symbolic threat to their values, 
but not as an economic threat. As nativist’s national pride increases their group esteem, 
their perception of symbolic threats decreases. Thus, national pride has the potential to 
reduce perceptions of a immigrants as symbolic threat for those individuals who oppose 
immigration the most. 
Chapter 5 analyses original experimental data from a survey experiment to explore how 
in-group commitment and out-group derogation relate. The survey uses two different 
video treatments, where the first treatment primes only national attachment and the second 
primes both national attachment and perception of threat. I show that only the second 
video treatment increases anti-immigrant sentiments and nationalism, which suggests how 
important perceived threat is for out-group derogation. Interestingly, this perceived threat 
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treatment also increases respondents’ belief in democracy but has no effect on social justice 
preferences. 
 The dissertation is concluded by a summary and outlook as well as a brief discussion 
of some of the policy implications of this dissertation. Among other things, I claim that 
the reaction of progressive forces to usually label citizens with such ethnic conceptions of 
nationhood as “nationalists” is counterproductive as it only strengthens the respective 
ethnic in-group attachment and increases the perceived threat by immigrants, as nativists 
feel not only threatened by immigration but also compromised by the popular majority 
within “their” nation.2.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Berg, L. and Hjerm, M. (2010) ‘National identity and political trust’, Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, 11(4), pp. 390–407.  
Davidov, E. (2009) ‘Measurement equivalence of nationalism and constructive 
patriotism in the ISSP: 34 countries in a comparative perspective’, Political Analysis, 17(1), 
pp. 64–82.  
Davidov, E. (2011) ‘Nationalism and constructive patriotism: A longitudinal test of 
comparability in 22 countries with the ISSP’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 
23(1), pp. 88–103.  
Huddy, L. and Khatib, N. (2007) ‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political 
Involvement’, American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), pp. 63–77. 
Schatz, R. and Staub, E. (1997) ‘Manifestations of Blind and Constructive Patriotism: 
Personality Correlates and Individual-Group Relations’, in Bar-Tal, D. and Staub, E. (eds) 
Patriotism: In the Lives of Individuals and Nations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.  
Schatz, R., Staub, E. and Lavine, H. (1999) ‘On the varieties of national attachment: 
Blind versus constructive patriotism’, Political Psychology, 20(1), pp. 51–74. 
                                               
 
2 I treat nationhood as well as national belonging as synonyms for national attachment. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: RAWLS FOR 
REALISTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Within democratic countries, elected governments decide about frameworks aimed at 
ensuring fair distribution of political rights and the fruits of economic prosperity. Rawls’ 
theory of justice as fairness is one of the most prominent theories that develop principles 
of social justice. Rawls maintains that in order to be just, the basic political and economic 
institutions of a society should be guided by his egalitarian principles of social justice. In 
this chapter, I show to what extent the empirical relationship between national attachment 
and group heterogeneity on the one hand and preferences for social justice, on the other 
hand, matters for Rawls’ theory of justice, in particular for the stability of the principles of 
justice he puts forward. In other words, I argue that Rawls’ theory of social justice requires 
certain assumptions to work in practice. In this chapter, I identify and explain these 
assumptions, which I partly test in the empirical chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
First, I sketch Rawls’ theory of justice (Section 1). Second, I illustrate how Rawls 
conceptualises the relationship between political philosophy and political practice and 
outline what “realist” critique is compatible with Rawls’ approach (Section 2). Third, I 
show how such a realist critique relates to Rawls’ concept of stability (Section 3). Fourth, 
I discuss the evaluative communitarian argument against liberalism that liberal principles 
of social justice do not provide a sufficient basis to ensure stability (Section 4). Rejecting 
this conceptual argument, I turn to the more empirical national identity argument in 
Section 5. In line with this argument, I put forward that empirical studies on national 
attachment matter for assessing Rawls’ theory of justice, in particular the stability of the 
principles proposed by it. I outline open questions about how exactly national attachment 
and stability are intertwined. As the form and the degree of group heterogeneity matters 
for this relationship, Rawls’ simplifying assumption of a closed society needs to be revised 
(Section 6). I conclude with summing up the implications of my empirical research on 
these issues for both political theory and social science (Section 7). 
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RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE 
In his classic work a Theory of Justice, Rawls develops a set of principles of justice that should 
guide the design and regulation of the basic structure of society for it to be just (Rawls, 
2005, p.4). All major social and political institutions of a liberal society, such as the 
economy, the legal system, or the family, make up the so-called basic structure. Rawls 
focuses on the basic structure because it does not only have the main impact on the 
distribution of benefits and burdens of social co-operation, such as wealth, opportunities, 
or health care but also shapes the character of social co-operation in these domains (Rawls, 
2005, p. 3). 
First, Rawls argues that morally arbitrary features, e.g. to be born with natural talents, a 
certain gender, or ethnicity as well as the socioeconomic status of one’s family, should not 
have an impact on the share of benefits of social co-operation that a citizen receives. 
Second, he presents the argument that “all social values (...) are to be distributed equally 
unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage” 
(Rawls, 2005, p. 62). Inequality - not equality - must and can only be justified by improving 
the situation of the worst-off. Based on these considerations, Rawls formulates two 
principles of justice:  
“[1.] Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which 
scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only 
those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. [2.] Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: [(a)] They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity; and [(b)], they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” 
(Rawls, 1993, pp. 5–6). 
The subject of the first principle of justice is the constitution of the respective political 
community and secures that all citizens have the same basic rights and liberties; the second 
principle mainly applies to economic institutions and has two parts. The second part 
ensures equality of opportunity (2a) and that inequality of wealth and income are to the 
greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (2b). The first principle takes 
priority over the second principle, and within the second principle, fair equality of 
opportunity (2a) takes priority over the difference principle (2b). 
Rawls uses the thought experiment of the “original position” to determinate the 
principles of justice. In the original position, all citizens are behind a veil of ignorance, thus 
are “deprived of knowledge of the race, class, and gender of the real citizen that they 
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represent” after the veil is lifted (Wenar, 2017). Rawls defines natural (objective) and social 
(subjective) circumstances of which citizens are informed under the veil of ignorance.  
As subjective conditions, Rawls assumes that individuals can act on principles of justice 
provided these principles are not too demanding (a limited form of altruism), have diverse 
religious and philosophical beliefs, and have roughly similar needs and interests, as well as 
their own life plans. Objective circumstances are that individuals have similar physical and 
mental powers or, put differently, possess capacities comparable in that no one among 
them can dominate the rest. Furthermore, moderate scarcity and a fixed territory are 
assumed, which makes human cooperation both necessary and possible. Rawls calls these 
subjective and objective conditions of justice the circumstances of justice (Rawls, 2005, p. 126). 
A particular simplifying assumption that Rawls makes about the circumstances of 
justice is that the society is self-sufficient and closed, “so that citizens enter it only by birth 
and leave it only at death” (Wenar, 2017) and later adds in Political Liberalism that citizens 
comprehend themselves to be normal and co-operating members of society over a 
complete life (Rawls, 1996, p. 81). I will discuss this in more detail in Section 6. 
IS RAWLS’ THEORY UTOPIAN OR REALIST? 
The argument I am putting forward in this chapter is that there are empirical questions, 
namely regarding national attachment and group heterogeneity that are relevant for Rawls’ 
principles of justice. This touches on the more general debate as to whether and, if so, what 
feasibility constraints matter for normative political theorising. There is often made a 
distinction between utopian and “realistic” theories in this respect (Valentini, 2012, p. 1). 
Whereas utopian theories are independent of any factual constraints, realistic theories rely 
on some assumptions or feasibility constraints that we consider as necessary for the 
respective theory. Utopian theories furthermore have a more universalist approach on the 
validity of the principles of justice they propose. Rawls, in contrast, acknowledges that a 
theory of justice needs to take into account some general facts, such as favourable 
circumstances (Rawls, 2005, pp. 351, 359). Rawls’ theory is realist in this sense, as it 
includes several of such factual constraints outlined in the circumstances of justice, such 
as moderate scarcity or the absence of war.   
At the same time, some scholars have argued that the conditions in Rawls’ theory of 
justice are unrealistic and that his theory should count as utopian. For example, Waldron 
suggests that Rawlsian theory should also include “circumstances of politics” describing 
them as: 
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“the felt need among the members of a certain group for a common framework or decision or course of 
action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement about what that framework, decision or action 
should be” (Waldron, 1999, p. 102). 
Although game-theoretical considerations form the basis of this argument, it is 
empirical by nature: collective disagreement might not only exist on what public goods to 
pursue, but also on the decision-making procedure itself that aims to resolve the 
disagreement on what public goods to pursue. Such second-order disagreement, in turn, 
might increase the motivational hurdles to engage in cooperative behaviour in one’s 
political community. Other authors also point to the lack of agreement on what counts as 
terms of coordination or political conflict in Rawls’ theory of justice (Mills, 2005; Williams, 
2005; Geuss, 2008; Galston, 2010).  
According to this realist critique, “Rawls’s mistake lies in a failure to take into account 
all those facts that are relevant to theorizing about justice itself” (Valentini, 2012, p. 7). 
This critique agrees with Rawls’ approach to include some factual constraints, but criticises 
that “more heavily fact-bound, social ideals such as legitimacy, democracy, peace, security 
and so forth” have to be included (Valentini, 2012, p. 7; see Tomlin, 2012; Waldron, 2004).  
To sum up – and to use Valentini’s terminology – Rawls’ theory of justice is neither 
fully utopian nor realistic. Rawls motivation to include factual constraints into his theory 
of justice becomes more evident when taking a closer look at Rawls concern for stability, 
as I will do in the next section. 
STABILITY AND REASONED ALLEGIANCE 
In Theory of Justice, Rawls attempted to establish a conception of justice for the basic 
structure of society. In his later work Political Liberalism, he addresses, inter alia, the question 
of whether this conception, justice as fairness, is stable (Rawls, 1993, p. 141). This question 
consists of two parts: First, whether individuals who grow up under fair conditions, defined 
by the political conception of a fair political community, develop a sufficient and normal 
sense of justice in order to comply with the political institutions. Of course, stability could 
be seen as a mere practical question of enforcing compliance, but then support would be 
ensured for the wrong reasons. In Rawls’ eyes, a liberal conception of justice has to develop 
a form of support that is self-enforcing so that “those who grow up under just basic 
institutions acquire a sense of justice and a reasoned allegiance to those institutions 
sufficient to render them stable. […] Stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the 
appropriate kind” (Rawls, 1993, pp. 142–143).  
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The second question is whether justice as fairness can be the focus of an overlapping 
consensus – given the fact of reasonable pluralism. An overlapping consensus is existent 
when citizens endorse a conception of justice “independent of comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines” (Rawls, 1993, p. 144). Thus, individuals agree in an 
overlapping consensus on a core set of principles for different reasons that pertain to their 
own perspective. In Rawls’ view, such an overlapping consensus constitutes the most 
desirable form of stability in a democratic society, as it is stable independent of the 
influence of one particular group in society. However, Rawls says very little on how 
“sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind” (Rawls, 1993, pp. 142-143) can be 
established and of what a liberal form of “reasoned allegiance” (Rawls, 1993, p. 142) should 
consist.  
In the section after the next, I will argue that national attachment is relevant for the sort 
of stability that Rawls has in mind. To lay the groundwork for this, I will start by discussing 
the communitarian critique of liberalism in the next section, which tries to make the 
conceptual point that support for principles of justice requires a specific common identity, 
before then moving on to the more empirical arguments I am concerned with. 
THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE AND THE LIBERAL REPLY 
There are two dimensions of the communitarian critique: an ontological and an evaluative 
one (Kukathas, 1996a; Taylor, 2003a). The ontological argument, which I will not discuss 
any further, articulates the view that “the self cannot be conceived of independently of 
society or the community: the self is situated or embodied” (Kukathas, 1996b). The evaluative 
dimension of the communitarian critique stresses the importance of communal or public 
or collective goods, as individuals are primarily social beings and those goods should take 
priority over individual rights.  
This contrasts with Rawls’ approach that can be classified as deontological liberalism to 
give the “priority of the right over the good” (Rawls, 2005, p.31) (deontological) and to 
claim that individuals are entitled to those rights and liberties. Consequently, Rawls’ theory 
of justice does not specify what goods a co-operative society should provide. Here, an 
implication of the evaluative critique is that deontological liberalism, such as Rawls’ theory 
of justice fails to provide two elements that are required to generate some form of 
“reasoned allegiance”: first a commonly defined good; second a form of community prior 
to the development of principles of justice.  
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This “lack-of-a-common-good” critique hence consists of two parts. According to the first, 
a self-endorsing, “reasoned allegiance” ensuring the stability of a Rawlsian society requires 
the pursuit of a common good. A liberal society needs an active citizenry that participates 
in politics, civil society, or the military. This is only possible when a common good is 
perceived to exist in order to motivate citizens to value and practice political participation. 
Second, Rawls’ theory of justice defines society as made up of individuals with individual 
life plans with differing conceptions of the good (doctrines) and consequently without a 
commonly held idea of the good that a society can embrace. Thus, so the argument, 
deontological liberalism is at odds with the commonly embraced conception of a good and 
consequently cannot provide the necessary environment for a co-operative society.  
This argument, however, centres on a narrow understanding of what counts as “good”, 
as what would be commonly embraced according to Rawls are the principles of justice and 
consequently a commonly embraced form of the “right” (see also Macedo, 1990; Taylor, 
2003). Whether such a common conception of the “right” suffices to generate support for 
principles of social justice is another, an empirical, question, but according to this liberal 
reply theoretically possible. 
The second part of the critique points to the need of a prior form of allegiance to 
formulate principles of social justice. For example, Michael Sandel argues that already the 
difference principle, which applies to economic institutions, as such requires a prior form 
of allegiance that liberalism cannot provide:  
“What the difference principle requires, but cannot provide, is some form of identifying among whom the 
assets I bear are properly regarded as commons, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted to and 
morally engaged to begin with.” (Sandel, 1984, p. 90) 
In Sandel’s view the difference principle as a principle of sharing is only justified when 
those I am sharing resources with are not merely ‘others’, but fellows of some form of 
community. Thus, the limits of a liberal conception of social justice are again not of 
practical, but of conceptual nature.  
One possible reply to this is that Rawls simply assumes the existence of a political 
community in the circumstances of justice, namely that a particular group of individuals 
shares a fixed territory and that human cooperation is both necessary and possible without 
attributing a value to the community as such.  
However, is this all enough to generate “reasoned allegiance”, which has the goal to 
engage and to sustain a political community based on liberal principles of justice? Being 
allegiant to liberal values alone would not be enough, as it would not clarify with whom I 
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should or am motivated to be allegiant with. Here, simply supporting principles of justice 
without a form of community, as Sandel argues, does not seem to be sufficient. Liberals 
could reply that a certain form of patriotism or national attachment is necessary to generate 
reasoned allegiance, that the principles of justice do not define such an allegiance, and that 
it does not have to. Theoretically, I can defend an individualist, liberal theory of social 
justice and still acknowledge that a commonly shared public culture is necessary to generate 
mass co-operation and support for principles of social justice. Then, a public culture that 
is compatible with liberal principles, but not prescribed by them, simply plays an 
instrumental, a motivational part, in generating “sufficient motivation of the appropriate 
kind”. However, whether a society that adopts such principles sustains a commonly shared 
public culture of the kind that provides the necessary motivation to engage in a political 
community, in other words: to produce its preconditions, remains an empirical question.  
To sum up, liberalism can be defended against the two communitarian critiques that 
liberalism a priori, i.e. conceptually, makes it impossible to provide a viable theory of social 
justice. However, whether and in what way a liberal form of “reasoned allegiance” 
sufficiently motivates citizens to support liberal principles of social justice actively, is an 
independent empirical question. I explore this second, empirical question in this 
dissertation.  
In the next section, in which I discuss the national identity argument, I bring forward 
the hypothesis that national attachment plays a role for both dimensions of stability, 
creating a motivational basis for supporting principles of social justice and ensuring the 
existence of an overlapping consensus. 
THE NATIONAL IDENTITY ARGUMENT 
A more empirical argument to the effect that stability requires a certain form of common 
identity is the national identity argument. One of its most prominent supporters, David 
Miller, argues that widespread support for redistributive policies, based on the belief that 
they are required by justice, will occur only when people see themselves as co-nationals. 
The national identity argument further suggests that such a common identity is what makes 
modern, diverse societies work:  
“When people identify with one another as compatriots, over and above the many more specific gender, 
ethnic, cultural, or religious identities they may have, they are more likely to display generalized trust, and to 
show solidarity. This reduces social conflict and increases willingness to cooperate, which in turn makes it 
easier for the society to produce public goods, to decide a wide range of matters by democratic means, and 
to channel its resources in the direction of disadvantaged members.” (Miller and Ali, 2014, p. 238)  
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Whether and how national attachment matters for stability of democratic societies and 
thus constitutes a “feasibility constraint” for theories of justice (Gilabert, 2012) remains an 
empirical question. Wiens (2016, p. 3) goes even further arguing “if people can’t be 
motivated to comply with the theory’s requirements, then they can’t comply with those 
requirements. If people can’t comply with the theory’s requirements, and if “ought” implies 
“can”, then the proposed theory of justice is false.” Thus, the implications of empirical 
findings on how national attachment ensures stability can be of normative nature. 
In my view there are five open questions with regard to the national identity argument: 
First, if at all, which forms of national attachment are most likely to increase support for 
principles of social justice? Does it depend on salience, how positive a national identity is 
perceived, or on the content of one’s national attachment? I will argue in Chapter 4 that 
this relationship is less than clear-cut and that national pride is less problematic when it is 
thought to be most detrimental, e.g. for nativists. A related debate focuses on whether 
citizenship, which involves being a full member of a state with the rights and duties that it 
entails, suffices to create solidarity (Mason, 1995, p. 247). Here, Miller argues that co-
nationals must have something in common that is more than just common citizenship, i.e., 
that there must be a “national character”, and that a viable and genuinely shared national 
identity must be based on a common culture, however of a “relatively thin kind”, consisting 
of “beliefs and attitudes, ritual observances and so forth” (Miller, 1989, p. 244 quoted in 
Mason, 1995 p. 247). However, it remains unclear what counts as common culture: rituals, 
holidays, a common language, or just shared values? In Chapter 5, I show that a traditional 
form of national identity that primes pride in the economy, being proud of one’s 
nationality, and the national history, only partly ensures collective support for social justice. 
Second, the national identity argument might depend on core personality traits. If a 
person by default has a greater need for safety and relies more heavily on forms of group 
belonging, increasing national identity could lead to higher support for social justice 
principles. I will argue in Chapter 3 that this is the case for individuals who display low 
levels of “Openness to Experience”.  
A third question is to what extent the collective level of national attachment matters for 
an individual’s support for principles of justice. In Chapter 4, I will argue that an 
individual’s national attachment becomes more important when it is at odds with the 
majority’s conception of nationhood and can unfold its beneficial effect for social 
cooperation.  
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Fourth, is citizenship a double-edged sword? Whereas common identities could increase 
in-group commitment, it could also increase out-group derogation in the form of 
nationalism or autocratic attitudes or nationalism. Related to that is the more fundamental 
question brought up by social identity theory on whether an in-group identity always 
requires some form of out-group to unfold its potential of in-group cooperation. I test this 
question in Chapter 5 with the help of video experiments. I find that using out-groups is 
more efficient to prime in-group identity. However, the benefits of the out-group 
treatment come at high costs, as this approach also increases out-group derogation in the 
form of nationalism or anti-immigrant sentiments.  
Fifth, in increasingly multi-ethnic societies, national attachment can also have very 
different effects conditional on the type and degree of group heterogeneity. For example, 
an exclusive form of national attachment might bear a high potential to foster solidarity in 
the absence of ethnic or religious heterogeneity, but could be detrimental otherwise. The 
tendency to stigmatise and exclude others constitutes an element in human psychology and 
does not seem to merely be an artefact of a defective history. Thus, even though in a 
Rawlsian well-ordered society problems of exclusion and hierarchy have been overcome, 
they have been overcome by human beings who still have the underlying tendencies that 
produce those problems. I experimentally test the effect of group ethnic heterogeneity in 
Chapter 5. I find that at least a traditional form of national attachment, that does not 
actively promote diversity, is not sufficient to compensate the small reduction in support 
of social justice due to group heterogeneity that I observe in the experiments.  
In the next section, I will explain in more detail how group heterogeneity forms a 
constraint on support for Rawls’ principles of justice and hence whether societies based 
on such principles can be expected to be sufficiently stable.  
MIGRATION, GROUP HETEROGENEITY, AND THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
To develop principles of justice for the basic structure of society, Rawls made the 
simplifying assumption that the society in question is fully closed, knowing that no existing 
human society matches this idealisation. Rawls included this simplification in order to 
ensure that the contractors, as well as their descendants, were making inescapable choices 
“once the veil of ignorance is lifted” (Voice, 2011, p. 149) or as Rawls puts it in Political 
Liberalism: “We have no prior identity before being in society” (Rawls, 1993, p. 41). 
If the interpretations of who counts as a member of the political community become 
too large, an overlapping consensus – the necessary condition for the second dimension 
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of stability – might be compromised. Individuals could still agree on the same principles 
of social cooperation, but not who should share the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.  
Unfortunately, the functionally motivated assumption of demarcation, i.e. the absence 
of migration, avoids this critical question on social justice in nation-states: who is or should 
be a member of this “cooperative venture for mutual advantage”? The variance of legal 
frameworks reflects the different possible answers to this question. Liberal thought also 
does not seem to have a clear answer to this question. If that is the case and there is strong 
disagreement on who counts as citizen, procedural legitimacy might be compromised and 
consequently the stability of a political community. If there is disagreement on who should 
be a member of the political community, to what extent does such disagreement matter 
for the implementation of Rawls’ theory in the real world? Rawls writes: 
“Immigration is also a common fact but we can abstract from it to get an uncluttered view of the 
fundamental question of philosophy […]. Of course, immigration is an important question and must be 
discussed at some stage. I surmise this is best done in discussing the appropriate relations between peoples, 
or the law of peoples.” (Rawls, 1993, p. 136, n. 4) 
In Law of Peoples it becomes evident that excluding the topic of migration is also related 
to his empirically inadequate belief that the main or almost exclusive causes for migration 
are the “persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, political oppression, famines, and 
population pressure” (Rawls, 1999, p. 9) and that no migration would exist in a world of 
perfectly just societies. To name only one example, one could imagine societies that are 
perfectly just with regard to the distribution of benefits and burdens within in each society, 
but which in the long run trigger migration flows because of an unsustainable emission of 
carbon dioxide.   
Even if it was true that no migration existed in a world with perfectly just societies, a 
perfectly just society without migration flows in the present has at least to deal with ethnic 
diversity as a result of migration in the past, which occurred throughout the transition 
towards a fully just society. Thus, a theory of justice has to deal with group heterogeneity, 
understood as diversity in time lived in the respective polity (generations or years), religious 
beliefs, ethnicity, language, or the conditions under which individuals have migrated into 
the respective territory even if we assumed that it would only have to be concerned with 
societies which are currently not subject to migration flows.  
This does not necessarily imply that there will be disagreement on the relevant 
principles of social justice, but it does imply that the question arises on who counts as a 
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legitimate member of the political community (see also Miller, 2013, pp. 84–91). This 
comports with Onora O’Neill (1997) who argues that Rawls’ assumption on closed 
societies presupposes a common political identity among citizens and that their 
membership of a particular society, with its historical traditions, and values, is given for 
Rawls. However, in real life people are often unsure about their political identity and that 
they may find those with whom they live in closed societies are not identical with those 
they regard as their people (O’Neill, 1997: p. 420).  
To sum up, the heterogeneity of a group can matter for the support of principles of 
justice as it has an impact to the degree to which members of society identify with each 
other. As mentioned, I will investigate in more detail how group heterogeneity impacts the 
support of social justice principles in Chapter 5. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE  
I have argued above that a theory of social justice needs to consider factual constraints on 
how national attachment might ensure stability if such a theory of justice aims to be rooted 
in the realities of human nature. I showed that national attachment could matter in various 
forms for ensuring long-term support for principles of social justice. In particular, the 
extent to which national attachment reduces the corrosive effects of different forms of 
group heterogeneity on co-operation is crucial for ensuring the long-term stability of multi-
ethnic societies. Considering the potential factual constraint of national attachment can be 
seen as a form of realist critique in a methodological sense. It suggests considering evidence 
from social science to ensure that the majority of the citizenry supports principles of social 
cooperation in the long run.  
At the same time the empirical investigation on how national attachment matters for 
solidarity within societies can be considered as a response to the evaluative communitarian 
argument that liberal deontologists egalitarians fail to provide the necessary elements to 
ensure stability.  
The main trade-off between integrating factual constraints and keeping abstract 
principles of justice is to develop principles that will match real-life cases and secondly also 
motivate individuals to support such principles of justice. Empirically testing how national 
attachment might have a motivational impact in supporting principles of social justice 
makes Rawlsian stability more likely without giving up the degree of abstraction of Rawls 
principles. This approach also helps to develop a gradual understanding of the 
realist/utopian dichotomy, where “[r]ealism is not therefore an alternative to utopianism, 
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but is situated at one end of a fact-sensitive (realistic)/fact-indifferent (utopian) spectrum” 
(Sleat, 2016, pp. 29–30). Empirically investigating the extent to which the motivational 
aspect to engage in principles of social justice depends on some of Rawls’ conditions of 
justice with both its realistic and utopian character also helps to set into context different 
forms of realist critique of Rawls’ theory of justice.  
Thus, “Rawls for Realists” is investigating the fact-sensitivity of Rawls’ theory of justice 
about national attachment. Realism, understood in these terms does not challenge liberal 
theory, but suggests a method to use fact-sensitive elements so that liberal theory can better 
fulfil its ambition to guide political action and lead to fairer societies. With the help of 
empirical evidence, “Rawls for Realists” contributes to the debate on how principles 
developed by political theory are more likely to be implemented in the real world. Empirical 
evidence on what increases the likelihood to comply with liberal principles of justice helps 
to better understand the feasibility constraints of political theory in political practice.  
Prominent voices expressed concerns that questions of justification and questions of 
acceptance are not sufficiently separated in Rawls’ theory of justice (e.g. Habermas, 1995). 
Wingenbach (1999) goes even further and argues that stability becomes the primary 
objective of Rawls’ theory. Perhaps it is possible that principles of justice are justified, but 
not accepted. If that were the case, however, such an ideal theory would not meet the self-
imposed ambition to guide political practice. At the same time, the principles of social 
cooperation could be accepted but not justified. As I have argued above, such a modus 
vivendi would also not meet the standards of stability.  
Investigating the psychological basis of social justice also brings to light the tension that 
liberal theories of justice face. On the one hand, liberalism does not intend to prescribe 
what forms of belonging should be promoted, on the other hand, liberalist thought – such 
as the Rawlsian – is concerned with guaranteeing the stability of liberal societies. If certain 
forms of national attachment that are compatible with liberal principles of justice do not 
promote social cooperation, this would constitute a challenge to liberal thought. 
Hopefully, “Rawls for Realists” can modestly contribute to empirically informed 
political philosophy since it investigates the role and applicability of theories of justice in 
real-world scenarios. Moreover, “Rawls for Realists” is normatively motivated social 
science, that provides empirical evidence that matters in the normative literature. This is 
how I hope to stimulate debates that bridge facts and norms and provides evidence on the 
role of national attachments as well as group heterogeneity for the engagement in principles 
of social justice and thus finally on social cohesion in modern democracy. In this way, the 
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following chapters “Rawls for Realists” create a better understanding of the extent to 
which variations in the circumstances of justice in ideal theory matter for the stability of 
democracies in the 21st century.  
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3. CHAPTER 3: WHO NEEDS 
NATIONAL ATTACHMENT?  HOW 
THE BIG FIVE PERSONALITY 
TRAITS MODERATE THE LINK 
BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY, 
PRIDE AND ECONOMIC 
EGALITARIANISM3 
ABSTRACT 
Does a stronger sense of national belonging heighten willingness to share resources with 
co-nationals, as claimed by the ‘national identity argument’? The research front remains 
divided over this question. By combining the literature on national identity with the Big 
Five framework of personality, we argue that core personality sheds new light on the 
ambiguous relationship between national attachment and economic egalitarianism. We 
expect national identity and pride to have a positive association with support for economic 
redistribution, but only for individuals who score low on Openness to Experience or high 
on Conscientiousness. These character traits should namely affect the extent to which an 
individual needs national belonging as a social identity in order to be willing to share 
resources with others. By analysing a merged dataset from the Dutch LISS panel study, we 
find robust support for the first hypothesis, but less so for the second one. 
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egalitarianism. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper develops and examines the psychological side of the ‘national identity 
argument’, according to which a strong sense of national attachment generates economic 
solidarity (Miller, 1995). On this view, the survival of the redistributive welfare state “in 
the long run” requires a strong sense of national belonging, which is held to provide the 
“emotional identification with compatriots that can overcome the competing pull of self-
interest” (Miller and Ali, 2014, p. 239). If this assumption holds true, the implication is that 
liberals have reason to revisit their typical cosmopolitanism, and instead welcome some 
form of liberal nationalism, which justifies policies that uphold and strengthen the national 
identity – on the condition, of course, that this identity remains open and flexible enough 
to count as a liberal one.4  
Scholarly interest in the empirical validity of this argument for liberal nationalism has 
recently been rekindled by contemporary migration flows, and the increasing polarization 
between those who welcome and those who feel more sceptical of the resulting ethnic 
diversity. In the background looms the fear that we have a general tendency to 'hunker 
down' in the face of increasing diversity (Putnam, 2007, p. 149). Now, this ‘anti-solidarity 
effect’ is widely contested (Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2013). It has for example been 
suggested that rather than pointing at diversity as such we should look to political 
multiculturalism; at least in the European context, multicultural policies risk leading the 
mainstream population to feel that their national identity is under attack, and this sense of 
threat in turn tends to undermine their solidarity (Wright, 2011; Verkuyten, 2005). This is 
probably why, in countries with multicultural policies, citizens who are already negative 
towards immigration tend to become more resentful of the political elites from whom they 
feel alienated, and less supportive of the political system as such, than in countries which 
have not adopted political multiculturalism (Citrin, Levy and Wright, 2014).  
In any case, national identity stands out as a potential antidote to societal divisions and 
diminishing solidarity. Research on social re-categorization and intergroup relations tells 
us that individuals from rivalling sub-groups can overcome their internal competition by 
                                               
 
4 For various versions of liberal nationalism, see Canovan (1996), Kymlicka (2001: chs. 10–11; 
2015), Moore (2001), Schnapper (1998) or Tamir (1993). 
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emphasis on a common, overarching group identity (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000), such 
as the national one (Riek et al., 2010; Transue, 2007). National identity, moreover, is the 
very good that the non-immigrant majority is argued to feel is threatened in countries that 
have adopted political multiculturalism, an experience that in turn might lead them to 
detract their support for the welfare state. Attempts to strengthen the national identity 
have also become a popular political response to waning social capital and increased 
polarization. Many European countries have introduced policies that explicitly aim to 
boost a sense of national unity, such as civics classes, national holidays, and an increased 
emphasis on, say, 'British', or 'Dutch' values, for both natives and immigrants (Cantle, 2008; 
Miller, 2008).  
These political trends lend a particular urgency to the question of whether or not a 
stronger national identity is really able to boost economic egalitarianism – or, as we will 
argue that the question should rather be formulated: who needs national attachment in 
order to support economic redistribution? Nevertheless, the research front remains 
divided over the hypothesized link between national attachment, which we will use as the 
umbrella term, and economic egalitarianism, as well as solidarity more broadly. On the one 
hand, there is evidence that being primed with an overarching national identity does indeed 
increase the willingness to economically help (cf. Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015; 
Transue, 2007) and trust (Robinson, 2016) co-nationals from a different ethnic background 
than one’s own. On the other hand, several survey studies show that national identity, even 
of a more civic or cultural than ethnic kind, is associated to less, not more, support for 
economic redistribution (Breidahl, Holtug and Kongshoj, 2018; Shayo 2009; Wright and 
Reeskens, 2013), and that ethnic national identities in particular are erosive rather than 
beneficial for general trust (Reeskens and Wright, 2012).  
Previous research suggests these differences are largely due to studies measuring the 
effects of different dimensions of national attachment as well as of solidarity (Miller and 
Ali, 2014). This paper, by contrast, focuses on a third nuance: the interaction between 
national identity and personality. The association between a stronger sense of national 
attachment and a person’s attitudes to redistribution, we argue, is likely to depend on that 
person’s underlying personality. In other words, even when we hold constant the type of 
national identity, as well as the type of egalitarian policy attitude it is supposed to affect, 
this link will vary across individuals. We build this expectation on the insight from social 
identity theory that individuals vary systematically in the extent to which their group 
identity affects their attitudes and behaviour (cf. Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle and Brown, 
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1990). For example, group members who value conservation highly feel more threatened 
by increasing group heterogeneity, which in turn sparks more negative out-group attitudes 
than among members with less focus on conservation to begin with (Roccas and Amit, 
2011). Now, this sounds very much like the sense of identity threat which is believed to be 
eroding support for the principle of general redistribution, and for which an overarching 
national identity is presented as a potential remedy. In that case, the implication is that we 
should not expect national identity to boost solidarity among all citizens alike, but only for 
fundamentally conservation oriented citizens. However, while previous research aiming to 
test the ‘national identity argument’ has begun to differentiate between types of national 
attachment as well as policies of redistribution, it has to our knowledge failed to theorize 
the possibility of such individual-level differences depending on personality. 
The main aim of this paper is to remedy this gap in the literature on the national identity 
argument, both theoretically and empirically. In the following, we thus develop hypotheses 
about the way that core personality traits interact with national identity in shaping 
egalitarian attitudes, and we test these hypotheses with data from the Dutch LISS study. 
More precisely, we hypothesize that the association between national attachment and 
egalitarianism will depend on Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness. While we 
do not find robust evidence for the latter interaction, we do find strong evidence for the 
former. Whereas Openness itself is negatively associated to egalitarianism in our Dutch 
sample, having a higher sense of national attachment counteracts this negative tendency. 
Individuals who are more open to novelty and change, by contrast, cannot be made more 
supportive of redistribution by having their national attachment strengthened. This is an 
important finding for the literature on liberal nationalism, because it suggests that national 
attachment can counteract the tendency to ‘hunker down’ in the face of diversity, by 
providing those who are concerned with conservation and tradition a sense of reassurance 
in their social identity. At the same time, this beneficial side of national identity and pride 
is limited to a certain group of individuals, namely those who score low on Openness to 
Experience by virtue of being sceptical to novelty, abstraction and change.  
Note that we only examine the first step that underpins the theory of liberal nationalism: 
the empirical claim that national attachment is positively associated to economic 
egalitarianism. Whether the type of identity that has this relationship is sufficiently inclusive 
to qualify as liberal, as opposed to for example conservative, is a separate issue, which we 
leave for future research to decide. By choosing the case of the Netherlands, we 
nevertheless study one of – if not the – most likely candidate for finding such a liberal 
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national identity. Dutch identity is typically considered to represent the archetype of a civic 
as opposed to an ethnic national identity (Kohn, 1944). In international comparisons of 
popular attitudes, the Dutch also stand out as holding the most open and inclusive notion 
of national identity (Larsen, 2017). Of course, no national identity that we could find in 
the real world is likely to be entirely purged of ethnic connotations. However, we believe 
it is fair to assume that among the different national identities that exist today, the Dutch 
national identity comes closest to approximating the civic ideal type. This in turn does not 
mean that it has no exclusionary tendencies; on the contrary, the Dutch case seems to 
illustrate the more general trend of liberal values, such as tolerance and gender equality, 
working to exclude newcomers who are perceived as illiberal (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 
2007, 21-24). Indeed, the Netherlands has experienced precisely the kind of ethnic and 
cultural polarization over recent years for which a strengthened national identity is often 
suggested as the antidote (Scheffer, 2011). The Netherlands thus stands out as one of the 
most relevant contexts for testing the national identity argument.  
Finally, by studying the Dutch case, we are also able to add new insights to the emerging 
literature on how personality affects attitudes to economic redistribution, in a context that 
despite its divisions is less starkly racially divided, after all, and certainly more traditionally 
supportive of the welfare state, than the typically studied U.S. case. Our findings suggest 
that the European context differs importantly from the American one, but also that the 
Dutch case differs from other European countries. The most striking example of this is 
again Openness to Experience, which shows a positive correlation to redistribution in the 
American case (Gerber et al., 2010; Gerber et al., 2011), but none at all in Denmark, the 
UK and Belgium (Bakker, 2017; Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2004). Our results show yet a 
third relation for the Netherlands: a significant but negative one. In other words, when 
Openness is not interacted with national identity or pride, in our Dutch sample it has a 
negative correlation with egalitarianism. This new finding makes sense in a context where 
redistributive principles are seen as established and perhaps even almost traditional parts 
of the political system. It also tells us more broadly that the links between core personality 
and political attitudes depend on national context, as well as on different levels of 
identification with social categories like the national one.  
THE ELUSIVE ‘SOLIDARITY BOOST’ FROM NATIONAL ATTACHMENT  
The short answer to the question of whether or not national attachment is indeed beneficial 
for solidarity is that we still do not know. In their study of attitudes in the U.S., Citrin, 
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Wong and Duff (2001) found no link between either nationalistic chauvinism or the 
experience of national attachment to views on government spending on health, education, 
or welfare. In another study of attitudes in the U.S., Theiss-Morse (2009, ch. IV) showed 
that Americans who feel a strong national attachment in fact become less supportive of 
welfare spending, but they do feel more obliged to help their co-nationals in other ways, 
for example by charity. Experimental research on the other hand suggests that making 
national identity salient does activate egalitarianism. Priming American national identity 
significantly raises both the speed with which words like 'fair', 'justice', and 'equality' are 
picked out in relation to other words (Butz, Plant and Doerr, 2007), as well as the 
willingness of paying more taxes for the sake of education (Transue, 2007). The most 
recent experiment of this kind, to our knowledge, extends these conclusions to India 
(Charnysh, Luca and Singh, 2015). 
Using observational data, Johnston et al. (2010) have further shown that a strong sense 
of Canadian identity is connected to a willingness to support the welfare state, as well as 
to higher levels of trust, especially in the political institutions. Yet other studies have found 
evidence for the opposite, negative, association between national attachment and 
egalitarian economic attitudes, both in the UK (Martinez‐Herrera, 2010) and Denmark 
(Breidahl, Holtug and Kungshoj, 2018) as well as in cross-national studies spanning 20 to 
29 countries, respectively (Shayo, 2009; Wright and Reeskens, 2013). Most recently, 
Johnston et al. (2017) found that national pride leads to more trust in both Canada and the 
U.S., but that it only leads to more solidarity in Québec, whereas this link is non-existent 
in the rest of Canada and negative in the U.S.5  
Given these divergent results, Miller and Ali, in their overview of previous research from 
2014, concluded that the assumption that a stronger sense of national identity leads to 
more solidarity has 'certainly not been decisively refuted, but nor has it so far been strongly 
confirmed'. Indeed, from all this, the most obvious conclusion is that a strong sense of 
national attachment does not promote economic egalitarianism across the board. In this 
paper, we therefore take care to, first, separate between three different dimensions of 
national attachment, which we expect to be differently related to economic egalitarianism; 
                                               
 
5 These results echo Robinson’s (2016), which show that, even in such an ethnically divided and 
artificially created state as Malawi, a stronger national identification tends to make people both 
more trusting overall, and less likely to trust their own ethnic group more than others. 
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and, secondly, to measure the latter by questions tapping one of its core aspects, support 
for the principle of economic redistribution.  
More precisely, we separate between national identity, national pride, and nationalism 
(sometimes called national chauvinism).6 Huddy and Khatib (2007) showed this tri-partite 
typology to be less politically biased than the more traditional typologies of nationalism vs. 
patriotism (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Li and Brewer, 
2004), or “blind” vs. “constructive” patriotism (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine, 1999). They 
further found that American national identity had a positive association to political 
participation, but only when controlling for nationalism, which on the contrary showed 
the opposite, negative, association with for example voter turnout. Using the same three-
dimensional factor structure, Jeong (2013) found that nationalism also heightens anti-
immigration attitudes. In this case, however, it was national pride rather than national 
identity that, when holding constant the two other dimensions of national attachment, 
showed a positive link to progressive attitudes.  
Our expectation is that national identity and national pride will be positively related to 
economic egalitarianism, while we do not expect the same for nationalism. In line with 
Huddy and Khatib (2007) and Jeong (2013), who only saw the beneficial effects of national 
identity and pride when controlling for nationalism, we will include the latter in our models 
as a control variable, something that to our knowledge has not been done before in the 
literature on the national identity argument. Yet we believe this is important since 
nationalism, here captured by the typical question of how much better the respondent 
thinks her own country is in comparison to others, captures a competitive and rather tough 
outlook that we should hardly expect to increase the willingness to sympathize with others 
and to share resources with them, even if they are co-nationals.   
The reason we expect national identity as well as national pride to correlate positively 
with egalitarianism is that they both, by contrast, tap into the kind of superordinate social 
identity that we know is able to unite otherwise rivalling groups, ethnic or otherwise, and 
to make them help rather than compete with one another (cf. Huddy, 2001; Klor and 
Shayo, 2010; Theiss-Morse, 2009). Given the literature on ‘deservingness judgments’, such 
                                               
 
6 Unfortunately, the dataset did not include questions on cognitive dimensions of national 
attachment, i.e. ethnic or civic national attachment. 
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a shared identity should also make us more likely to consider recipients of economic 
benefits to be more deserving than otherwise (van Oorschot, 2006). 
However, social identity theory further suggests that having such a strong superordinate 
identity as the national one affects people differently. For some individuals within the 
group, their social identity will simply have more bearing on their other decisions and 
attitudes than it does for others of the same group members (cf. Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle 
and Brown, 1990; Mummendey and Klink, 2001). Thus, as we will argue in the section 
after the next, our personality is likely to moderate the association between national identity 
and economic egalitarianism. First, however, let us introduce the literature on why 
personality should matter for economic attitudes to begin with.  
BRINGING PERSONALITY INTO THE PICTURE 
One of the most well-established findings from the extensive literature in political and 
social psychology is that political and social attitudes, as well as behaviour, are affected not 
only by situational variables such as context and circumstances, but also by our personal 
predispositions, which tend to be remarkably sticky throughout adult life. Conservative 
social attitudes, for example, appear to be consistently related to a greater tendency to avoid 
uncertainty, a higher intolerance of ambiguity, and a stronger reaction to perceived threat 
(cf. Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Jost, Nosek and Gosling, 2008; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). 
This is not to say that we are incapable of consciously changing our attitudes based on 
convincing arguments or evidence, nor to deny that our class, political situation and other 
contextual factors also have a vast influence on our ideological convictions. The point is 
rather that we should expect the link of these latter factors to be moderated by our 
underlying personality traits.   
Over the last few decades, the Big Five model, a more all-encompassing approach to 
systematic personality differences than for example the focus on self-esteem (Sniderman, 
1975) or dogmatism (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1982) in earlier research, has emerged 
as the dominant framework. This approach more clearly separates personality, both 
conceptually and empirically, from the attitudinal and behavioural outcomes it supposedly 
predicts. These five dimensions are also considerably more stable across time and context 
than are other personality facets, such as self-concepts (Caspi, Roberts and Shiner, 2005; 
Gerber et al., 2011, p. 266; McAdams and Pals, 2006; McCrae and Costa, 1996). The Big 
Five model conceptualizes core personality as a combination of five dimensions. Openness 
to Experience, sometimes also called 'intellect', refers to cognitive orientations such as 
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creativity, curiosity, imagination, and non-conformity. Conscientiousness, sometimes also 
referred to as 'prudence' or 'control', relates to responsibility and the willingness and 
capacity to exercise self-discipline in various ways. Emotional Stability, sometimes also 
referred to as the inverse Neuroticism, was initially developed to predict the likelihood that 
soldiers would cope mentally with combat, and thus includes anxiety, excitability, and 
negativity. Agreeableness denotes the tendency to care for others, and thus includes altruistic 
elements, as well as the wish to co-operate. Extraversion, finally, refers to a person's 
communication style; those with high scores on this dimension are sociable and lively in 
their interactions with others.7 The existence of these five factors has been replicated 
across numerous contexts.8 The Big Five personality traits furthermore have a significant 
impact on political orientation towards both social and economic issues on the left-right 
continuum (Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2010; Gerber et al., 2011), attitudes towards 
immigration (Gallego and Pardos, 2014), and prejudice (cf. Akrami, Ekehammar and 
Bergh, 2011; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). The Big Five have also been found to predict 
political participation (cf. Gerber et al., 2011; Mondak, 2010; Mondak and Halperin, 2008). 
Most importantly for our purposes, recent research has been able to show that two of 
the Big Five traits are consistently related to economic attitudes. First, Openness to 
Experience has been found to be associated to support for economic redistribution, 
presumably because such policies are often seen as unconventional, and Openness to 
Experience includes being positive to change and novelty. Perhaps this is also because 
Openness increases a person’s ability to imagine herself or others in a situation of 
economic deprivation, and therefore leads to more concern for those worst off in society. 
Secondly, Conscientiousness is on the contrary linked to resistance towards economic 
redistribution, probably because the focus on self-discipline of those who score high on 
Conscientiousness leads to the endorsement of individual effort, and skepticism against 
what they see as benefits to the lazy (Gerber et al., 2010; Gerber et al., 2011, esp. p. 269 
and 278). The most recent study to our knowledge, finally, found that Agreeableness and 
Neuroticism predict support for economic redistribution as well, presumably because 
those who score high on these dimensions are more altruistic and tender-minded, and 
                                               
 
7 For a longer description, see Mondak and Halperin (2008). 
8 For a review, see John, Naumann and Soto (2008). A few studies, it should also be noted, 
however, argue that there are more (Ashton and Lee, 2005; Paunonen and Jackson, 2000) or fewer 
(Blackburn et al., 2004; Musek, 2007) than five factors.  
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more aware and afraid of risks, respectively, thus leading them to favour a societal safety 
net (Bakker, 2017).  
However, more research is needed regarding these relationships. First, remarkably few 
studies have estimated the link between personality and economic attitudes separately from 
the link to social attitudes, despite the fact that personality does indeed relate differently 
and sometimes inversely to what is left and right for these two policy domains. For 
example, Agreeableness is negatively associated with economic conservatism, but 
positively with social conservatism (Gerber et al., 2010). Secondly, even among those who 
do separate these policy attitudes, not all find evidence that there is in fact a relationship 
between personality and economic attitudes specifically (cf. Carney et al., 2008, p. 825; 
Mondak and Halperin, 2008, p. 355). Hibbing, Smith and Alford (2014, p. 305) even 
suggest that “psychological and biological characteristics are less relevant to economic 
issues (…) than they are to social issues”. Others on the contrary argue that personality 
matters for economic attitudes as well, but in a way that is distinct from the more well-
researched issue of social attitudes (Duckitt and Sibley, 2010; Feldman and Johnston, 
2014). Finally, there is the issue of how personality interacts with situational variables. In 
the US, Conscientiousness is related to right-wing attitudes to economic redistribution only 
for whites, not African-Americans. The reason for this, it has been suggested, is that the 
former but not the latter associate economic redistribution and welfare policies with 
benefits to the supposedly un-disciplined (Gerber et al., 2010; Gerber et al., 2011, p. 275 
and 278). Openness to Experience, finally, predicts support for redistribution in the US, 
but not in Denmark, the UK (Bakker, 2017) or Belgium (Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2004). 
This raises the question of what these relationships look like in other European welfare 
states, which in comparison to the U.S. are less racially divided and historically more 
supportive of a redistributive welfare.  
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND NATIONAL ATTACHMENT 
The previous section suggests that the relationship between personality and economic 
attitudes deserves to be studied more, especially outside of the U.S. We shall now argue 
that there is also reason to expect two personality traits – Openness to Experience and 
Conscientiousness – to moderate the relationship between national attachment and 
egalitarianism. 
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PERSONALITY DOES NOT DETERMINE NATIONAL ATTACHMENT 
At first glance personality might perhaps be considered mainly as an underlying variable, 
which affects both solidarity and one’s level of national attachment directly. We, however, 
expect Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness to moderate the relationship 
between national attachment and the dependent variable, rather than to determine national 
attachment. There are two reasons for this.  
First, consider the evidence from previous research, which to our knowledge has 
studied not how national attachment relates to the Big Five but to the authoritarian 
personality. Huddy and Khatib (2007, p. 72) for example found that a respondent's 
authoritarianism correlated significantly only with nationalism, but not with national 
identity, or national pride. Along similar lines, Schatz and Lavine (2007, p. 342) showed 
authoritarianism to be unrelated to national identity. In their samples, this personality 
measure was not consistently associated even with nationalism. Finally, Schatz, Staub and 
Lavine (1999, p. 167) similarly found that, while right wing authoritarianism was highly and 
positively correlated to blind patriotism, it was not, however, significantly correlated to 
what they call constructive patriotism, which is closer to both national identity and national 
pride, the dimensions of national attachment we will interact with personality. 
Second, we follow previous research in conceptualizing national identity as a social 
identity (Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, 2003, p. 519; also see Huddy, 2001). This 
approach suggests that we should expect national identity to be a much less stable 
characteristic than a person's core personality. We know that, even when we never meet a 
given person, the mere knowledge that we share a social identity with them – even an 
arguably trivial and quickly assembled one – gives rise to a redefinition of the self in terms 
of its social rather than individuated identity, and this in turn makes us act in line with our 
group identification rather than our individual self-interest (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; 
Turner and Giles, 1981). The ease with which in-group favouritism can be manipulated 
has been widely replicated (Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1995), e.g. in a number of different 
national contexts (Brewer and Brown, 1998).9 The applicability of this reasoning to national 
identity specifically is further supported by the fact that many experimental studies manage 
to manipulate the salience of respondents' national identity through rather simple means 
                                               
 
9 For a critique, however, see Ellemers et al. (1999, p. 372). 
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(cf. Butz, Plant and Doerr, 2007; Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015; Robinson, 2016; 
Transue, 2007).  
Summing up, although cultivating a strong national identity may to some extent be more 
appealing to some personalities than others, it makes sense to treat national attachment as 
a partly situational variable that interacts with personality traits, rather than being 
determined by them. Our level of national attachment is likely to be affected by political 
and cultural context; for example, by the extent to which national identity, threats towards 
it, and ways of protecting it are discussed in the national media and by political actors. 
We shall now turn to the two personality traits that we expect to interact with national 
attachment in predicting egalitarianism. 
HOW OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE INTERACTS WITH NATIONAL ATTACHMENT 
Regarding Openness to Experience, there is reason to consider the findings of the 
psychology literature that has studied the links between social identity – sometimes of a 
national kind – and out-group attitudes. This research namely shows that the link between 
group identification and in-group bias, including the tendency to trust and share resources 
with other in-group members, is greater for people who are less individualistic and more 
collectivistic in their self-construals, and thus more sceptical of difference and changes that 
might challenge the status quo. For example, social identity processes have been found to 
affect group members who use intergroup comparisons to sustain their group identity 
more than those who use more absolute standards (Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle and Brown, 
1990).10 In line with this, the aforementioned flag experiment by Butz, Plant and Doerr 
(2007) revealed not only that being exposed to the national flag led to egalitarianism, but 
also that this reminder had a stronger effect on those who scored high on nationalism. 
Being shown the American flag led high scoring nationalists to express less hostility 
towards Arabs and Muslims; but did not have the same effect on individuals who scored 
low on nationalism. Finally, consider the results of Collingwood, Lajevardi and Oskooi 
(2018) from a recent panel study of attitudes to the U.S. travel ban towards individuals 
from seven predominantly Muslim countries, which was issued in February 2017 by 
President Trump. Their conclusion is that the media coverage of the ban as ‘un-American’ 
                                               
 
10 For another application of this to out-group rejection, see Mummendey and Klink (2001). It 
has also been found that members with high conservation values are more threatened by group 
heterogeneity, and this leads them to more negative out-group attitudes (Roccas and Amit, 2011).  
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shifted public opinion from positive to negative, above all for citizens with a strong sense of 
national identity. National identity was thus successfully mobilized to change opinion in a 
more inclusive direction, but this effect was largest for those who identify highly with the 
nation. 
These findings suggest the ‘solidarity boost’ we expect from a stronger sense of national 
identity and pride – to the extent we conceive of this as an in-group bias based on a shared 
social identity – is less likely to occur, the more individualistic people are, and the less keen 
they are to preserve their group identity. Conversely, the more concerned a person is about 
her group identity, and the more sceptical she is of new and different cultural influences 
which might risk changing that identity, the more likely she is to become more positive 
towards redistribution by getting a stronger sense of national attachment. A stronger 
experience of national identity or national pride might namely provide people who focus 
on security and status for their group with a sense of reassurance and comfort, and thus 
make them feel able to 'afford' to share their resources with others in their country. It 
might also make it easier to identify with the plight of those worst off in one’s society. 
People on the lower end of the security and tradition spectrum, on the other hand, who 
are more open to change and less keen on conservation, are not as likely to have this need 
for a sense of shared social – in this case national – identity in order to hold egalitarian 
attitudes. They already imagine the situation of the worst off, and also feel less threatened 
by new reforms. This can be summarized into the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Openness to Experience reduces the effect of national identity and 
national pride on economic egalitarianism. Consequently, the interaction terms for these 
forms of national attachment are negative. 
HOW CONSCIENTIOUSNESS INTERACTS WITH NATIONAL ATTACHMENT 
Finally, recall that persons who score high on Conscientiousness emphasize self-discipline 
and hard work, and that this is believed to be why they tend to hold more right-wing 
attitudes on economic issues. However, the very same people also underline the 
importance of fulfilling their obligations; in fact, one of the measures of this dimension is 
whether or not one tends to shirk one’s duties. This may prove important, given that the 
main mechanism implicit in the theory behind the national identity argument revolves 
around the heightened sense of obligation to one’s co-nationals that a stronger sense of 
national attachment is held to bring along. David Miller for example argues that 'the 
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potency of nationality as a source of personal identity means that its obligations are strongly 
felt' (1995, p. 70). 11  Moreover, this fits well with the empirical literature on in-group 
helping, which shows that holding a strong group identity is related to feeling a greater 
responsibility for helping other group members (Dawes, van de Kragt and Orbell, 1990; 
Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002; Mullen, Brown and Smith, 1992; Ouwekerk, Ellemers 
and De Gilder, 1999). 
From this we can conclude that, while Conscientiousness alone is likely to be associated 
to less egalitarian attitudes, we should expect the interaction between Conscientiousness 
and national identity and national pride to increase egalitarianism, after all, since 
Conscientiousness makes us more concerned with our obligations. Our second hypothesis 
summarizes this expectation:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Conscientiousness increases the effect of national identity and pride on 
economic egalitarianism. Consequently, the interaction terms for these forms of national 
attachment are positive.12 
DATA AND MEASUREMENTS  
Our cross-sectional data consists of five merged subsets of the Dutch LISS (Longitudinal 
Internet Studies for the Social Sciences) panel administered by CentERdata (Tilburg 
University). This panel consists of 4500 households, comprising 7000 individuals. Panel 
members complete online questionnaires of about 15 to 30 minutes in total every month.13 
The sixth wave of the ‘Personality LISS Core Study’ was collected in June 2013 (response 
rate: 90.6%); the second wave of the ‘Nationalism and national dimension of cultural 
                                               
 
11 Also see Canovan (1996, p. 30), Kymlicka (2015, p. 4), and Tamir (1993, pp. 96-98). 
12 Note that we do not believe there are theoretical reasons to expect the remaining personality 
traits (Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Extraversion) to interact with national attachment in 
predicting egalitarianism. This is because although there might, as Bakker (2017) found, be a 
positive link that runs from Neuroticism and Agreeableness, respectively, to egalitarianism, the 
underlying mechanisms behind such a relationship seem unrelated to the social identity that 
national attachment constitutes. In the case of Neuroticism, such a relationship rather has to do 
with the likelihood that being more aware of risks will also make a person more prone to valuing a 
societal safety net. In the case of Agreeableness, it is rather a matter of a more general 
tendermindedness which leads to egalitarian attitudes in general, presumably towards co-nationals 
and non-nationals alike.  
13 More information on the original sample and the recruitment process is available online: see 
CentERdata. 2013, esp. 
https://www.lissdata.nl/sites/default/files/bestanden/Sample%20and%20Recruitment_1.pdf 
[Last accessed 10 November 2017]. 
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consumption’ survey in September 2013 response rate: 88.8%; the ‘Perceptions of the 
determinants of economic success and demand for redistribution of income’ in February 
2013 (response rate: 80.4%); and the sixth wave of the ‘Income’ core study in June and 
July 2013 (response rate: 78.4%). As the data collection period only differs by up to six 
months, we do not expect any statistically significant variation over time that might bias 
our estimates.  
National Attachment: We measure national identity by the standardized factor score 
of responses to the following two statements: “My Dutch identity is an important part of 
me”, and “I feel truly connected to other Dutch people” (Cronbach’s alpha 0.73). In 
contrast to Gallego and Pardos (2014), we prefer a two-dimensional indicator that excludes 
the statement “I am glad to be Dutch”, since a sense of national identity needs not be 
positive by definition. To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we also run the same 
model with a 3-dimensional indicator of national identity, including “I am glad to be 
Dutch” (Table 3.5 in the appendix). The original responses were measured on a five-point 
scale, ranging from “disagree entirely” to “agree entirely”. For the construction of the 
latent variable the middle category of “neither agree nor disagree” is always coded as not 
agreeing. We measure national pride with the five-item response scale to the question 
“How proud are you to be a Dutch citizen?”, ranging from “disagree entirely” to “agree 
entirely”. The statement “On the whole, the Netherlands is a better country than most 
other countries’ captures nationalistic ideology, which is more an issue of comparing one’s 
nation to others than of perceiving it to provide an important part of one’s identity (cf. 
Huddy and Khatib, 2007). As already outlined in the introduction, this measurement is 
problematic, as it is unclear what it actually captures. So, nationalism should be treated as 
both a robustness check and as effort to better connect to the existing literature on national 
attachment. 
Dependent Variable: Economic egalitarianism. We test the empirical relationship 
with two different dependent variables, which are identical or consistent with the standard 
outcome variable used by other comparable studies (cf. Bakker, 2017; Hjerm and Schnabel, 
2012; Shayo, 2009; and Wright and Reeskens, 2013). The first dependent variable is 
measured as the response to the statement “It is the government’s responsibility to reduce 
the difference in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes” 
on a 5-point scale (ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree). This measure has 
been extensively used in public opinion surveys, such as in the ISSP ‘role of government’ 
modules in 1985, 1990, and 1996, in particular to assess within-country variation of 
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egalitarian preferences. The second dependent variable is also constructed as a 5-point 
scale with the same answer code as the first dependent variable and the statement: “The 
government should reduce the income differences between people, even if it means that 
people with high incomes lose some purchasing power”. The mean of both variables is 
about the same but the second, slightly more controversial, dependent variable denotes a 
higher variance that we can exploit for our models. We also run probit models to 
demonstrate the robustness of our findings. Here, the middle categories (“neither agree 
nor disagree”) for both variables are coded as disagreement.  
Personality Dimensions: The Big Five character traits were measured using 50 items 
(10 items per domain) from the common IPIP framework (Goldberg et al., 2006). 
Respondents were told: “Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each 
statement describes you”. The response options ranged from 1 “very inaccurate” to 5 “very 
accurate”. In the regression models, we use dummy variables for each of the aggregated 
personality dimensions with 1 representing a personality trait above the mean. To display 
the average marginal associations conditional on the level of Conscientiousness and 
Openness to Experience, we split the personality indicators into quintiles.  
Controls: We measure ideology with the help of self-placement on the left right scale. 
The question wording was: “Where would you place yourself on the scale below, where 0 
means left and 10 means right”. While some previous studies of the link between national 
attachment and egalitarianism fail to control for ideology (e.g. Shayo, 2009), we include it 
in our models, as those who place oneself to the right politically, show higher levels in all 
dimensions of national attachment and are less supportive of redistribution (cf. Miller and 
Ali, 2014). Besides political ideology, income levels constitute an important control as they 
are strongly correlated with redistributive preferences and with Openness to Experience, 
one of our main independent variables. Further controls include age, gender, as well as 
educational level.   
Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics of all measures that we use as independent, 
dependent, and control variables. Note that the mean level of support for the principle of 
economic redistribution in our sample is high: 3.43 out of a maximum of 5. National 
attachment is not as positively skewed, but the mean levels are still as high as 1.15 out of a 
maximum of 2 for the two-dimensional national identity indicator, 1.75 out of a maximum 
of 3 for national pride, and 3.09 out of a maximum of 5 for nationalism.  
From Table 3.2, which displays the bivariate correlations, we can first note that 
redistributive preferences are not directly correlated with any of our three dimensions of 
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national attachment. Second, the correlations between redistributive preferences and 
personality are very low or even non-significant. Conscientiousness is positively correlated 
with national identity and pride, but not with nationalism, in our dataset. The correlations 
with Openness to Experience, however, are either insignificant (national identity) or very 
weak (national pride and nationalism). All levels of national attachment are correlated with 
placing oneself towards the right end of the ideological spectrum, as is Conscientiousness. 
Openness to Experience is on the contrary correlated with placing oneself more towards 
the left, in line with what we know from previous research (Gerber et al., 2010; Gerber et 
al., 2011).  
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Table 3.3 displays the results of the OLS regressions of national attachment and personality 
on our two dependent variables of egalitarian attitudes. Our results are independent of 
various specifications, such as including “I am glad to be Dutch’ in national identity, and 
hold for non-linear (probit) models (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5 in the appendix).  
Judging from the baseline model (1) without any controls, it would seem that national 
identity has a positive association with egalitarianism, while for both national pride and 
nationalism these relationships are on the contrary negative. However, as soon as we add 
background variables and ideology as controls to our model (2), these associations lose 
their significance. This suggests that the correlations in the baseline model were spurious 
and driven by the three variables which now show a significant negative correlation with 
pro-redistributive preferences: income, placing oneself more to the right ideologically, and 
being male. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Variable name N Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
It is the government’s responsibility to 
reduce the difference in income between 
people with high incomes and those with 
low incomes. 
Redis 1,273 3.434 1.101 1 5 
The government should reduce the income 
differences between people, even if it 
means that people with high incomes lose 
some purchasing power 
Redis2 1,273 3.434 1.169 1 5 
National identity (2-dimensional indicator: 
Ni7 + Ni8) 
Ni2 1,233 1.15 .868 0 2 
My Dutch identity is an important part of 
me  
Ni7    1,271 .631 .483 0 1 
I really feel connected to other Dutch 
people 
Ni8 1,271 .518 .500 0 1 
National identity (3-dimensional indicator: 
Ni6 + Ni7 + Ni8) 
Ni3  1,231 1.909 1.175 0 3 
I am happy to be Dutch  Ni6 1,251    .754 .43    0 1 
National pride  Pride 1,251 1.753 .8625 0 3 
Nationalism Nationalism 1,221 3.089 1.017 1 5 
Education Edu 1,273 2.701 1.474 1 6 
Income  Income 1,196 1.595 1.143 0 4 
Political Ideology Lrscale 1,072 5.237 2.157 0 10 
Age Age 1,273 54.667 16.4 17 89 
Gender  Gndr 1,273 1.549 .499 1 2 
Openness to Experience Open 1,270 .45 .497 0 1 
Conscientiousness Consc 1,270 .531 .499 0 1 
Agreeableness Agreea 1,273 .567 .495 0 1 
Extraversion Extra 1,273 .480 .499 0 1 
Neuroticism Neuro 1,270 .429 .495 0 1 
 
When we add the Big Five to our model (3), it becomes clear that in our Dutch sample, 
the direct association between Openness to Experience and redistribution is significant 
and negative. This result differs both from the positive correlation found in the US (Gerber 
et al., 2010; Gerber et al., 2011, p. 275 and 278) and from the lack of a significant correlation 
found in Denmark, the UK (Bakker, 2017) and Belgium (Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2004). 
The other direct significant association we find with personality in model 3, by contrast, 
corroborates the results from other European countries: in line with previous findings by 
Bakker (2017), we too find that Agreeableness is positively associated to preferences for 
redistribution.  
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Table 3.3. Regression Results of OLS Models: (2-Dimensional Indicator for National 
Identity)a  
Model 1 
Baseline  
2 Adding 
Controls 
3 Adding 
personality 
4 Adding 
interactions 
5 Adding 
interactions 
6 Interactions 
with 2nd dv 
7 Interactions 
with 2nd dv 
Dependent variable Redis Redis Redis Redis Redis Redis2 Redis2 
National identity  0.166* 0.0739 0.0840 0.0795 0.106 0.0952 0.113 
 (0.0917) (0.0968) (0.0974) (0.0982) (0.141) (0.104) (0.145) 
National pride -0.0814* -0.0201 -0.0239 -0.0225 -0.0256 -0.0613 -0.0453 
 (0.0486) (0.0511) (0.0521) (0.0773) (0.0518) (0.0792) (0.0563) 
Nationalism -0.0412 0.00186 0.00105 -0.00727 -0.00344 0.0338 0.0370 
 (0.0348) (0.0351) (0.0357) (0.0354) (0.0356) (0.0378) (0.0380) 
Education  -0.0223 -0.00964 -0.00800 -0.00986 -0.0609** -0.0631** 
  (0.0252) (0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0281) (0.0281) 
Income  -0.161*** -0.151*** -0.158*** -0.155*** -0.121*** -0.118*** 
  (0.0355) (0.0357) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0377) (0.0379) 
Political ideology  -0.163*** -0.164*** -0.162*** -0.163*** -0.169*** -0.170*** 
  (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0175) (0.0174) 
Age  0.00834*** 0.00747*** 0.00727*** 0.00738*** 0.0150*** 0.0151*** 
  (0.00223) (0.00226) (0.00225) (0.00225) (0.00235) (0.00236) 
Gender  -0.141* -0.173** -0.179** -0.180** -0.160** -0.163** 
  (0.0765) (0.0776) (0.0775) (0.0773) (0.0803) (0.0803) 
Openness to experience   -0.203*** 0.155 -0.0236 0.226 0.103 
   (0.0745) (0.150) (0.116) (0.164) (0.121) 
Conscientiousness   -0.0419 -0.363** -0.182* -0.333** -0.151 
   (0.0685) (0.148) (0.109) (0.163) (0.118) 
Agreeableness   0.152** 0.149** 0.145* 0.0950 0.0894 
   (0.0745) (0.0740) (0.0743) (0.0762) (0.0765) 
Extraversion   -0.0287 -0.0195 -0.0229 -0.0711 -0.0733 
   (0.0700) (0.0698) (0.0700) (0.0731) (0.0734) 
Neuroticism   0.0342 0.0349 0.0350 0.0133 0.0137 
   (0.0672) (0.0669) (0.0671) (0.0701) (0.0702) 
Openness to experience 
x national pride 
   -0.208***  -0.182**  
    (0.0768)  (0.0828)  
Openness x national 
identity  
    -0.306**  -0.323* 
     (0.155)  (0.167) 
Conscientiousness x 
national pride 
   0.187**  0.197**  
    (0.0795)  (0.0834)  
Conscientiousness x 
national identity 
    0.243  0.273 
     (0.157)  (0.166) 
Constant 3.605*** 4.338*** 4.427*** 4.452*** 4.443*** 4.018*** 3.985*** 
 (0.109) (0.236) (0.241) (0.257) (0.244) (0.271) (0.256) 
        
Observations 1,210 988 985 985 985 985 985 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.143 0.150 0.159 0.153 0.180 0.176 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1    
aOrdinary least square regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Most importantly, models 4 to 7, which include our interactions, provide clear support for 
hypothesis 1: Openness to Experience does indeed moderate the relationship between 
both national pride and national identity, on the one hand, and economic egalitarianism, 
on the other, and it does so in the expected negative direction. This can be seen from the 
negative and statistically significant interaction coefficients of Openness to Experience and 
national pride (models 4 and 6), and of Openness to Experience and national identity 
(models 5 and 7) in Table 3.3. This relationship is further illustrated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2, 
which display the average marginal associations between national identity and national 
pride, respectively, and egalitarian preferences, conditional on Openness to Experience. 
Figure 3.1 for example allows us to conclude that national identity is positively associated 
to supporting redistribution for the 40% of the population who score low on Openness to 
Experience, as can be seen from the fact that the confidence intervals for the first two 
quintiles on the x axis do not overlap with zero on the y axis. In short, for this group of 
people, increasing the strength of national identity tends to significantly raise the support 
for redistribution. For people who score higher on Openness to Experience, by contrast, 
we cannot be confident that the relationship between national identity and redistribution 
preferences is significantly different from null.14 In comparison to someone who expresses 
an average level of national identity, the predicted difference in redistribution preferences 
for a person who scores one standard deviation above the mean on the national identity 
indicator (ni2) and expresses a low level of Openness to Experience (sd: 0.44; marginal 
effect: 0.35) is 0.15 (Figure 3.1). This effect is substantive, as the effect size is comparable 
to the marginal effect of a change in one standard deviation in income (0.17), which counts 
as one of the strongest predictors of redistributive preferences. The results are also stable 
for probit models (see Table 3.4 as well as Figures 3.5 and 3.6 in the appendix).  
 
 
 
                                               
 
14  The association is robust and remains even if we omit national pride from all models (Table 
3.6 and Figure 3.7 in the appendix). The same holds if we run models that include the 3-dimensional 
indicator of national identity (Table 3.5 in the appendix). 
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Figure 3.1. Average Marginal Effect of National Identity on Egalitarian Preferences by 
Openness to Experience 
 
Figure 3.2. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Egalitarian Preferences by 
Openness to Experience 
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With regard to our second hypothesis, the results are less consistent. On the one hand, in 
line with our expectations, the coefficients for the interaction terms of Conscientiousness 
with national pride are positive and statistically significant (Table 3: models 4 and 6). For 
example, if an individual’s level in national pride increases by one unit (sd: 0.86) and 
Conscientiousness is high, the predicted change in redistribution preferences accounts for 
an increase of 0.14 units (model 4). On the other hand, the coefficients for the interaction 
terms of Conscientiousness with national identity are insignificant (models 5 and 7), except 
for in model 7 in Table 3.5 where we do find the expected positive association (see the 
appendix).  
Figure 3.3. Average Marginal Effect of National Identity on Egalitarian Preferences by 
Conscientiousness 
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 also illustrate that the average marginal associations of both national 
pride and national identity are statistically insignificant. Moreover, the interaction terms for 
national pride fit better into our models, but lead to less intuitive total marginal associations 
of national pride. Finally, although the results of the interaction terms are as expected, the 
overall association with support for redistribution is negative when Openness to 
Experience is high or Conscientiousness is low. 
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Figure 3.4. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Egalitarian Preferences by 
Conscientiousness 
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
We have offered the first theoretical discussion and empirical study of how personality 
interplays with national attachment in shaping economic egalitarianism. Our main 
conclusion is that national identity and pride are indeed associated with support for 
redistribution, but only for those who score low on Openness to Experience. The evidence 
for such an interaction is consistent and robust. We believe the mechanism behind this 
relationship is that national identity and pride provide these individuals with a feeling of 
reassurance in their social identity that in turn counteracts the tendency to ‘hunker down’ 
in the face of increasing diversity. The sense of group identity that a strong national identity 
provides might also make it easier for people who score low on Openness to imagine 
themselves in the shoes of those who are worst off in society. By contrast, individuals who 
are more open-minded and curious, and thus score higher on Openness to Experience, do 
not get the same ‘solidarity boost’ from a stronger sense of national belonging. This could 
be because their social identities are not as crucial for determining their other attitudes, and 
because they don’t have the same need for a shared group identity in order to imagine 
themselves in the situation of those who are on the receiving end of economic 
redistribution.  
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We also developed the theory that those high on Conscientiousness might experience a 
heightened sense of obligation to care for their co-nationals, but did not find clear evidence 
for this hypothesis. Although the interaction terms between Conscientiousness and 
national pride were statistically significant, we did not find the same strong evidence for an 
interaction between this personality trait and national attachment. Not finding the expected 
marginal associations, displayed in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, is mainly driven by the different 
relationship between Conscientiousness and our dependent variables when national pride 
is very low. However, as this case is very infrequent (N=96) this difference has a small 
impact on our calculation of the average marginal associations. This warrants further 
research, especially since Conscientiousness seems to capture much of what theorists of 
liberal nationalism assume to be the mechanism that links national attachment to 
egalitarianism: a heightened sense of obligation to one’s co-nationals (cf. Kymlicka 2015, 
4; Miller 1995, 70). Disentangling the different mechanisms that might be at play here is a 
crucial task for future research. 
Our findings suggest that there is reason to take seriously the ‘national identity 
argument’, e.g. the central assumption in the theory of liberal nationalism that national 
identity is beneficial for solidarity (Miller and Ali, 2014). Previous work seeking to 
empirically test the national identity argument has found that, with the exception of Canada 
(Johnston et al., 2010), national attachment has no significant effect on support for 
government spending (Citrin, Wong and Duff, 2001), or even decreases support for 
redistribution, in cross-national studies (Shayo, 2009; Wright and Reeskens, 2013), as well 
as within the US (Johnston et al., 2017; Theiss-Morse, 2009), the UK (Martinez-Herrera, 
2010), and Denmark (Breidahl, Holtug and Kongshoj, 2018). On the other hand, 
experimental studies tend to find that raising the salience of national identity does in fact 
heighten concerns for equality and justice (Butz, Plant and Doerr, 2007), support for 
redistribution (Transue, 2007) and willingness to help otherwise rivalling groups 
economically (Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015). It is not easy to know, however, which 
aspect of national attachment that is being primed in these studies, especially since recent 
work has suggested that different primes, such as flags v. national landscapes, increase the 
salience of rather different aspects of national attachment with divergent results for 
solidarity (Gangl, Torgler and Kirchler, 2016). 
In contrast to both these types of studies, we have taken care to separate between the 
three different dimensions of national attachment that previous research has found to have 
divergent effects on other outcomes, such as political participation (Huddy and Khatib, 
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2007) and attitudes to immigration (Jeong, 2013). Based on social identity theory, we 
expected national identity (1) and national pride (2) to be positively related to egalitarian 
attitudes, while we did not expect the same for nationalism, and thus included it as a control 
in our models. Thus, in contrast to all of the aforementioned studies, we can be more 
certain of which of the different dimensions of national attachment that is responsible for 
the link to egalitarianism that we find. Moreover, we developed and found empirical 
support for the theory that since such social identities tend to affect individuals differently 
depending on their core personality, the link between national identity and pride to 
egalitarianism is conditional on personality.  
By choosing as our context the relatively civic national identity of the Netherlands 
(Kohn, 1944; Larsen, 2017), we suggest it can be assumed that the type of nationhood that 
the respondents in our sample report feeling attached to, or proud of, is typically more 
civic than ethnic, as was discussed in the introduction. However, we are aware that there 
is also a great deal of variation within each country regarding such conceptions of national 
identity. Although the LISS data we have used did not allow us to study such variation at 
the individual level, and it is not clear to us how exactly personality would interact with 
these different normative understandings of nationhood, we encourage future research to 
consider this. Perhaps, for example, the negative link that has been found between ethnic 
and cultural conceptions of national identity and egalitarianism (Breidahl, Holtug and 
Kungshoj, 2018; Wright and Reeskens, 2013) is also in turn affected by core personality?  
We have assumed that the direction of causality runs from personality and national 
attachment to egalitarianism. Given that we only use cross-sectional survey data, we cannot 
exclude the possibility of reverse causality. However, our interpretation of the direction of 
this relationship is supported by the fact that personality stabilizes itself already early in 
life, and thus precedes more fluctuating and issue-specific attitudes, such as support for 
economic redistribution (Caspi, Roberts and Shiner, 2005). Another possible objection is 
that those in favour of redistribution might become more proud to be Dutch, and have a 
stronger Dutch identity, because of the redistributive policies that the Dutch welfare state 
pursues. On the other hand, such convinced egalitarians could also show less national pride 
and identity for the reason that they think these policies are not sufficiently redistributive. In 
any case, both the correlations and regression coefficients we report reveal that the direct 
associations between economic egalitarianism and national identity as well as national pride 
are modest at best.  
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Finally, our findings also shed light on a second literature: the one on personality and its 
links to political attitudes, which has only recently begun to separate economic from the 
more studies social attitudes. Some studies have concluded that economic attitudes are not 
in fact affected by personality (Carney et al., 2008, p.825; Mondak and Halperin, 2008, 
p.355). Our findings suggest that this would be a mistaken conclusion, but that this link 
also depends on context. While Gerber and colleagues (2010, 2011) found that in the U.S., 
Openness to Experience is positively associated to support for redistribution, and Bakker 
(2017) found no such link in Denmark or the UK, in our Dutch sample Openness in fact 
turned out to have a considerable negative association with support for redistribution, before 
taking into account the interactions with national attachment. This is noteworthy and 
possibly suggests that redistributive policies are considered the conventional, safe option 
in the Dutch context, so that individuals who value new ideas are less likely to support 
them. We also found that Conscientiousness has a negative association with support for 
such policies only when national pride is low. This suggests that in the Netherlands, 
attitudes towards redistribution do not reflect one’s underlying view of hard work, and 
whether or not to allow benefits for those supposedly lazy minorities who one suspects 
shun it, as it has been argued is the case for white Americans (Gerber et al. 2011, p. 278). 
Nor did we find the positive effect of Neuroticism found in previous studies. The only 
result from Bakker’s recent study (2017) based on European data that we are able to 
replicate with some robustness is that Agreeableness is related to support for economic 
redistribution. These differences, and the country-level variations that may explain some 
of them, constitute an important avenue for future research on personality and economic 
attitudes. 
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Table 3.6. O
LS M
odels: N
ational Identity and Personality on Egalitarianism
 (Tw
o-Item
 Indicator) (A
ll M
odels W
ithout N
ational Pride) a 
M
odel 
1 B
aseline 
2 A
dding controls 
3 A
dding personality 
4 A
dding interactions 
6 Interactions w
ith 2
nd dv 
D
ependent variable 
R
edis 
R
edis 
R
edis 
R
edis 
R
edis2 
N
ational identity 
0.0727 
0.0442 
0.0500 
0.0663 
0.0587 
 
(0.0750) 
(0.0796) 
(0.0809) 
(0.130) 
(0.132) 
N
ationalism
 
-0.0556* 
-0.00195 
-0.00411 
-0.00842 
0.0267 
 
(0.0334) 
(0.0337) 
(0.0344) 
(0.0343) 
(0.0363) 
Education 
 
-0.0219 
-0.00941 
-0.00954 
-0.0654** 
 
 
(0.0248) 
(0.0256) 
(0.0256) 
(0.0277) 
Incom
e 
 
-0.160*** 
-0.151*** 
-0.154*** 
-0.116*** 
 
 
(0.0353) 
(0.0355) 
(0.0356) 
(0.0375) 
Political ideology 
 
-0.163*** 
-0.164*** 
-0.164*** 
-0.170*** 
 
 
(0.0163) 
(0.0162) 
(0.0162) 
(0.0171) 
A
ge 
 
0.00838*** 
0.00753*** 
0.00746*** 
0.0150*** 
 
 
(0.00220) 
(0.00224) 
(0.00222) 
(0.00234) 
G
ender 
 
-0.143* 
-0.172** 
-0.180** 
-0.155* 
 
 
(0.0761) 
(0.0770) 
(0.0767) 
(0.0797) 
O
penness to experience 
 
 
-0.198*** 
-0.0259 
0.119 
 
 
 
(0.0740) 
(0.115) 
(0.120) 
C
onscientiousness 
 
 
-0.0488 
-0.187* 
-0.161 
 
 
 
(0.0680) 
(0.108) 
(0.117) 
A
greeableness 
 
 
0.146** 
0.141* 
0.0794 
 
 
 
(0.0741) 
(0.0739) 
(0.0764) 
Extraversion 
 
 
-0.0316 
-0.0265 
-0.0791 
 
 
 
(0.0693) 
(0.0692) 
(0.0723) 
N
euroticism
 
 
 
0.0297 
0.0305 
0.0170 
 
 
 
(0.0668) 
(0.0667) 
(0.0697) 
O
penness to experience x national identity 
 
 
 
-0.293* 
-0.330** 
 
 
 
 
(0.154) 
(0.165) 
C
onscientiousness x national identity 
 
 
 
0.239 
0.271 
 
 
 
 
(0.155) 
(0.165) 
C
onstant 
3.561*** 
4.333*** 
4.423*** 
4.439*** 
3.974*** 
 
(0.106) 
(0.232) 
(0.238) 
(0.241) 
(0.253) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bservations 
1,217 
994 
991 
991 
991 
A
djusted R2 
0.001 
0.144 
0.151 
0.154 
0.175 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1  aO
rdinary least square regressions w
ith robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 3.5. 95% Confidence Intervals for Average Marginal Associations of National 
Identity on Egalitarianism by Openness to Experience (Probit Models) 
 
 
Figure 3.6. 95% Confidence Intervals for Average Marginal Associations of National 
Pride on Egalitarianism by Openness to Experience (Probit Models) 
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Figure 3.7. 95% Confidence Intervals for Average Marginal Associations with National 
Identity on Egalitarian Preferences by Openness to Experience (Without Variable on 
National Pride) 
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4. CHAPTER 4: PRIDE AND 
PREJUDICE – WHEN CAN 
NATIONAL PRIDE REDUCE ANTI- 
IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS? 
ABSTRACT 
Strong national pride is often thought to increase anti-immigrant sentiments and reduce 
the inclusiveness of political community for immigrants in countries with low levels of 
average ethnic national attachment – i.e., in most developed democracies. Observational 
data from different datasets suggests a markedly different pattern. National pride goes 
along with lower or at least not higher anti-immigrant sentiments for those citizens who 
embrace an ethnic conception of national attachment. Consequently, the absence rather 
than the abundance of national pride towards one’s nation is associated with culturally 
motivated anti-immigrant sentiments for the group that is opposed the most to 
immigration. My theoretical framework disentangles the role different dimensions of 
national attachment play for anti-immigrant sentiments and suggests that in particular for 
citizens who embrace an exclusive form of national attachment, national pride leads to 
lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments if this group is in the minority. I use two different 
datasets (EVS 2008 and ISSP 2013) with several different dependent variables and 
specifications to provide evidence for this empirical regularity.  
 
Keywords: National identity, national pride, immigration, anti-immigrant sentiments, 
intergroup bias.  
INTRODUCTION  
On average more than half of the citizenry of democratic countries state that ethnicity 
matters for being a citizen of one’s own country (EVS 2008, ISSP 2013). This group is 
most opposed to immigration and often concerned with a loss of their national identity in 
the context of increasingly multi-ethnic societies. In countries with low average levels of 
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overall ethnic national attachment - i.e., in most developed democracies – this group feels 
not only threatened by immigration but also compromised by the majority of citizens who 
embrace a predominantly civic form of national attachment.  
In this context, increasing levels of national pride are usually thought to reinforce this 
pattern. In contrast to this, I put forward the hypothesis that for this group of citizens, 
national pride has the counterintuitive effect of reducing anti-immigrant sentiments. I 
argue that this pattern prevails because these individuals perceive immigrants mainly as a 
symbolic threat, e.g. a threat to the in-group’s values or norms, rather than as a realistic threat, 
reflecting concerns about economic competition. Increasing group esteem in the form of 
national pride reduces the perception of immigrants as symbolic threat: where national 
pride is thought to be most detrimental for attitudes towards immigrants, it can be the 
most helpful.  
I use the concept of national attachment as an umbrella term for different identity 
dimensions. I differentiate between cognitive, affirmative, and evaluative dimensions of national 
attachment. The cognitive dimension refers to the content of national attachment, e.g. ethnic 
or civic forms (What characteristics matter to “truly” count as a co-national?). The 
affirmative dimension national identity describes the salience of national attachment (How 
important is national attachment?). The evaluative dimension national pride captures the 
emotionality of national attachment (To what extent is national attachment associated with 
positive feelings?). Ethnic national attachment is represented by the idea of common 
descent as an essential criterion for truly being a member of one’s country (e.g. Berg and 
Hjerm, 2010, p. 396). In the following, I define individuals who strongly support this 
statement as “high ethnic individuals”. Finally, I define feeling as a feeling or belief of 
superiority and contempt for foreigners or other political communities. 
Many researchers believe that some forms of national attachment - if beneficial to in-
group co-operation at all - have the potential for out-group derogation. Consequently, 
critics argue that although some forms of national attachment might strengthen solidarity 
within a political community, they might reduce the inclusiveness for immigrants (Tajfel, 
1969b; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). The literature agrees that ethnic national 
attachment is positively associated with anti-immigrant). The effect of national pride on 
anti-immigrant sentiments, however, is ambiguous. Here, I explain this ambiguity with the 
help of two distinctions. First, I argue that the effect of national pride depends on the 
individual conception of one’s national in-group: national pride is associated with lower 
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anti-immigrant sentiments for citizens who embrace an ethnic conception of national 
attachment. Second, I suggest that this holds only true for countries with low average levels 
of ethnic national attachment, e.g. where high ethnic individuals embrace a different 
conception of national attachment than the majority of the citizenry. This country context 
is important for two reasons: first, high ethnic individuals perceive their conception of 
national attachment as contested within their country and more likely perceive themselves 
as a minority. This strengthens the relevance to be a member of this group (Kelly, 1990), 
which in turn leads to stronger out-group hostility. Second, in low ethnic countries, 
national attachment is of less present in public space. Compared to individuals who 
embrace more inclusive forms of national attachment, high ethnic individuals attribute 
more importance to national belonging in general (higher salience, i.e. national identity). 
Such high salience at the individual level increases the need for a conscious positive feeling 
towards one’s nation in the form of national pride to perceive oneself as a member of a 
political community. This is how I explain the ambiguous relationship between national 
pride and prejudice by offering a new and counterintuitive explanation of the role of 
national pride.  
I use recent survey data from the ISSP 2013 and the EVS 2008 study, cross-validate 
measures with other sources, and use random effects models to account for country-
specific unobserved effects in order to maximise the external validity of my findings. The 
results are statistically significant, substantive, and independent of most specifications and 
models.  
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE  
For Albert Einstein, most forms of national attachment needed to be overcome and even 
national pride was the evil twin of nationalism. Diderot went further and considered 
feelings of national pride as immoral, Lessing viewed any form of national pride as 
“heroical weakness” (Stewart, 1971, p. 618). A large body of evidence supports these – to 
put it mildly – concerns that policies fostering national attachment increase anti-immigrant 
sentiments (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009; Reeskens and Wright, 2013). In the 
recent past, however, research focussing on particular dimensions of national attachment 
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depicts a more ambiguous picture (e.g. Hjerm, 1998; Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Mayda, 
2006; Jeong, 2013; Miller and Ali, 2014).15 
Civic forms of national attachment decrease, ethnic forms increase anti-immigrant 
sentiments. Intuitively, the effect of national pride on anti-immigrant sentiments, 
understood as the unfounded belief that immigrants have negative effects on the recipient’s 
country economy or society or are a threat to national culture, should depend on the object 
of national pride. If I am proud of my country’s distinct culture or history, high levels of 
national pride are expected to be associated with strong anti-immigrant sentiments, 
whereas citizens who embrace civic conceptions of national attachment might be more 
ambivalent towards the effects of immigration. This is supported by Pehrson, Vignoles, 
and Brown (2009) who show that the correlation between national attachment and anti-
immigrant sentiments ranged from weakly negative (–.06) to moderately positive (.37) with 
a stronger relationship in countries where people on average endorsed a concept of 
nationhood based more on language, and weaker when national identity was based on civic 
elements.16 Hjerm (1998) also demonstrates that whereas ethnic national attachment and 
pride increase anti-immigrant sentiments, civic forms decrease them. These relationships 
are independent of differences in country-specific conceptualizations of the nation-state 
(Hjerm, 1998, pp. 344–45). Pehrson et al. (2009) also show that the cognitive dimension 
of national attachment matters on whether in-group identification leads to out-group 
derogation. Only national attachment based on essentialist, e.g. unchangeable attributes 
such as ethnicity lead to out-group derogation.  
Nationalism increases, national pride decreases anti-immigrant sentiments. 
Another common distinction centres on the difference between nationalism and national 
pride. National pride is closest to what many authors call patriotism (Huddy and Khatib, 
2007, p. 64), although recent research tends to differentiate between various forms of 
patriotism.17 In contrast to national pride, nationalism is strongly positively correlated with 
anti-immigrant sentiments. These findings go in line with Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) 
who also demonstrate that - in contrast to nationalism – national pride does not increase 
                                               
 
15 I explain the different concepts of national attachment in more detail in the “concepts” 
section. Table 4.2 also provides an overview of all concepts. 
16  Unfortunately, the authors did not differentiate between national pride and national 
attachment, since they constructed a two-dimensional item with the mean of both affirmative 
measures. 
17 See introduction for a longer discussion. 
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prejudice. Jeong (2013) and Johnston et al. (2010) also argue for a more nuanced view on 
the effect of national attachment on anti-immigrant sentiments. Jeong (2013) shows that 
nationalism increases anti-immigrant sentiments, while national pride leads to pro-
immigrant sentiments. Johnston et al. (2010) provide evidence that this holds true for 
Canada. In particular, with Canada putting recent emphasis on migration in their national 
history, this case provides a good example for establishing a pro-immigrant national 
narrative that leads to strong and inclusive forms of national attachment.  
Civic national attachment can also increase anti-immigrant sentiments. Wright 
and Reeskens (2013) argue that both civic and ethnic forms of national attachment predict 
an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments. The authors conclude that “symbolic boundaries 
around one’s national in-group, whatever those boundaries might be, has an exclusionary 
effect with regard to immigrants” (2013, p. 1457). Mayda (2006, p. 514) also shows that 
national pride has a small but positive effect on anti-immigrant sentiments. However, many 
variables that are coded as national pride in other models (e.g. Table 4: 526) measure partly 
nationalist concepts (e.g., “country better than others”).  
The effect of national pride on anti-immigrant sentiments remains 
contradictory. Some studies even find contradictory evidence for the same country. For 
example, in Germany some studies find a negative relationship (Blank and Schmidt, 1993; 
Heyder and Schmidt, 2002), no relationship at all (Citrin, Wong and Duff, 2001; Karasawa, 
2002), or even positive associations between national pride and the acceptance of right-
wing ideology (Cohrs et al., 2004; see also Wagner et al., 2012), which is one of the 
strongest predictors for anti-immigrant sentiments.  
Overall, the effect of national pride on anti-immigrant sentiment remains ambiguous. 
Explanations for this ambiguity are scarce and part of it can be ascribed to a partly 
imprudent use of measures for national pride. Another source of ambiguity could simply 
be: national pride implies different things in different countries. For example, German 
citizens seem to have a different relationship towards national pride than Americans. Even 
within countries, ostensibly identical concepts of national attachment may have 
considerably different meanings among different social groups (Lewin-Epstein and 
Levanon, 2005). For Israel, the authors provide one of the rare cases where ethnic anational 
attachment is negatively related to xenophobia among veterans. The unique character of 
the country can explain this outlier, as Jewish immigrants are often perceived as members 
of the political community although they are not (yet) citizens. This may be an extreme 
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case but suggests that challenges of measurement are more complex than previously 
thought.  
Besides making a clear conceptual distinction between affirmative (national identity) 
evaluative (national pride) and cognitive dimensions of national attachment (What is the 
content of national attachment: ethnic, cultural, or civic conceptions of national 
attachment?), I suggest that national pride alters group esteem of the national in-group. 
Increased group esteem, in turn, reduces perceptions of immigrants as a symbolic threat, 
which is the highest for high ethnic individuals. In short, I will argue that for high ethnic 
individuals, higher levels of national pride result in lower levels of out-group derogation in 
the form of anti-immigrant sentiments.  
CONCEPTS: NATIONAL ATTACHMENT, NATIONAL PRIDE, AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT 
SENTIMENTS  
Anti-immigrant sentiments arise in four interrelated but still distinct forms: first, in 
opposing immigration or in denying the right to immigrate; second, in the concern about 
the consequences of immigration; third, in the denial of certain individual rights towards 
legal immigrants; fourth, in negative stereotypes about immigrants. Here, I focus on the 
second and third forms of anti-immigrant sentiments. Of course, statements about the 
harmful effects of immigrants do not need to be driven by prejudice: one could embrace 
the statement that immigrants are a burden to the welfare system while being in favour of 
large-scale immigration. Nonetheless, by using different dependent variables as well as 
controls, such variation within each country helps to isolate the part of the variation that 
is driven by prejudice. Here, the term prejudice implies that the motives for the attribution 
of unfavourable characteristics to a group are unjustified or irrational. Anti-immigrant 
sentiments matter for the inclusiveness of advanced democracies as the citizens with such 
feelings also have stronger preferences for more restrictive policies towards immigrants 
and display lower levels of trust towards them.18 
There is no consensus on how to measure or conceptualise national attachment. 
However, recent findings emphasise its multidimensional character. In line with Theiss-
Morse (2009, p. 8), I differentiate between cognitive, evaluative and affirmative dimensions of 
national attachment. The focus lies on two cognitive (ethnic and civic national attachment), 
                                               
 
18 See also Chapter 5. 
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one evaluative (pride) and one affirmative (perceived closeness) dimension of national 
attachment. Although the civic-ethnic distinction has been criticised as being too simplistic 
(Shulman, 2002) there are good theoretical and empirical arguments to maintain it. 
Empirically, the low and positive correlations between the different single-variable 
measures of the different dimensions of national attachment in Table 4.1 also suggest that 
they are non-competitive and can be treated as different concepts. Ethnic national 
attachment represents the idea of common descent as an important criterion for being a 
citizen of a country (e.g. Berg and Hjerm, 2010). Civic national attachment at the individual 
level refers to having a common set of values or institutions and is often associated with 
Habermasian constitutional patriotism. 
Table 4.1. Bivariate Correlations (EVS 2008) 
      
 ethnic civic proud threat wchauv 
ethnic 1     
civic 0.0656*** 1    
proud 0.165*** 0.133*** 1   
threat 0.331*** 0.0557*** 0.130*** 1  
wchauv 0.260*** 0.0837*** 0.0990*** 0.677*** 1 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
National pride, the evaluative component of national attachment, describes a feeling of 
pride towards one’s country. In contrast to nationalism, it is only referring to the political 
community itself (self-referential), not to non-members (relational). Sometimes national 
pride can be based on comparisons of the national in-group over time (Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2008; Mummendey, Klink and Brown, 2010). National pride is a genuinely 
positive feeling that a person experiences as a result of associating herself with a nation 
(Miller and Ali, 2014, p. 245). In contrast to this, a person can have a high level of national 
identity (salience) but be also very critical of one’s country. The stronger national pride at 
the individual level, the more positive is one’s relationship towards the object of pride. The 
object of pride can range from the country, over cultural achievements, to one’s 
citizenship. Moreover, national pride is not closely tied to objective conditions but is 
instead related to idio-national readings of history or assessments of the contemporary 
geopolitical (Smith and Jarkko, 1998, pp. 15-16).  
The affirmative dimension of national attachment is national identity or perceived 
closeness to one’s country. National identity is similar to other indicators that measure how 
much one feels or thinks to be British or German (Huddy and Khatib, 2007). This 
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affirmative dimension is another way to measure salience, i.e. the importance of a particular 
group identity. These measurements are not correlated with political ideology (Sidanius et 
al., 1997; Citrin, Wong and Duff, 2001; Sniderman et al., 2002) and are positively associated 
with social capital. 
Table 4.2. Dimensions of National Attachment 
    
 Type Status Expected Effect on 
Out-group Derogation 
Ethnic National Attachment  Cognitive IV Positive 
Civic National Attachment  Cognitive IV Positive 
National Pride  Evaluative IV Ambivalent 
National Identity Affirmative IV Ambivalent 
Nationalism Mixed Control Positive 
    
IV = Independent Variable 
Moreover, I define nationalism19 as a feeling or belief of superiority and contempt for 
foreigners or other political communities. Its contributing effect to anti-immigrant 
sentiments is empirically documented and theoretically straightforward. Critics might 
consider the distinction between national pride and nationalism as artificial.20 However, 
empirical (Doob, 1976; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Feshbach, 1991, 1994; Sidanius 
et al., 1997) and theoretical arguments (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989; Habermas, 1992; 
Viroli, 1997; Huddy and Khatib, 2007) support this approach. 
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTEGRATED THREAT THEORY 
How do different forms of national identity matter for attitudes towards immigrants? By 
definition, immigrants are not automatically part of the political community to which 
national attachment refers. Within a political community, citizens apply the criteria of 
solidarity towards their group members. This implies the acknowledgement of certain 
rights such as basic access to education, healthcare, or social benefits.21 Although citizens 
usually acknowledge some legitimate claims towards the fulfillment of basic needs by non-
                                               
 
19 There are many different and contradictory usages of the term nationalism. Sometimes no 
difference is made with regard to patriotism or national identity. In other cases, nationalism is 
understood as a general attitude, which citizens have when they care about their national identity. 
I do not understand nationalism as a principle of self-governance based on ethnic commonalities.  
20 The Athenians, who made patriotism self-conscious, reflective, and rational for the first time, 
were proud of their polis not because it was their own, but for considering it as superior to the rest 
of Greece and the world (Stewart 1917: 621). 
21 This set is usually described in the context of principles social justice. 
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citizens under certain circumstances, it is contested what these supposedly legitimate needs 
consist of, and most of all, who should be responsible for their fulfillment. 
But how can stronger national attachments lead to higher levels of anti-immigrant 
sentiments? At least, putting a stronger emphasis on some form of national attachment 
does not imply that such citizens are less willing to grant non-members the same rights as 
to members of their political community. In my view, there are two possible explanations 
for such a negative association: the comparative nature of national attachment and the in-
group members’ perception of immigrants as a realistic or symbolic threat. In the next 
section, I describe these two theoretical links between national attachment and anti-
immigrant sentiments as one prominent form of out-group hostility.  
First, according to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) any in-group identity, 
e.g. national attachment, leads to the devaluation of an out-group (intergroup bias) in the 
absence of conflicts of interest or previous group conflict: the character in which a positive 
social identity develops is comparative, e.g. is defined in (favourable) comparisons to the 
(or many) out-group(s). Members of a political community socially categorise themselves 
concerning nationality, religion or class and compare themselves regarding a set of criteria 
to their out-groups. For example, being British is not only defined by being in favour of 
democracy but always defined by group characteristics that are non-British, e.g. being 
against the idea of or not living in autocratic regimes. Since the in-group members’ aim of 
such comparisons is to develop a positive distinctiveness to the respective out-group, 
(perceived) membership increases the positive evaluation of the in-group relative to the 
out-group. From this point of view, intergroup bias is an omnipresent feature. The so-
called “Minimal Group Paradigm” (MGP) experiment (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971) 
shows that the mere perception of belonging to a randomly assigned group already triggers 
the discrimination of non-members (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, p. 38). Mullen, Brown and 
Smith (1992) also show that stronger in-group identities (salience) lead to increasing inter-
group bias.22  
                                               
 
22 A stronger emphasis on group membership (intragroup relationships) possibly also leads to 
a weaker emphasis on interpersonal relationships (empathy) driven by individual characteristics. In 
turn, lower levels of empathy towards immigrants might lead to stronger anti-immigrant 
sentiments. In both cases, higher in-group salience would lead to higher out-group derogation.  
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Second, the perception of immigrants as a threat to the own in-group can also explain how 
national attachment leads to anti-immigrant sentiments. 23  Perceived intergroup threat 
counts as one of the strongest predictors for anti-immigrant sentiments (Mayda, 2006; 
Green, 2009). High ethnic individuals more often see immigrants as a symbolic threat, as 
full inclusion of immigrants – i.e. granting citizenship - is often incompatible with ethnic 
national attachment with regard to its defining core: ethnic ancestry. One could criticize 
this assertion by arguing that this conflict of interest only arises in the case of full inclusion, 
which never concerns all immigrants. However, immigrating into a country is almost 
always the precondition to acquire citizenship if non-nationals have no national ancestry. 
This sets ethnic national attachment apart from its civic counterpart, as one could support 
the inclusion of immigrants while fully embracing a civic form of national attachment. If 
in-group members believe that their interests can only be satisfied at the expense of another 
group, as it is the case for an in-group member embracing a salient ethnic national 
attachment, hostility towards the out-group increases (Sherif, 1966; Esses et al., 2001). Of 
course, this argument presupposes that individuals have an interest in keeping their existing 
identity categories or an aversion to loss of identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).  
Besides economic concerns about labour market competition, symbolic threats, i.e. the 
perception that an out-group constitutes a threat to the in-group’s values or norms, are 
more strongly associated with anti-immigrant sentiments (Scheepers, Gijsberts and 
Coenders, 2002; Mayda, 2006). Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004) show that 
participants, who were exposed to various scenarios concerning new immigrants, found 
less opposition to unskilled immigrants who might pose an economic threat than to 
immigrants who did not fit into the national culture. Some authors find that symbolic 
threats are the primary or even only driver for out-group derogation, and not realistic 
threats such as fears about labour-market competition with immigrants (Hainmueller and 
Hiscox, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hainmueller, 
Hiscox and Margalit, 2015). Bobo and Hutchings (1996) also find that economic self-
interest has little influence on perceived threat by other ethnic groups. At the same time, 
                                               
 
23  The integrated threat theory of prejudice states that four different types of threats can result 
in prejudice against an out-group: realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and 
negative stereotypes. Realistic and symbolic threats are mainly related to the in-group as a whole 
(intergroup threat) whereas intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes mainly relate to fears at the 
individual level (interpersonal threat). 
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economic factors that drive anti-immigrant sentiments are rather sociotropic, i.e. driven by 
concerns about the national economy, not by individual economic competition (Valentino 
et al., 2017). 
Finally, the stronger individuals identify with an in-group (high-identifiers), the more 
likely they are to derogate out-groups than low-identifiers, in the case of a (perceived) 
intergroup conflict (Struch and Schwartz, 1989; Bizman and Yinon, 2001). Consequently, 
identification with some form of national identity does not only have a direct effect on 
anti-immigrant sentiments but also moderates the relationship between perceived threat 
and anti-immigrant sentiments. As I will show in the empirical section on high ethnic 
individuals, HEIs identify more strongly with all concepts of national identity and 
consequently are high-identifiers. At the same time, HEIs perceive immigrants more likely 
as an intergroup threat. As a result, ethnic national attachment increases anti-immigrant 
sentiments. 
Summing up, following social identity theory any emphasis on some form of national 
attachment as a one primary form of group identity is expected to translate into higher 
out-group derogation – in our case anti-immigrant sentiments – as social identification is 
constructed via favourable comparisons with out-groups, irrespective of the particular 
meanings or deployments of the respective identity. As high ethnic individuals are high-
identifiers in all other categories of national attachment, they are more likely to show out-
group aggression. Second, in-group members with a strong ethnic national attachment 
should exhibit stronger anti-immigrant sentiments, as they will perceive immigrants more 
likely as a symbolic threat to their national in-group.  
National Pride and Group Esteem. How could higher levels of national pride, the 
evaluative dimension of national attachment, reduce anti-immigrant sentiments? In the 
following, I argue that national pride in particular and positive evaluations of one's social 
identity, in general, reduce anti-immigrant sentiments. National pride increases in-group 
esteem. Higher in-group esteem, in turn, reduces out-group hostility.24  
 
 
                                               
 
24  Although group status is externally and self-esteem is internally attributed, I do not 
distinguish between both concepts, both are empirically highly correlated and conceptually close 
to each other.  
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Figure 4.1. Theorized Relationship between National Pride Out-group Derogation 
 
As discussed at the beginning of this section, national pride can form a category of 
membership that allows developing a positive distinctiveness to the respective out-group 
In comparison to the cognitive element of national attachment (ethnic or civic), national 
pride and national identity embrace an underspecified group concept. Citizens can feel 
proud of their country, without necessarily defining the object of pride. This in turn easily 
allows increasing group esteem, as the valued dimensions of comparisons to other out-
groups can be picked up randomly. As long as it is not perceived as necessary to further 
specify the object of national pride e.g. the economy, cultural or political achievements, 
group esteem of the national in-group can be easily “manipulated”.  
Higher group esteem leads to lower out-group derogation. Experimental evidence 
shows that higher self-affirmation reduced the likelihood to negatively evaluate a member 
of a stereotyped out-group (Fein and Spencer, 1997). Self-affirmations also reduced 
perceived threat across a variety of potentially threatening situations and consequently to 
react to out-group threats (Sherman and Cohen, 2006). Branscombe and Wann (1994) 
showed the converse argument experimentally: decreasing group esteem increased out-
group hostility: when high-identifying American participants viewed a film, in which a 
Russian boxer beats an American boxer, participants more likely derogated Russians 
(quoted in Riek, Mania and Gaertner, 2006, p. 337). Moreover, some experimental 
evidence shows that being a member of a less desirable in-group, increased out-group 
derogation (Noel, Wann and Branscombe, 1995). Higher group esteem lowers out-group 
hostility in particular for high-identifiers. Belonging to positively valued groups is essential 
for a member's self-image. According to Gagnon and Bourhis (1996) and Tajfel and Turner 
(1979), this need for self-esteem mainly motivates out-group hostility, when people are 
high-identifiers with their in-group. As HEIs are high identifiers, higher levels of national 
pride, which increases group esteem, should reduce out-group hostility. Finally, McGregor 
et al. (2008) show that in-group affirmation can also reduce out-group derogation for 
individuals with a high need for structure. As I will describe below high ethnic individuals 
↑ National 
Pride
↑ In-Group-
Esteem
↓Perception 
of Symbolic 
Threats
↓ Out-Group 
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are more likely to display this character trait. This all leads to the main hypothesis of this 
paper. 
 
Hypothesis 1: National pride reduces anti-immigrant sentiments for citizens who 
endorse an ethnic conception of national attachment 
 
Political Context: High and low ethnic countries. I distinguish between countries 
with high and low average levels of ethnic national attachment. Low ethnic countries are 
also high civic (Figure 4.2).25 As I have emphasised in the theory section, this distinction is 
important, as in high civic countries high ethnic citizens constitute a minority and more 
likely feel marginalised about their concept of national identity and consequently their in-
group status. Moreover, low ethnic countries are the most developed democracies, which 
also experience higher levels of migration and are more transnational. Low ethnic countries 
on average also show higher levels of GDP per capita (Figure 4.3). Whereas Western 
European countries are usually low ethnic, Eastern European countries tend to be high 
ethnic. 
Figure 4.2. Scatterplot of Average Levels of Civic and Ethnic National Attachment by 
Country, Mean Indicated by Red Lines, (EVS 2008)  
 
                                               
 
25 Except for very small countries such as Malta, Cyprus or Iceland. 
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Figure 4.3. Average Level of GDP per Capita and Ethnic National Attachment, by 
Country (EVS 2008) 
 
To better illustrate my distinction, I select Norway (NO) and Hungary (HU) as two typical 
representatives of a low and a high ethnic country. In Norway, about 10% of the citizenry 
(40% in HU) believe that ancestry matters in order to be truly Norwegian (Hungarian) and 
almost 80% (17% in HU) think that it is not important (EVS 2008). Both Norway and 
Hungary have experienced a sharp increase in immigration since 2000, are constituted by 
a large ethnic group of 84% and speak one official language. However, ethnic national 
attachment is more dominant in Hungary, where also more substantial linguistic 
differences between the neighbouring states and the nation-state have made it easier to 
identify between a national ‘us’ and ‘them’. Concerning their country, Norwegians are 
mainly proud of civic elements such as freedom of speech, gender equality or their welfare 
system. National symbols are only abundant on the 17th of May, the constitution day 
commemorating Norway’s independence from Denmark, although banal nationalism26 is 
arguably present. In contrast to this, Hungary makes a distinction between state and 
national holidays and has three of the latter. Prime Minister Orban’s “system of national 
                                               
 
26 Banal nationalism, a term coined by Michael Billig (1995), refers to everyday, less visible forms 
of national identification that are neither exotic or remote. 
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cooperation” (Batory, 2016, p. 289) has increased national and historical symbolism in 
political culture. Although Hungarians are in general not prouder of their nationality than 
Norwegians, they are indeed about their history, achievements in sports, or arts and 
literature (36% are very proud in HU, 12% in NO). In short, Norway’s collective national 
attachment is less ethnic than Hungary’s, but not less proud of their country. In such a 
“Norwegian context” of collective national attachment, national pride should reduce anti-
immigrant sentiments for individuals who assign high importance to ethnic national 
attachment (high ethnic individuals).  
High ethnic individuals in low ethnic countries: Who they are. In the following 
section, I describe the group of high ethnic individuals in low ethnic countries. High ethnic 
individuals (HEIs) are citizens who support the statement that having Norwegian ancestry 
is very important to feel truly e.g. Norwegian. Coming back to our low ethnic country 
Norway, compared to the rest of the population, high ethnic individuals are older and are 
more likely to be male (57%). However, other groups of society are as often represented 
as in the group of low ethnic individuals. HEIs are also more likely to support the statement 
that they are less proud of their country than they would like to be (HEI: 42%, 36%). In 
high ethnic countries the opposite is the case. This suggests that the group, embracing a 
conception of national attachment that is not shared by the majority of its citizens, 
perceives significantly more often their in-group esteem as too low. 
 Moreover, taking a closer look at the high ethnic individuals in Norway who are very 
proud (VP) in comparison to the rest of HEIs, we can see that the former group also 
expresses less often the wish to be prouder than they actually are (VP: 26.5%; 15.5%).  
HEIs also reject the statement that more patriotism is dangerous for immigrants. 
Moreover, they agree more often that patriotism is needed to remain united as a country 
(HEI: 64%, 40%) and think that it is better that different ethnic and racial groups should 
adapt and blend into the larger society rather than maintaining their traditions (HEI: 76%, 
66%). Finally, this group is more convinced that the main aim of their country is to 
maintain order within the polity (HEI: 64%, 54%), less that citizens should have more to 
say in politics and support more authoritarian policies (EVS 2008, ISSP 2013).  
It comes with no surprise that high ethnic individuals also have less confidence in 
democratic institutions such as parties (HEI: 20%, 23%), the government (HEI: 32%, 
40%) or the parliament (HEI: 42%, 48%), but more confidence in the church (HI: 49%, 
42%) or the armed forces (HEI: 61% vs. 55%) (EVS 2008).  
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Table 4.3. Ethnic National Attachment and National Identity in Low Ethnic Countries, 
(ISSP 2013)27 
 Ethnic National Attachment 
 Not Important Fairly Important Very Important Total 
National Identity % % % % 
Not Close 12.7 10.5 9.5 11.6 
Close  46.1 46.2 30.2 43.1 
Very Close 41.2 43.2 60.3 45.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 4.3 displays the average distribution ethnic national attachment and national identity 
(salience) for low ethnic countries, weighted by the country size. The table illustrates that 
HEIs are also high-identifiers, as they feel more closely attached to their country. These 
observations go in line with the positive correlation coefficients between ethnic national 
attachment and national identity, displayed in Table 4.1. The bivariate correlations are 
similar in both datasets.  
Table 4.4. Ethnic and Civic National Attachment in Low Ethnic Countries (EVS 2008) 
 Ethnic National Attachment 
 Not important Quite Important Very Important Total 
Civic National 
Attachment % % % % 
Not important 3.4 3.4 2.9 3.3 
Quite Important 28.5 32.6 14.5 27.7 
Very Important 68.1 64.0 82.6 69.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Moreover, the relationships between both civic and ethnic forms of national attachment 
and national identity (salience) are positive. This has also been described by Theiss-Morse 
who shows in an American context that “strong identifiers are more likely to set boundaries 
than weak identifiers, whether the boundaries are strict and exclusionary […] or 
amorphous and permeable” (2009, p. 13). Table 4.4 displays the distribution of civic 
                                               
 
27 Includes only national weights. 
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national attachment conditional on ethnic national attachment for low ethnic countries. As 
in Table 4.3 the results are weighted by country size. The results suggest that high-
identifiers/HEIs have a more definite opinion on what national attachment consists of. 
This also holds for other cognitive dimensions of national attachment: HEIs are more 
likely to support the statement that respecting the country’s laws and institutions (HEI: 
84%, 66%) and also speaking the country’s language (HEI: 88%, 60%) is very important 
“to be truly Norwegian” (EVS 2008). 28  Consequently, HEI’s in Norway ascribe more 
importance to all cognitive dimensions of national attachment. Finally, the difference 
between high ethnic individuals and other sub-groups becomes also apparent if we 
investigate the correlations between formal education and out-group derogation (see 
Figures 4.18 and 4.19 in the appendix). Here, both figures illustrate that formal education 
decreases the perception of immigrants as a symbolic less for high ethnic individuals 
(nativists) than for all other subgroups. Consequently, the differences in average levels of 
perceived threat between high ethnic individuals and other subgroups increase for higher 
levels of formal education. High ethnic individuals in low ethnic countries do not perceive 
immigrants as a symbolic threat but also are more likely to feel marginalised by the 
increasingly dominant civic majority of co-nationals. The typical representation of HEIs 
as nationalists in many developed democracies rather strengthens than weakens their group 
identity, but decreases the group esteem or evaluation of their group. 
 
Hypothesis 2: National Pride reduces anti-immigrant sentiments for citizens who 
endorse an ethnic conception of national attachment in countries with low average levels 
of ethnic national attachment  
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
I use recent survey data from the EVS 2008 and the ISSP 2013 studies and cross-validate 
measures of national attachment with other sources. Both cross-national datasets are 
unique, as they include extensive and manifold measures of national attachment. The EVS 
2008 dataset offers a fuller range of controls than the ISSP 2013. The ISSP 2013, however, 
provides more detailed measures of respondents’ global, national or ethnic identification, 
aspects of national pride and support for their own nation or attitudes towards national 
                                               
 
28 Although strongly correlated, there is a difference between salience and importance of a social 
identity that has often been neglected (e.g. Morris 2013).   
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and international issues. The EVS 2008 contains over 67.000 observations from 47 
European countries. Following the approach by Wright and Reeskens (2013), I focus on 
the 29 countries that are a member of at least the European Union (EU) or the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states, as 
these are the countries usually classified as advanced, immigrant-receiving European 
democracies. This size of this subsample accounts for more than 36.000 observations. 
Correspondingly, I select observations in the ISSP 2013 dataset, which leads to a 
subsample of about 25.000 observations in 29 countries.  
As argued in the theory section, country context matters for the relationship between 
national pride and anti-immigrant sentiments. This is why I merge country variables with 
both datasets. I differentiate between countries with high and low average levels, based on 
the national average distribution of responses on civic and ethnic national attachment. If 
more than 50% of respondents of a country indicated that ethnic national attachment is 
not important (at all) for “being truly [NATIONALITY]”, it was coded as low ethnic 
country. 
The distinction between high and low ethnic countries is important for four reasons: 
first, high and low ethnic countries are different concerning migration flows and economic 
development, as low ethnic countries experience net immigration and are economically 
more advanced than high ethnic countries. Second, cross-national differences of what 
national pride represents are very high. This classification partly accounts for this. Third, 
anti-immigrant levels are consistently higher in high ethnic countries. Fourth, citizens 
embracing an ethnic conception of national attachment in low ethnic countries, stand in 
contrast with the majority view, possibly leading to a lower sense of belonging to one’s 
political community.  
Econometric Considerations. Besides balancing out the need for a multidimensional 
character of the national attachment variables and the preference for parsimonious models, 
the direction of causality remains unclear. Although I have argued that particular forms of 
national attachment have an effect on out-group derogation, the reverse might be right: 
anti-immigrant sentiments might have a positive effect on exclusivist conceptions of 
national attachment, which are used for the justification of one’s prejudice (Sidanius and 
Pratto, 2001). However, the few longitudinal studies in the field do only find evidence for 
an effect of different forms of national attachment on out-group derogation (Pehrson, 
Brown and Zagefka, 2009, pp. 71–73; Wagner et al., 2012, p. 327). 
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Dependent Variables. EVS 2008: Anti-Immigrant Sentiments is measured by the 
respondents’ self-placement on a scale ranging from 1 “Immigrants will not become a 
threat to society” to 10 “Immigrants will become a threat to society”. To demonstrate the 
robustness of the relationship I also use self-placement on whether “Immigrants are a 
strain on a country’s welfare system” as a second dependent variable in the EVS dataset. 
However, less weight should be attributed to this second variable, as it is possible to believe 
that immigrants are indeed are a strain on the national welfare system without being 
prejudiced against immigrants.  
In the ISSP 2013 dataset anti-immigrant sentiments are measured i.a. by the question: 
“Immigrants increase crime rates”, where the five-point scale ranges from 1 “disagree 
strongly“ to 5 “agree strongly”. The second dependent variable enquires whether 
“[COUNTRY’S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants” using the same scale.    
Independent Variables. Ethnic national attachment is measured in both datasets with 
the question: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly 
[NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each 
of the following is … to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry?”. Answers can 
range from 1 “not at all important to 4 “very important” in the EVS 2008 dataset. The 
ISSP 2013 dataset includes one additional category (“fairly important”). “Not at all 
important” and “not very important” are merged into one category, as the main focus of 
this analysis rest on whether ethnic national attachment matters or not for ethnic 
individuals.29 
National pride is measured with the following question: How proud are you of being 
[COUNTRY NATIONALITY]? The four-point scale ranges from 1 “not at all proud” to 
4 “very proud”. Except of category 3 (“fairly proud”/”quite proud”) EVS 2008 and ISSP 
2013 rely on the same scale. For the ISSP 2013 dataset, I also test the same model with all 
available variables for national pride to demonstrate the robustness of the relationship. I 
construct a 9-item standardised factor score of responses to nine different dimensions of 
national pride, e.g. pride in country’s cultural achievements, its history, or social security 
system. The original responses constituted of a four-point scale ranging from “very proud” 
to “not proud at all”. For the construction of the latent variable the middle category of 
“not very proud” was always coded as not being proud.  
  
                                               
 
29 The other specifications do not lead to different results. 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of Civic National Attachment by Country (ISSP 2013) 
 
Figure 4.5. Distribution of Ethnic National Attachment by Country (ISSP 2013) 
 
Control Variables. All regression models include a wide range of controls such as age, the 
highest level of completed formal education, positioning on the left-right scale, household 
income deciles, or a dummy variable for being unemployed. The number of controls varies 
by each dataset and all controls are listed in the tables.  In comparison to the ISSP 2013 
dataset, the range of control variables in the EVS 2008 survey is more extensive. 
Nonetheless, the ISSP 2013 includes the most essential controls. The ISSP dataset also 
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provides nationalistic pride as an important control, which is not included in the EVS 
dataset 
Economic conflict of interest could have a strong effect on anti-immigrant sentiments. 
For example, skilled individuals are more likely to be in favour of immigration in countries 
where the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants is high. Moreover, natives in 
occupations with a larger share of immigrants to natives are more likely to oppose 
migration (Mayda, 2006, p. 527). This is why, I control for education and income levels, as 
these factors are both correlated with anti-immigrant sentiments and ethnic national 
attachment.  
Age and being male usually increase opposition towards migration. The same holds for 
positioning oneself more to the political right. Finally, I expect to observe effects by 
belonging to socioeconomic groups that have more transnational capital. Consequently, 
students should display lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments. In contrast to this 
pensioners display higher opposition. 
As I suspect individual group status as a contributing factor to anti-immigrant 
sentiments, I control for social capital and satisfaction with one’s life, as these variables 
should be correlated with ethnic national attachment, national pride, and anti-immigrant 
sentiments, the main variables of interest (e.g. Reeskens and Wright, 2013). Satisfaction 
with one’s life and happiness levels should reduce anti-immigrant sentiments.   
As stated above, increased awareness of an in-group could have a positive relationship 
with anti-immigrant sentiments.  However, I expect cultural and civic national attachment 
to be weaker predictors of anti-immigrant sentiments than ethnic national attachment. 
Moreover, nationalistic pride should result in stronger inter-group bias.   
Macro-level variables also influence anti-immigrant sentiments. Good economic 
conditions measured in GDP and low unemployment rates should reduce opposition 
towards migration, as competition for resources constitutes a realistic threat to the in-
group (Quillian, 1995; Esses et al., 2001; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002).  
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Table 4.5. Descriptive Statistics (EVS 2008)30 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
age 41,869 48.96 17.89 16 108 
proud 38,815 1.35 0.68 0 2 
civic 41,425 1.52 0.62 0 2 
ethnic 41,289 0.93 0.81 0 2 
cultural 41,604 1.56 0.61 0 2 
wchauv 39,730 6.72 2.62 1 10 
threat 39,448 6.34 2.70 1 10 
gndr 42,013 0.56 0.50 0 1 
income 42,025 2.31  1.14 1 4 
edu 41,617 3.03 1.37 0 6 
social 40,476 1.01 1.03 0 3 
origin 42,025 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Happy 41,614 3.08 0.68 1 4 
socexpd 42,025 5.59 2.60 1.63 10.4 
unrate 42,025 6.10 2.02 2.5 11.3 
gini 42,025 29.69 4.13 23 38 
fract 42,025 0.22 0.16 .041 0.587 
gdpcap 42,025 24.21 7.96 11 48 
      
 
Testing Strategy. All regression models include country random effects to account for 
country-specific unobserved effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country. 
Besides, I calculate probit regressions to show that the estimates do not depend on the 
regression model. Moreover, ethnic national attachment is coded as a factor variable in the 
interactions with national pride to test for non-linear effects.   
I do not conduct any confirmatory or explanatory factor analysis of the different 
measures of national attachment, since this has been already sufficiently tested in the past 
(Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Wright and Reeskens, 2013). Nonetheless, to demonstrate 
that the measures capture different social phenomena and that they are non-competitive, 
I provide bivariate correlations of all measures from both datasets. I run all models at the 
individual and the collective (country) level. At the collective level, I test whether the 
average prevalence of ethnic national attachment and national pride affects anti-immigrant 
sentiments.  
                                               
 
30 Table 4.9 in the appendix includes the summary statistics of the ISSP dataset. 
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Moreover, I display correlations with the help of local polynomial smooth plots for 
different levels of ethnic national attachment and levels of anti-immigrant sentiments for 
the most common categories of national pride. 31  This approach aims to show how 
different results of the association between ethnic national attachment and anti-immigrant 
sentiments depend on the measure of national pride in the respective dataset. Finally, I 
take a closer look at the relationship between national pride and anti-immigrant sentiments 
for each country to discuss possible heterogeneous results and alternative mechanism.  
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Table 4.6 displays the results of the OLS regressions on the dependent variable that 
“Immigrants will become a threat to society” (Models 1-6).32 Except of model 6 and 8 all 
results only include low ethnic countries. Models 7 and 8 are conducted with the second 
dependent variable that “Immigrants are a strain on the welfare system”. Besides the 
independent variable national pride (evaluative dimension), ethnic and civic national 
attachment are included in almost all models.  
The interaction terms illustrate to what extent the effect of national pride on perceived 
threat is different for nativists in comparison to those who think that ethnic national 
attachment “is not important”. The first interaction term (Ethnic x proud) includes 
individuals who stated that ancestry is “important” for truly being a co-national, the second 
interaction (Strong ethnic x proud) those who responded with “very important”. Based on 
hypothesis 1, the interaction term should be negative. Hypothesis 2 suggests that in low 
ethnic countries, interaction terms are all negative and statistically significant. 
Consequently, the interaction should not be negative for high ethnic countries (models 6 
and 8). Moreover, ethnic national attachment should be positively associated with 
perceived threat. In contrast to this, formal education, having foreign origin in the family, 
social capital, as well as life satisfaction should be negatively associated with perceived 
threat. 
In line with both hypotheses, the interaction models in low ethnic countries (2, 5, and 
7) are negative, resulting in an overall negative marginal effect of national pride for those 
individuals who think that ethnic national attachment is very important. Figure 4.6, which 
displays the average marginal effects on perceived threat, conditional on the degree to 
                                               
 
31 “Very proud” and “quite proud” for national pride. 
32 Table 4.8, which is included in the appendix, shows the results for the second dataset. 
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which respondents embrace an ethnic form of national attachment, reflects these results: 
for respondents who think that ethnic national attachment is very important, the negative 
coefficient size of the marginal effect is substantive and statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level. Consequently, in low ethnic countries, national pride reduces anti-immigrant 
sentiments for high ethnic individuals - the group which is most opposed to immigration. 
As already visible in models 7 and 8 in Table 4.6, the results are weaker for the second 
dependent variable. This is in line with Figures 4.6 and 4.7 that display the average marginal 
effects of national pride for each category of ethnic national attachment separately to better 
illustrate how national pride is very differently associated with anti-immigrant sentiments. 
Both figures suggest that the marginal effect of national pride for low ethnic individuals 
predicts a positive increase of anti-immigrant sentiments, but the opposite for respondents 
who think that ethnic national attachment is very important to “truly” count as co-national. 
The marginal effects are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and substantive. 
Although the coefficient sizes of the average marginal effects for models in the ISSP 
dataset are not contradicting my expectations, the marginal effect for high ethnic 
individuals is not statistically significant, as the 95 per cent confidence interval includes 
zero. 
Based on my theory section I have no expectations on how overall national pride relates 
to out-group derogation. Surprisingly, in almost all models higher national pride predicts 
an increase in perceived threat, independent of whether interactions are included in the 
model. For example, in baseline model 3, the marginal effect of one standard deviation in 
national pride results into an increase of perceived threat of 0.1836, which accounts for 
50% of the effect of a decrease in formal levels of education by one standard deviation. 
However, the impact of national pride would be lower if we could control for nationalism.   
Concerning group salience all three aspects are in line with my expectations: first, both 
civic and ethnic national attachment are positively associated with out-group derogation. 
In line with social identity theory, group salience increases out-group derogation even if 
group characteristics are inclusive. Only some models in the ISSP dataset (Table 4.9) 
include statistically insignificant coefficients for civic national attachment. Second, the 
effect is stronger for ethnic national attachment, i.e. four to eight times stronger than for 
civic national attachment. Third, these relationships hold for both high and low ethnic 
countries. 
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The effect of social capital also suggests that some form of group esteem or self-confidence 
plays a central role for out-group derogation, as it is one of the strongest predictors in the 
models: an increase by one standard deviation predicts a more significant decrease in 
perceived threat than an increase by one standard deviation in formal education or whether 
respondents have an immigration background in their family. The effect size is stable 
within each country subgroup across all models and twice as large in low ethnic countries. 
Consequently, social capital as an individual level characteristic can explain twice as much 
variation of perceived threat in low ethnic countries than in high ethnic countries. The 
thinner national attachment at the national level, the more important social capital seems 
to become. Contrasting with Mayda (2006) my results suggest that human capital becomes 
more, not less critical when democracies are more affluent. For example, in Table 4.6 the 
marginal effects of educational levels are twice as large in low (model 5) than in high ethnic 
countries.  
As expected political ideology matters, but almost five times more in low ethnic than in 
high ethnic countries, suggesting a significantly larger divide on the subject matter in low 
ethnic countries. Both national attachment and questions on migration are contested in 
low ethnic countries. In the ISSP dataset (Table 4.8, appendix), in high ethnic countries, 
the coefficients of political ideology are not even statistically significant. Male respondents 
show only higher levels of out-group aggression in high ethnic countries. Moreover, 
income levels play a minor role for anti-immigrant sentiments. Country-level variables 
depict a comparable result, as economic aspects such as GDP per capita or unemployment 
rates are statistically unrelated with out-group derogation in the EVS 2008 dataset. 
However, in the second ISSP 2013 dataset, these two macro-economic characteristics 
predict changes in the dependent variable. Only ethnic fractionalization predicts perceived 
threat in low ethnic countries in both datasets. Probably, an increased number of salient 
ethnic groups more likely leads to higher levels of out-group derogation against 
immigrants, as smaller and contested groups, as well as higher group salience, should lead 
to higher levels of derogation against any out-group. 
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Table 4.6. Effects of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments (EVS 2008) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
Model 
Adding 
Interaction 
Baseline 
and 
Controls 
Adding 
Country 
Variables 
Adding 
Interactions 
Model 5 
for High 
Ethnic 
Countries 
2nd DV: 
Adding 
Interactions  
2nd DV: 
Model 7 
for High 
Ethnic 
Countries 
ethnic  1.649*** 0.846*** 0.831*** 1.212*** 0.549*** 0.964*** 0.603*** 
  (0.126) (0.0884) (0.0945) (0.113) (0.142) (0.137) (0.118) 
proud 0.615*** 0.542*** 0.198** 0.214*** 0.320*** 0.136 0.187*** 0.154* 
 (0.107) (0.0691) (0.0966) (0.0806) (0.0788) (0.105) (0.0621) (0.0826) 
civic   0.109 0.142** 0.153** 0.0638 0.308*** 0.134** 
   (0.0793) (0.0640) (0.0674) (0.0632) (0.0650) (0.0620) 
social   -0.376*** -0.409*** -0.403*** -0.208*** -0.305*** -0.190*** 
   (0.0505) (0.0446) (0.0443) (0.0419) (0.0370) (0.0332) 
happy   -0.0989* -0.143*** -0.137*** -0.241*** -0.161*** -0.212*** 
   (0.0522) (0.0351) (0.0356) (0.0312) (0.0329) (0.0325) 
age   0.00217 0.00164 0.00181 0.00346* 0.00647* 0.00460** 
   (0.00255) (0.00334) (0.00334) (0.00207) (0.00383) (0.00185) 
edu   -0.298*** -0.303*** -0.304*** -0.150*** -0.163*** -0.123*** 
   (0.0300) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0290) (0.0336) (0.0220) 
income   0.0265 0.0210 0.0209 0.0328 0.0716 0.0324 
   (0.0394) (0.0419) (0.0427) (0.0208) (0.0592) (0.0202) 
lrscale   0.508*** 0.516*** 0.509*** 0.133*** 0.439*** 0.116*** 
   (0.0472) (0.0450) (0.0430) (0.0338) (0.0383) (0.0330) 
gndr   -0.0203 -0.0190 -0.0191 -0.0860*** -0.113 -0.112*** 
   (0.0580) (0.0559) (0.0574) (0.0328) (0.0699) (0.0369) 
origin   -0.407*** -0.497*** -0.498*** -0.421*** -0.439*** -0.451*** 
   (0.0912) (0.0720) (0.0703) (0.119) (0.0954) (0.113) 
gdpcap    0.0239* 0.0241* 0.0456 0.0499* 0.0517* 
    (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0302) (0.0288) (0.0296) 
fract    1.648*** 1.622*** 0.529 2.223*** -0.376 
    (0.546) (0.535) (1.524) (0.223) (1.415) 
unrate    -0.00392 -0.00551 -0.110* -0.0474 -0.114* 
    (0.0842) (0.0834) (0.0592) (0.101) (0.0679) 
gini    -0.0369 -0.0340 -0.0427 -0.0537 -0.0560 
    (0.0549) (0.0529) (0.0361) (0.0493) (0.0367) 
Ethnic x proud  -0.224**   -0.169** 0.0222 -0.143 -0.0615 
  (0.0932)   (0.0724) (0.0900) (0.108) (0.0765) 
Strong ethnic x 
proud 
 -0.703***   -0.579*** -0.0540 -0.466*** -0.180 
  (0.156)   (0.123) (0.155) (0.149) (0.128) 
Constant 4.955*** 4.449*** 5.692*** 5.837*** 5.562*** 7.500*** 5.176** 8.078*** 
Number of 
country 
9 9 9 9 9 20 9 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 4.6. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Perception of Immigrants as 
Symbolic Threat by Strength of Ethnic National Attachment (EVS 2010) 
 
Figure 4.7. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments 
by Strength of Ethnic National Attachment (EVS 2010) 
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Figure 4.8. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Perceived Threat by Strength 
of Ethnic National Attachment (ISSP 2013) 
 
CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATION 
As cross-country heterogeneity is high, I show my results for all countries separately. Figure 
4.9 displays the marginal effect of national pride on the perception of immigrants as a 
symbolic threat by country. The left battery of the figure presents the marginal effects for 
nativists, the right for non-nativists. The countries are ranked by the degree to which 
citizens embrace a civic or ethnic conception of national attachment with the Netherlands 
being the most civic and Cyprus being the most ethnic country in that respect. In low 
ethnic countries, i.e. the upper area of Figure 4.9, the marginal effects for non-nativists are 
higher than for nativists. This suggests that national pride increases out-group derogation 
rather for non-nativists than for nativists. However, only partly in line with hypothesis 1, 
the marginal effect of pride on anti-immigrant sentiments is about as often negative as it 
is positive. Countries, in which the marginal effects are negative, are Ireland, Austria, Italy, 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Portugal, all countries in which migration forms a 
foundational part of the national narrative. This suggests that national narratives have a 
substantive impact on whether national pride has an inclusive or exclusive effect. The 
relationship with the second dependent variable shows a similar pattern. 
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Figure 4.10 illustrates the average marginal effects for all nine low ethnic countries 
conditional on ethnic national attachment at the individual level of the EVS dataset. The 
left side of the table shows the results for the first dependent variable, the right side the 
results for the second dependent variable of the EVS dataset. Except for Iceland and 
Sweden coefficients for the average marginal effects are as expected positive for low levels 
of ethnic national attachment and negative for nativists. However, results are often not 
statistically significant. The results in the ISSP dataset also do not show statistically 
significant coefficients for low ethnic countries and are less in line with my hypotheses, as 
only slightly more than 50 per cent of low ethnic countries show the expected negative 
slope for average marginal effects (Figure 4.12).  
Figure 4.9. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride Perceived Threat across 
Countries and Strength of Ethnic National Attachment (EVS 2010) 
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Figure 4.10. Low Ethnic Countries: Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-
Immigrant Sentiments (EVS 2010) 
 
Figure 4.11. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments 
(1st DV) across Countries and Strength of Ethnic National Attachment (ISSP 2013) 
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Figure 4.12. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments 
In low ethnic countries (ISSP 2013) 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND LIMITATIONS  
The results in the EVS dataset are more robust than those in ISSP dataset. I assess the 
robustness of my findings by running probit models for Tables 4.6 and 4.8 (Tables 4.12 
and 4.13, in the appendix). Different codings of the national attachment dimensions and 
all dependent variables also do not substantively change the results. The results are also 
stable when all models are conducted with linear combinations of both dependent 
variables. Following Gelman and Carlin (2014), I additionally calculate the likelihood that 
the average marginal effects in Figures 4.6-8 show the wrong sign (type S error). Table 4.7 
displays the type S errors for those respondents who think that ethnic national attachment 
is “very important” to qualify as co-national. Although statistical power is rather low, type 
S errors are close to zero. Consequently, although the effect size might be exaggerated 
(type M error), the average marginal effects are very likely negative for this subgroup. 
Table 4.7. Type S and M Errors for Average Marginal Effects of Strong Nativists  
Figure    Dataset  se D crit power  typeS  typeM 
4.6  EVS .15 .243 1.96 .368 0 1.621 
4.7  EVS .123 .209 1.96 .395 0 1.575 
4.8  ISSP .055 .081 1.96 .319 .001 1.752 
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Limitations. So far, this testing strategy does not account for the selectiveness of welfare 
state systems (Rothstein, 2016), which might play a role on the country level. Moreover, I 
can only partly control for the relative skill composition (Mayda, 2006), since the data does 
not include suitable information. However, as I have outlined above, labour market 
competition at the individual level is no or only a weak driver of anti-immigrant sentiments.  
National attachment might not be a report of an internal state, but could the expression 
of a political view, as respondents might associate different forms of national attachment 
with a particular political ideology. If that holds, partisan cues and not group esteem will 
form the mechanism between national attachment and out-group derogation. However, 
this should rather support my results, as higher levels of national pride are associated with 
political parties that are more critical of immigration. Finally, in some societies immigrants 
are traditionally seen as permanent residents and future citizens (Kymlicka, 2015). I do not 
account for such differences.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This paper provides an additional explanation of how ethnic national attachment 
moderates the relationship between national pride and out-group derogation. Based on 
social identity and integrated threat theory, I argued that national pride could reduce out-
group derogation for those groups in society that perceive immigrants the most as a 
symbolic threat, i.e. nativists. Where national pride is thought to be the most detrimental 
for attitudes towards immigrants, it might even contribute to lower levels of out-group 
derogation. My theoretical framework helps to differentiate between the ascribed 
characteristics (cognitive dimension) of one’s national in-group, the evaluative dimension 
of national attachment, national pride, as well as the salience of national attachment 
(national identity). Higher salience of national attachment leads to higher levels of out-
group derogation. This supports Wright and Reeskens (2013) as well as Mayda (2006) who 
have argued that any form of symbolic boundaries has exclusionary effects. I find that this 
effect of ethnic national attachment is about three to eight times stronger than for civic 
national attachment. This result suggests that if one would like to increase the inclusiveness 
of societies, an ethnic conception of national attachment is the biggest hurdle, but labelling 
such groups as backward or nationalist, would lead to the opposite result. Lower national 
pride decreases in-group esteem. Lower in-group esteem, in-turn, increases the perception 
of immigrants as a symbolic threat and consequently increases out-group derogation.   
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Better understanding of how national attachment can reduce anti-immigrant sentiments is 
also helpful for increasing support of social justice principles. The more nativist citizens 
are concerned about immigration in the context of believed or actual increasing ethnic 
heterogeneity, the lower is the support for principles of social justice: Support for social 
justice principles is strongly associated with the perceived composition of immigrants – 
not the share of immigrants as such. In general, respondents overestimate the total number 
of immigrants across the board and are convinced that immigrants are culturally and 
religiously more distant from them as well as economically weaker. Low-skilled, less 
educated and those embracing right-wing political ideology working in immigration-
intensive sectors, show the strongest bias. Just making these respondents think about 
immigration reduces support for redistribution, including actual donations to charities 
(Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2018). The groups the most prone to overestimating the 
cultural distance as well as the size of immigration are also those who embrace an ethnic 
form of national attachment.  
As a consequence, in line with concerns developed in Chapter 2, ethnic heterogeneity 
systematically reduces the motivational basis with to support social justice principles, as 
immigration is believed to increase the share of groups that are negatively prejudiced. 
However, it is very important to emphasise that symbolic threat going in line with the 
overestimation of the magnitude and composition of migrants drives this negative 
relationship.  
These prejudices on immigrants and the concerns that go along with them pose a factual 
constraint on the support mostly accepted principles of justice, such as the preferences for 
redistribution. In that sense the relationship between national attachment and out-group 
derogation matters for ensuring stability for Rawls’ theory of justice, thus as 
methodological realist critique, i.e. “Rawls for Realists”.  
It remains an open question whether the misperception of the magnitude as well as the 
characteristics immigration lead to increased symbolic threat, are a result of the latter, or 
are two sides of the same coin. In any case, both phenomena are empirically and 
conceptually closely related. This suggests, both reducing the symbolic threat of 
immigrants as well as any policy leading to a better assessment of immigration increases 
preferences for redistribution for substantial proportions in low ethnic societies. This 
finding is also in line with the result that ethnic fractionalization predicts perceived threat 
in low ethnic countries in both datasets.  
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By providing a framework on how different groups in society “need” or use national pride 
depending on their conception of cognitive national attachment and concerning the 
majoritarian group identity, this paper also contributes to the constructionist literature.  
Alternatively, my findings could be criticised with the argument that expressed levels of 
national pride are not merely a report of an internal state, but a political expression of 
oneself within a spectrum of opinion. If the prevailing cognitive dimension of nationhood 
in a country is inclusive, then supposedly higher reported levels of national pride should 
reduce anti-immigrant sentiments. However, if this holds national pride should reduce anti-
immigrant sentiments especially for those who embrace a civic conception of national 
attachment, which is not the case in the data.  
Neither do I argue that strengthening national attachment is desirable in a normative 
sense nor do I want to suggest that fostering pride should be the first choice to reduce 
anti-immigrant sentiments. Non-instrumental interactions at the individual level, in 
particular, friendships (McLaren, 2003), perspective-taking (e.g. Simonovits, Kézdi and 
Kardos, 2018), as well as higher overall levels of social capital, seem to be more effective. 
I merely argue that for high ethnic individuals in low ethnic countries, national pride rather 
decreases than increases anti-immigrant sentiments.  
If further research does not reject this hypothesis for other high civic countries, the 
effects of strengthening a common identity are not as clear-cut as often suggested by both 
the political left and right. Higher levels of national pride have an inclusive effect via 
reducing anti-immigrant sentiments for those groups of societies that oppose immigration 
the most. Consequently, the political right might be correct in assuming that national 
attachment facilitates cooperation and integration in advanced democracies, but wrong 
regarding the mechanism, as national pride increases the willingness to cooperate for some 
groups of the host country, not necessarily for immigrants.   
Further, my results matter for those who aim at developing inclusive and solidarity-
promoting multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2015). This paper shows that at the individual level 
ethnic and civic national attachment are non-competitive but competitive at the national 
level. Citizens who embrace an ethnic conception of national attachment are more, not 
less, likely to support a civic conception of nationhood. Nonetheless, as I have shown in 
this paper, it is still helpful to differentiate between individuals along their conception of 
ethnic national attachment.  
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Overall, my findings suggest that higher levels of national pride do not increase 
prejudice for nativists when the majority in society embraces a predominantly civic 
conception of national attachment. As with the great novel by Jane Austen, we probably 
miss a crucial point of the story, if we remain convinced that all those who are prouder are 
also more likely to be prejudiced. 
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APPENDIX  
Figure 4.13. The Difference between Low and High Ethnic Countries: Average 
Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments by Strength of Ethnic 
National Attachment (DV: “Immigrants are a Threat to Society) (EVS 2008)  
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Figure 4.14. The Difference between Low and High Ethnic Countries: Average 
Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments by Strength of Ethnic 
National Attachment (DV: “Immigrants are a Threat to Society”, Probit Model) (EVS 
2008) 
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Figure 4.15. The Difference between Low and High Ethnic Countries: Average 
Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments by Strength of Ethnic 
National Attachment (DV: “Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system”) 
(EVS 2008) 
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Figure 4.16. The Difference between Low and High Ethnic Countries: Average 
Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments by Strength of Ethnic 
National Attachment (DV: “Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system”, 
Probit Model) (EVS 2008) 
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Figure 4.17. The Difference between Low and High Ethnic Countries: Average 
Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments by Strength of Ethnic 
National Attachment (DV: “Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system”) 
(ISSP 2013)   
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Figure 4.18. The Difference between Low and High Ethnic Countries: Average 
Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiment by Strength of Ethnic 
National Attachment (DV: “Immigrants are a strain on a country’s welfare system”, 
Probit Model) (ISSP 2013) 
 
Figure 4.19. Correlation between Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and Education, by 
Different Forms of National Attachment (EVS 2008) 
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Figure 4.20. Correlation between Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and Education, by 
Different Forms of National Attachment (ISSP 2013) 
 
Figure 4.21. Average Marginal Effect of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments 
(2nd DV) across Countries and Strength of Ethnic National Attachment (EVS 2010) 
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Table 4.8. Effects of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments (ISSP 2013) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
Model 
Adding 
Interactions 
Baseline 
and 
Controls 
Adding 
Country 
Variables 
Adding 
Interactions 
Model 5 for 
High Ethnic 
Countries 
2nd DV: 
Adding 
Interactions 
2nd DV: 
Model 7 for 
High Ethnic 
Countries 
         
ethnic 0.471*** 0.639*** 0.397*** 0.399*** 0.570*** 0.179*** 0.563*** 0.185*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0590) (0.0392) (0.0401) (0.0511) (0.0449) (0.0532) (0.0649) 
proud 0.128** 0.193*** 0.0957** 0.104** 0.171*** 0.0102 0.101** 0.00753 
 (0.0503) (0.0509) (0.0451) (0.0503) (0.0528) (0.0384) (0.0446) (0.0221) 
civic   0.0683 0.0919* 0.0920* 0.0458 0.0502 -0.0214 
   (0.0493) (0.0486) (0.0481) (0.0311) (0.0389) (0.0331) 
age   0.00158* 0.00145* 0.00160** 0.00186 -0.00201* -0.00284** 
   (0.000830) (0.000789) (0.000805) (0.00134) (0.00122) (0.00131) 
edu   -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.117*** -0.151*** -0.129*** 
   (0.0144) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0146) (0.0226) 
income   -0.00431 0.00643 0.00649 -0.00148 -0.0379* -0.0513** 
   (0.0150) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0298) (0.0220) (0.0240) 
lrscale   0.0643*** 0.0590*** 0.0573*** -0.00668 0.0497* -0.00649 
   (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0112) (0.0259) (0.0125) 
gndr   -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.177*** -0.0619** -0.119*** -0.0317 
   (0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0291) (0.0302) (0.0414) (0.0227) 
origin   -0.252*** -0.203*** -0.205*** -0.258*** -0.122** -0.0848 
   (0.0571) (0.0619) (0.0622) (0.0618) (0.0501) (0.0672) 
gdpcap    -3.04e-
05*** 
-3.01e-05*** -2.46e-05** -2.37e-05*** -8.27e-06 
    (8.67e-06) (8.54e-06) (1.01e-05) (5.83e-06) (1.06e-05) 
unrate    -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.0506*** -0.109*** -0.0661*** 
    (0.0662) (0.0648) (0.0151) (0.0228) (0.0175) 
socexphd    -0.00126 -0.00126 0.0501** 0.0270*** 0.0571** 
    (0.0200) (0.0196) (0.0210) (0.00875) (0.0228) 
gini    -5.165** -5.131** -1.865 0.918 3.811** 
    (2.131) (2.085) (1.364) (0.789) (1.601) 
fract    0.146 0.138 1.233* 0.277 0.787 
    (0.0992) (0.0999) (0.672) (0.214) (0.760) 
Ethnic x 
pride 
 -0.0790***   -0.0858*** 0.0310 -0.0636** 0.0375 
  (0.0260)   (0.0286) (0.0329) (0.0277) (0.0365) 
Strong ethnic 
x pride 
 -0.249***   -0.253*** 0.0419 -0.198*** 0.00958 
  (0.0537)   (0.0529) (0.0396) (0.0586) (0.0663) 
Constant 2.946*** 2.858*** 3.202*** 7.206*** 7.103*** 3.996*** 3.663*** 1.599* 
 (0.0885) (0.0927) (0.113) (0.677) (0.652) (0.818) (0.461) (0.911) 
         
Observations 10,511 10,511 10,432 10,432 10,432 6,349 10,400 6,302 
Number of 
Countries 
12 12 12 12 12 9 12 9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.9. Summary Statistics (ISSP 2013) 
 (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
close 21,735 1.33 0.67 0 2 
proud 21,359 1.29 0.68 0 2 
civic 21,696 1.43 0.69 0 2 
ethnic 21,620 0.85 0.84 0 2 
cultural 21,834 1.54 0.66 0 2 
undermine 21,161 2.80 1.16 1 5 
lrights 21,280 1.02 0.89 0 2 
gndr 22,129 0.53 0.50 0 1 
income 22,131 0.10 1.00 -2 27 
age 22,131 48.68 16.91 15 96 
edu 22,131 3.49 1.57 0 6 
natio 21,051 0.08 0.27 0 1 
origin 22,131 0.10 0.31 0 1 
socexphd 18,494 23.07 6.11 8 32 
unrate 19,289 8.40 4.05 3.5 26.1 
gini 19,833 0.31 0.05 0.244 0.457 
gdpcap 19,289 36,465.54 11,361.78 16,020 59,310 
fract 22,131 0.28 0.18 0.468 0.587 
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4.10. Country Distribution (EVS 2008) 
 No. % % 
AT  1510 3.61 3.61 
BE 1507 3.60 7.21 
BG 1500 3.58 10.79 
CH 1271 3.04 13.83 
CY 999 2.39 16.22 
CZ 1794 4.28 20.50 
DE 2039 4.87 25.37 
DK 1507 3.60 28.97 
EE 1518 3.63 32.60 
ES 1497 3.58 36.17 
FI 1134 2.71 38.88 
FR 1501 3.59 42.47 
GB-GBN 2045 4.88 47.35 
GR 1498 3.58 50.93 
HU 1513 3.62 54.55 
IE 982 2.35 56.89 
IS 808 1.93 58.83 
IT 1519 3.63 62.45 
LT 1499 3.58 66.04 
LV 1506 3.60 69.63 
MT 1497 3.58 73.21 
NL 1552 3.71 76.92 
NO 1090 2.60 79.52 
PL 1479 3.53 83.06 
PT 1553 3.71 86.77 
RO 1489 3.56 90.33 
SE 1174 2.81 93.13 
SI 1366 3.26 96.39 
SK 1509 3.61 100.00 
Total 41865 100.00  
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Table 4.11. Country Distribution (ISSP 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 No. % % 
BE 1463 5.92 5.92 
CH 759 3.07 8.99 
CZ 1314 5.31 14.30 
DE 1315 5.32 19.62 
DK 1266 5.12 24.74 
EE 635 2.57 27.30 
ES 585 2.37 29.67 
FI 706 2.85 32.52 
FR 1114 4.50 37.03 
GB 676 2.73 39.76 
GE 918 3.71 43.48 
HR 494 2.00 45.47 
HU 681 2.75 48.23 
IE 766 3.10 51.32 
IL 732 2.96 54.28 
IS 765 3.09 57.38 
LT 795 3.21 60.59 
LV 544 2.20 62.79 
MX 317 1.28 64.07 
NO 1264 5.11 69.19 
PT 344 1.39 70.58 
SE 902 3.65 74.22 
SI 462 1.87 76.09 
SK 886 3.58 79.68 
TR 1325 5.36 85.03 
US 1103 4.46 89.49 
ZA 2598 10.51 100.00 
Total 24729 100.00  
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Table 4.12. Effects of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, Probit Models 
(EVS 2008) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
Model 
Adding 
Interactions 
Baseline 
Model and 
Controls 
Adding 
Country 
Variables 
Adding 
Interactions 
High 
Ethnic 
Countries 
2nd DV: 
Adding 
Interactions 
Model 7 for 
High Ethnic 
Countries 
         
ethnic  0.693*** 0.369*** 0.369*** 0.531*** 0.199*** 0.454*** 0.253*** 
  (0.0707) (0.0428) (0.0403) (0.0569) (0.0606) (0.0551) (0.0608) 
proud 0.251*** 0.224*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.167*** 0.0311 0.132 0.0547 
 (0.0362) (0.0300) (0.0354) (0.0298) (0.0310) (0.207) (0) (0.0457) 
civic   0.0420 0.0423 0.0496 0.0330 0.0872 0.0552* 
   (0.0455) (0.0379) (0.0398) (0.152) (0) (0.0324) 
social   -0.203*** -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.106 -0.165 -0.0968*** 
   (0.0248) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0901) (0) (0.0167) 
happy   -0.0748** -
0.0746*** 
-0.0714*** -0.127 -0.0814 -0.0997*** 
   (0.0318) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0) (0) (0.0183) 
age   0.000261 0.000270 0.000334 0.00198 0.00186 0.00228** 
   (0.000968) (0.00141) (0.00142) (0.00248) (0.00130) (0.000892) 
edu   -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.0795 -0.0765 -0.0692*** 
   (0.0159) (0.0124) (0.0127) (0) (0) (0.0137) 
income   0.0238 0.0234 0.0227 0.0107 0.0276 0.0157 
   (0.0181) (0.0163) (0.0168) (0) (0) (0.0197) 
lrscale   0.254*** 0.254*** 0.251*** 0.0814*** 0.200 0.0710*** 
   (0.0199) (0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0251) (0) (0.0201) 
gndr   0.0462** 0.0462** 0.0440** 0.000342 -0.0558** -0.0130 
   (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0490) (0.0268) (0.0197) 
origin   -0.235*** -0.238*** -0.239*** -0.207 -0.229*** -0.242 
   (0.0476) (0.0520) (0.0526) (0) (0.0558) (0.174) 
gdpcap    0.0118 0.0121 0.00985** 0.0312 0.0126 
    (0.0176) (0.0171) (0.00385) (0) (0.0211) 
fract    0.779** 0.773** 0.109 1.069*** -0.286 
    (0.346) (0.336) (1.247) (0.329) (0.895) 
unrate    0.00448 0.00428 -0.0411 -0.00937 -0.0404 
    (0.0476) (0.0470) (0.121) (0.0146) (0.0598) 
gini    -0.0244 -0.0231 -0.0187 -0.0220 -0.0270 
    (0.0328) (0.0324) (0.0296) (0) (0.0429) 
Ethnic  x pride  -0.0701   -0.0437 0.0407 -0.0778 -0.0173 
  (0.0491)   (0.0398) (0.142) (0.0476) (0.0423) 
Strong ethnic x 
pride 
 -0.322***   -0.274*** 0.00232 -0.302*** -0.0719 
  (0.0868)   (0.0839) (0.224) (0.0524) (0.0651) 
Constant -0.0799 -0.286** 0.278 0.406 0.290 1.323 -0.210 1.567 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.193) (1.083) (1.044) (0) (0) (1.643) 
         
Observations 11,077 10,940 10,541 10,541 10,541 25,693 10,541 25,693 
Number of 
Countries 
9 9 9 9 9 20 9 20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.13. Effects of National Pride on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, Probit Models 
(ISSP 2013) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
Model 
Adding 
Interactions 
Baseline 
and 
Controls 
Adding 
Country 
Variables 
Adding 
Interactions 
Model 5 
for High 
Ethnic 
Countries 
2nd DV: 
Adding 
Interactions 
Model 7 
for High 
Ethnic 
Countries 
         
ethnic 0.459*** 0.615*** 0.388*** 0.387*** 0.552 0.321*** 0.519*** 0.251 
 (0.0642) (0.0615) (0.0563) (0.131) (0) (0.0711) (0.0394) (0) 
proud 0.133** 0.166*** 0.0960** 0.0975 0.131 0.0697 0.0599 0.0284 
 (0.0542) (0.0475) (0.0467) (0) (19.57) (0.0680) (0.0435) (0) 
civic   0.0658 0.0687 0.0776 -0.0198 0.0290 -0.0664* 
   (0.0535) (0.120) (20.08) (0.0339) (0.0392) (0.0382) 
age   0.00325*** 0.00322 0.00340 0.00236 -0.00291* -0.00181 
   (0.00111) (0.0150) (0.493) (0.00195) (0.00153) (0.00168) 
edu   -0.122*** -0.123 -0.123 -0.113*** -0.182*** -0.146*** 
   (0.0123) (0) (0) (0.0289) (0.0118) (0.0314) 
income   0.00853 0.00798 0.00732 0.0104 -0.0494* -0.0518** 
   (0.0177) (0.215) (3.287) (0.0344) (0.0256) (0.0228) 
lrscale   0.0648*** 0.0653 0.0638 0.000759 0.0470* -0.0217** 
   (0.0226) (0.0860) (7.810) (0.0160) (0.0255) (0.0111) 
gndr   -0.145*** -0.144 -0.143 -0.0369 -0.106** 0.0184 
   (0.0337) (0.136) (0) (0.0457) (0.0419) (0.0231) 
origin   -0.229*** -0.225 -0.223 -0.252*** -0.122*** -0.0939* 
   (0.0656) (0.173) (16.93) (0.0580) (0.0414) (0.0569) 
gdpcap    -3.14e-
05*** 
-3.06e-05 -2.14e-
05** 
-3.22e-
05*** 
-9.18e-06 
    (6.11e-06) (0.000836) (9.16e-06) (6.62e-06) (1.31e-05) 
unrate    -0.195 -0.193 -0.0725*** -0.141*** -
0.0819*** 
    (0) (0) (0.0196) (0.0335) (0.0254) 
socexphd    0.00185 0.00128 0.0884*** 0.0301*** 0.0957** 
    (0.0127) (0.462) (0.0290) (0.0109) (0.0397) 
gini    -5.059 -5.020 -2.110* 1.728 3.927** 
    (0) (0) (1.157) (1.507) (1.835) 
fract    0.125 0.120 1.561** 0.117 1.335* 
    (0) (0) (0.631) (0.498) (0.767) 
Ethnic  x pride  0.0116   0.00537 -0.0296 0.0152 0.0177 
  (0.0440)   (45.10) (0.0585) (0.0290) (0.0292) 
Strong ethnic x 
pride 
 -0.266***   -0.278 -0.165** -0.173*** -0.113** 
  (0.0667)   (24.10) (0.0729) (0.0386) (0.0446) 
Constant 0.358 0.299 0.622 4.725 4.608 0.620 1.555*** -1.861 
 (0.812) (0.813) (0.807) (0) (0) (0.828) (0.426) (1.254) 
         
Observations 10,898 10,898 10,807 10,807 10,807 6,504 10,807 6,504 
Number of 
Countries 
12 12 12 12 12 9 12 9 
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5. CHAPTER 5: BACK TO THE 
ROOTS? HISTORICAL CONFLICT, 
NATIONAL PRIDE, AND OUT-
GROUP DEROGATION  
ABSTRACT 
Researchers have long inquired about the “positive” effects of national attachment on in-
group solidarity, and its potential “negative” effects on out-group derogation. Put simply, 
there is a concern that while national attachments foster solidarity and trust, they increase 
out-group derogation in the form of nationalism or anti-immigrant sentiments. 
Importantly, however, the effect of national attachment may strongly depend on the 
context, most importantly the perception of an outside threat. Given this context 
dependency and the possibility of endogeneity, such questions are inherently difficult to 
study empirically. 
As a novel empirical contribution, this paper operationalizes the key concepts and uses 
a pre-registered survey experiment to study the effect of national attachment by employing 
videos that separately cue national attachment and external threat. An online sample of 
British voters (N=934) is exposed randomly to either a short video containing positive 
references to the United Kingdom, or a longer video that also includes scenes displaying 
World War 2, cueing external threat. The key innovation in this design is that it allows 
separating out the effects of a general sense of attachment from the effects of a prime on 
external threats facing the country. 
Three main findings result. First, only national attachment in combination with external 
threat increases levels of out-group derogation, supporting the conjecture that perceived 
threat is central to the negative effects of national attachment. Second, the in-group 
derogates out-groups that are unrelated to the primed conflict. Third, the potential for out-
group derogation does not appear strongly related to socioeconomic factors.  
Keywords: Experiments, immigrants, immigration, social justice, out-group derogation, 
patriotism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Researchers have long inquired about the “positive” effects of national attachment on in-
group solidarity, and its potential “negative” effects on out-group derogation. Put simply, 
there is a concern that while national attachments foster solidarity and trust, they increase 
out-group derogation in the form of nationalism or anti-immigrant sentiments. 
Importantly, however, the effect of national attachment may strongly depend on the 
context, most importantly the perception of an outside threat. Given this context 
dependency and the possibility of endogeneity, such questions are inherently difficult to 
study empirically. 
As a novel empirical contribution, this paper operationalizes the key concepts and uses 
a pre-registered survey experiment to study the effect of national attachment by employing 
videos that separately cue national attachment and external threat. An online sample of 
British voters (N=934) is exposed randomly to either a short video containing positive 
references to the United Kingdom, or a longer video that also includes scenes displaying 
World War 2, cueing external threat. The key innovation in this design is that it allows 
separating out the effects of a general sense of attachment from the effects of a prime on 
external threats facing the country. 
Three main findings result. First, only the long video increases levels of out-group 
derogation, supporting the conjecture that perceived threat is central to the negative effects 
of national attachment. Second, the in-group derogates out-groups that are unrelated to 
the primed conflict. Third, the potential for out-group derogation does not appear strongly 
related to socioeconomic factors.  
At the same time, the long video increases national pride more than the short video and 
only the long video increases beliefs in democracy but does not increase preferences for 
social justice. Only male respondents exhibit more solidarity but trust less after watching 
the video with military scenes. I ascribe this finding to an additional defence mechanism, 
rooted in evolutionary psychology in times of threat, associated with lower, not higher 
levels, of trust. Finally, by using a second randomly assigned treatment, I investigate 
whether preferences on social justice change if respondents are first primed by questions 
about immigration. I find that group heterogeneity decreases preferences for social justice 
and does so the most for high-identifiers, the lower educated and those who would not 
vote for one of the largest parties.  
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Figure 5.1. Treatment Effects on Traditional National Attachment of Long and Short 
Video (for respondents who have passed attention filters)  
 
This paper contributes to research on social identity, intergroup threat, and evolutionary 
group theory. For the first time, it experimentally demonstrates that stronger in-group 
identity in the form of national attachment is more likely to increase out-group derogation 
in the case of a perceived out-group threat. Some scholars have found support for this 
relationship with the help of observational data and smaller samples (Bizman and Yinon, 
2001; Voci, 2006; Brewer, 2007; Caricati, 2018), but results potentially suffer from 
endogeneity bias.  
Contrasting social identity theory (SIT), this paper also suggests that all groups in society 
have the disposition to derogate out-groups, e.g. independent of how strong respondents 
identify with their country in the first place (Struch and Schwartz, 1989). Finally, the results 
support the hypothesis that out-group derogation increases against groups unrelated to the 
original out-group threat.  
Moreover, the findings also contribute to the literature of the comparative political 
economy of inequality and redistribution in three ways. First, they confirm that national 
attachment can increase in-group commitment; second, priming national attachment with 
historical military scenes is more effective for in-group commitment, but also increases 
out-group derogation statistically significant; third, it suggests a new solidarity mechanism 
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that centres on an increase in perceived threat. Increased insecurity increases preferences 
for social justice for those who believe to be most affected by external conflict, e.g. male 
respondents. For example, this complements Rehm (2009) who shows that risk at the 
individual level is the strongest predictor for redistributive preferences.  
My results show that this mechanism does not translate into more democratic attitudes 
or trust but only into the willingness to share resources with the in-group.  
Finally, the paper applies an experimental approach to overcome the problems of 
endogeneity. By priming various dimensions of national identity, pride, and nationalism, it 
identifies the treatment effects of the videos. By testing both indicators and single 
dimensions in a pre-registered experiment of four outcome batteries (two for in-group 
commitment, two for out-group derogation) the use of two video treatments, the 
development of several attention filters, as well as the test of alternative mechanisms, the 
paper brings forward a more sophisticated standard of the analysis of video treatments in 
survey experiments that investigate the effect of national attachment on in-group 
commitment and out-group derogation. 
Figure 5.2. Potential effects of national attachment on in-group commitment and out-
group derogation 
 
  
 
114 
CONCEPTS 
I use the concept of national attachment as an umbrella term for different identity 
dimensions regarding nation-states. I differentiate between cognitive (ethnic or civic forms 
of national attachment) affirmative (the importance/salience of national attachment), and 
evaluative (national pride) dimensions of national attachment. Ethnic national attachment is 
represented by the idea of common descent as an important criterion for truly being a 
member of one’s country (Berg and Hjerm, 2010, p. 396).  
An out-group or intergroup threat is usually defined as incompatibility of goals, beliefs, 
attitudes, or behaviour (Myers, 2014). The nature of conflicts can vary, and the most 
common distinction focuses on realistic and symbolic threats. Realistic threats posed by 
an out-group relate to threats to the political or economic power of the in-group. Symbolic 
threats originate from perceived group differences in values, beliefs or attitudes (see Sears 
and Funk, 1991; Stephan and Stephan, 2000, p. 25).  
The consequences of perceived threat are manifold and matter for social cooperation. 
Perceived threats can lead to negative emotional and physiological reactions, adverse 
attitudes and intercultural biases, negative verbal and nonverbal behaviours, and overt 
hostile behaviour (Stephan and Stephan, 2017). Even when an out-group threat does not 
lead to hostile behavioural responses, the cognitive and affective responses to threat are 
likely to be negative (Stephan, Ybarra and Rios, 2015).  
Finally, I define out-group derogation or prejudice as the existence or expression of 
unfavourable attitudes toward an out-group. Here, it does not depend why individuals hold 
or express hostile opinions toward an out-group (Stangor, Sullivan and Ford, 1991; Esses, 
Haddock and Zanna, 1993; Haddock, Zanna and Esses, 1993; Eagly, Mladinic and Otto, 
1994; Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998) and also not whether such attitudes are 
justified, or consciously expressed (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998, pp. 720–21).  
UNDER WHICH CIRCUMSTANCES DOES IN-GROUP ATTACHMENT LEAD TO OUT-
GROUP DEROGATION?  
Many researchers believe that some forms of national attachment - if beneficial to in-group 
co-operation at all - have the potential for out-group derogation. Consequently, critics of 
national identity argue that although some forms of national identity might strengthen 
solidarity within a political community, they also reduce the inclusiveness for immigrants 
(Tajfel, 1969a; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989).  
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Initially, social identity theory stated (Tajfel, 1969a) in-group identity always lead to an 
unfavourable evaluation of an out-group (intergroup bias) in the absence of interest 
conflicts or previous group hostility, as the character in which a positive social identity 
develops is comparative, e.g. is defined in (favourable) comparisons to the (or many) out-
group(s). For example, members of a political community socially categorise themselves 
concerning nationality, religion or class and compare themselves regarding a set of criteria 
to their out-groups. Since the in-group members’ aim of such comparisons is to develop a 
positive distinctiveness to the particular out-group, (perceived) membership increases the 
positive evaluation of the in-group relative to the out-group. Even the mere perception of 
belonging to a certain group, by experimentally assigning participants to a group, already 
triggers the discrimination of non-members (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, p. 38). Stronger in-
group identities (salience) also lead to increasing inter-group bias (Mullen, Brown and 
Smith, 1992). In a cross-sectional study Louis et al. (2013) show that national attachment 
is associated with negative attitudes toward immigrants indirectly, via perceptions of 
immigrants as being in threatening zero-sum relationships, suggesting that national identity 
always leads to out-group derogation, at concerning immigrants. This confirms and direct 
link between national attachment and out-group derogation from previous studies (Curşeu, 
Stoop and Schalk, 2007).  
At the same time, the paper also confirms the centrality of threat perceptions about 
anti-immigrant sentiments as one main form of out-group derogation (Esses, Jackson and 
Armstrong, 1998; Cohrs and Asbrock, 2009; Falomir-Pichastor, Gabarrot and Mugny, 
2009). 
More recent research suggests that stronger in-group attachment only negatively affects 
out-groups in the case of an out-group threat. For example, Brewer (Brewer, 2001, 2007) or 
Brewer and Caporael (2006) argue that the correlation between in-group identity and out-
group derogation is only negative in such cases. A recent cross-sectional study (Caricati, 
2018) confirms this pattern. This reflects an evolutionary approach to group identity, which 
stresses that groups are important for basic activities such as child rearing, food collection, 
tool development, food production, or group defence and not primarily to create a social 
distinction from a certain out-group in order to develop a positive identity (Brewer, 2007; 
Sidanius and Kurzban, 2013). Halevy et al. (2008) brings forward a similar argument that 
group identity does not have to go in line with out-group derogation, as it is important for 
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internal cooperation. Finally, Voci (2006) shows that only when an in-group was 
threatened, stronger in-group attachment was associated with out-group derogation.  
Despite all the evidence that is in line with Integrated Threat Theory suggesting that 
group attachment precedes and leads to perceived threat (Stephan et al., 2009), perceived 
threat could also lead to higher levels of in-group identity.  
This possibly bidirectional relationship underlines the usefulness of the experimental 
design that primes national attachment separately under a threat and a no-threat scenario.   
Therefore, the experimental design is uniquely able to provide a test the following 
hypothesis that has emerged in the literature as described above:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The long video, which includes military scenes, but not the short video, 
increases out-group derogation. 
 
It is also important to note here also that in line with social identity theory, some 
scholarship has suggested that the strength of in-group identification matters: Bizman and 
Yinon (2001, p. 192), Struch and Schwartz (1989), and Falomir-Pichastor, Gabarrot, and 
Mugny (2009) show that at least high identifiers are more likely to derogate out-groups in 
the case of conflict. Branscombe and Wann (1994) find a similar relationship for high 
identifiers: reductions in collective self-esteem only lead to out-group derogation, following 
a threat to that identity. Tausch et al. (2007) also show that Northern Irish who strongly 
identify with their religion are far more likely than weak identifiers to translate perceived 
threats to their values or political power into negative out-group attitudes. Finally, Riek, 
Mania, and Gaertner (2006) show that high-identifiers are more likely to experience 
intergroup threat. Finally, there is some evidence that not only out-groups causing the 
threat, but groups unrelated to the source of threat were derogated (Leach et al., 2003).  
NATIONAL ATTACHMENT AND IN-GROUP COMMITMENT 
In the following, I elaborate on how national attachment as a form of in-group attachment 
can increase the willingness to share resources with co-nationals (solidarity) and to 
conform to group norms (e.g. pro-democratic attitudes). Both outcome measures are an 
essential form of in-group commitment and increase the likelihood of national cohesion.   
Solidarity. The short answer to the question of whether or not national attachment is 
indeed beneficial for solidarity is that the evidence is still inconclusive. In their study of 
attitudes in the U.S., Citrin, et al. (2001) found no link between either nationalistic 
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chauvinism or the experience of national attachment to views on government spending on 
health, education, or welfare.  
Using observational data, Johnston et al., (2010) have further shown that a strong sense 
of Canadian identity is connected to a willingness to support the welfare state, as well as 
to higher levels of trust, especially in the political institutions. Johnston et al. (2017) found 
that national pride leads to more trust in both Canada and the U.S., but that it only leads 
to more solidarity in Québec, whereas this link is non-existent in the rest of Canada and 
negative in the U.S..  
At the same time, Robinson (Robinson, 2016) found that, in such an ethnically divided 
and artificially created state as Malawi, a stronger national identification tends to make 
people both more trusting overall, and less likely to trust their ethnic group more than 
others. Yet other studies have found evidence for an opposite, negative, association 
between national attachment and egalitarian economic attitudes, both in the UK (Martinez-
Herrera, 2010), Denmark (Breidahl, Holtug and Kongshoj, 2018) as well as in cross-
national studies spanning 20 to 29 countries, respectively (Shayo, 2009; Reeskens and 
Wright, 2013).   
Given these divergent results in previous research, Miller and Ali, in their overview of 
empirical studies of the national identity argument from 2014, concluded that the 
assumption that a stronger sense of national attachment leads to more solidarity “has 
certainly not been decisively refuted, but nor has it so far been strongly confirmed” (p. 253, 
54). This still holds, even when we consider the two most recent studies. On the one hand, 
a study with new Danish data found that the more a person agrees with either conservative 
or liberal nationalism, the less trusting and willing to support the welfare state she actually 
tends to become (Breidahl, Holtug and Kongshoj, 2018).  
From all this, the most obvious conclusion is that a strong sense of national attachment 
does not promote economic egalitarianism across the board. For example, the willingness 
to support universal welfare policies, such as childcare, might be differently affected by 
national attachment than the willingness to support means-tested policies, such as 
unemployment benefits (Miller and Ali, 2014; this is also argued by Johnston et al., 2010). 
This is why the questions on social justice are formulated in a general way to avoid 
questions that are too politically charged and to rather test solidarity among co-nationals. 
As the video treatments do not include any form of information on the ethnic composition 
of the citizenry or does not prime ethnic diversity, respondents who embrace more 
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exclusive group boundaries of what it means to be “truly” British, should not respond 
differently to the treatment. 
In summary, existing research is ambiguous on the sign of the relationship between 
national attachment and social justice preferences. I hypothesize for the purposes of this 
study that it is positive, but note that this is expectation could also reasonably be reversed 
based on a reading of the literature. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Both video treatments increase general preferences for social justice  
 
Finally, higher in-group identity and economic solidarity tend to be associated with higher 
levels of depersonalized trust, i.e. directed toward all members of an in-group if the 
mechanism was tested. This comports with Lenard and Miller (2018) who support the 
hypothesis that identities provide a foundation for extending trust by permitting those who 
share them to make assumptions about the motivations and intentions of others.  
Depersonalized trust also plays an important role in explaining social cooperation at the 
national level. Brewer (1981) even defines in-group membership as a form of contingent 
altruism ((see Ashmore, Jussim and Wilder, 2001 for a more comprehensive discussion). 
As I will explain later, I will challenge this understanding of solidarity. 
Pro-democratic attitudes as group norms. Higher levels of national attachment 
could contribute to national cohesion by increasing overall support of the respective 
political system, e.g. the functioning or performance of democracy. As social identity 
theory predicts that individuals with a strong group attachment are most likely to conform 
to group norms (Turner et al., 1987; Terry, Hogg and White, 1999) individuals with higher 
levels of national attachment should also be more convinced of democracy as a political 
system. In this view citizens more strongly support these beliefs not necessarily for their 
innate values but because there are embraced by the majority of the in-group. If the main 
driver are group norms embraced by the majority, then pro-democratic beliefs should 
increase independent of whether they procedural or (substantive) outcome-oriented. 
However, outcome-oriented democratic beliefs might be easier to manipulate as stronger 
in-group attachment should always lead to a more positive view on the performance of the 
country’s institutions regardless of the area of performance.   
This is consistent with (Huddy and Khatib, 2007) who demonstrate that national 
attachment is positively associated with political interest and voter turnout in both student 
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and adult samples. However, to experimentally investigate this relationship is so crucial, as 
social capital literature assumes the opposite causal relationship (Richey, 2011).  
At the same time “high identifiers are most likely to conform to ideal or prescriptive 
norms (e.g., all good Americans should vote) rather than descriptive norms (e.g., only some 
Americans actually vote)” (Christensen et al., 2004, quoted in Huddy and Khatib, 2007) 
and are more likely to perceive groups as homogeneous (Doosje and Ellemers, 1997; 
Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 1997). This suggests that although general support for 
performance-related beliefs on democracy might increase with higher levels of national 
attachment, individuals could be more willing to extend majority rule, and more likely 
support illiberal forms of democracy.  
In short, increased support for democracy does not have to go in line with stronger 
endorsement of related democratic principles. This is why I hypothesize that video 
treatments increase support for democracy, but do not affect the willingness to protect 
minority rights.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Both video treatments increase substantive pro-democratic beliefs but 
not the willingness to protect minority rights. 
 
Heterogeneous effects. Overall the so-called ‘national identity argument’ that a strong 
sense of national attachment increases or generates some form of solidarity with the 
national in-group (Miller, 1995) necessitates a more nuanced analysis. As I have also argued 
in Chapter 3 and 4, previous research suggests that this is due to measuring the effects of 
different types of national attachment, outcome measures, but in particular because citizens 
embrace different forms of national attachment.  
For example, priming a form of national attachment that is in line with an individual’s 
conception might lead to a larger boost in national attachment at the individual level. As 
the video treatment does not prime an inclusive form of national identity, but rather one 
with an emphasis on the economy, British history, traditions, as well as in the military, I 
expect the treatment to exert stronger effects on conservative voters, as well as those who 
embrace an ethnic form of national attachment. At the same time, high-identifiers, i.e. 
those individuals who feel close or very close to their country, should also react more 
strongly to the treatment.  
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To conclude, an increase in national attachment should increase support for social justice 
principles among co-nationals and democratic beliefs. The effects should be stronger for 
those groups that embrace the form of national attachment that is experimentally primed, 
in this case voters for the conservative party, or nativists.  
EXTERNAL THREAT AND NATIONAL ATTACHMENT  
External threat can increase national cohesion either via higher levels of in-group identity 
or perceived risk, which in turn increases in-group commitment.  
The in-group identity mechanism. As described above higher levels of national 
attachment increase in-group commitment. If the perception of external threat also 
increases national attachment, priming an out-group aggression would consequently lead 
to stronger in-group commitment. For example, Moskalenko et al. (2006) show that group 
identification increases under conditions of threat. An external threat strengthens in-group 
boundaries and in-group solidarity (Coser, 1956; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Again, high 
identifiers might react more strongly to an increase in-group identity in the case of threat. 
For example, in the Netherlands Iranian immigrants who identified strongly with their 
nationality group and who perceived the Dutch as discriminatory toward their group were 
more likely to self-categorize themselves as typically Iranian (Verkuyten and Nekuee, 1999; 
Huddy, 2003, pp. 44–45). Given this evidence, I expect a treatment that primes external 
threat to increase overall national attachment in my experiment. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The long video, which includes military scenes, increases national 
attachment more than the short video. 
 
The risk mechanism. One alternative mechanism that could explain the positive 
relationship between external threat and in-group commitment operates via perceived 
insecurity, which in turn increases support for welfare state institutions. By combining the 
power-resources and revisionist school on welfare state support Rehm et. al.  (2012) argue 
that popular support for the welfare state varies with the joint distribution of economic 
disadvantage (low income) and economic in-insecurity increases support for the welfare 
state. The less correlated low income and high risk, the higher support for welfare state 
institutions. The authors also show that support extends beyond the least advantaged. 
Thus, perceived insecurity by those who are not economically disadvantaged can increase 
national solidarity. This is in line with evidence that shows that individuals who work in 
   
 
121 
sectors that are exposed to higher volatility due to economic openness (Katzenstein, 1985; 
Rodrik, 1998; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004) or who are more vulnerable to medical or 
demographic risks (Taylor-Gooby et al., 1999) are also more in favour of welfare state 
institutions. All these arguments emphasize that being exposed to risk increases support 
for the welfare state (Baldwin, 1996; Mares, 2003; Iversen, 2005) 
What seems to be true about exposure to economic risks, should also hold for more 
fundamental forms of perceived risk, such as insecurity in times of external threat or 
conflict. In potential (military) conflict, the main risk to which individuals of a national in-
group are exposed is not merely economic, e.g. being poor, but centres on an increased 
risk of being attacked or killed. Thus, priming an abstract external threat with the help of 
military scenes should also increase social justice for those who believe to be affected by 
possible conflict. If that holds true, an external threat would lead to increased support of 
social justice independently of the national attachment mechanism.  
This comports with Bowles et al. (2003) as well as Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) who 
argue that the explanation for individual participation in intergroup conflict must be rooted 
at the group level, given the strong incentive at the individual level not to engage in conflict 
when a large in-group is under threat. Over the course of human history, groups who have 
implemented more effective ways to effectively stimulate solidarity mechanisms, such by 
altruistic behaviour (i.e., ethnocentric) or via norms and institutions (Boyd et al., 2003; 
Bernhard, Fischbacher and Fehr, 2006 quoted in Halevy et al., 2008) have gained strategic 
advantage over other groups. 
However, we still do know very little about the exact mechanisms that ensure such 
solidarity mechanisms and to what extent this relates to the literature on national and 
solidarity as well as on social identity theory.  
Male in-group solidarity in times of threat. Historically, men have been the main 
agents in intergroup conflict: as aggressors as well as casualties (Goldstein, 2003; 
McDonald, Navarrete and Van Vugt, 2012). As mortality rates due to conflict very likely 
have been very high, a high selection pressure on social behaviour in particular men “may 
possess psychological bias “towards protecting and supporting one’s ingroup (particularly 
when intergroup conflict is salient)” (McDonald, Navarrete and Van Vugt, 2012). This so 
called ‘male warrior hypothesis’ suggests that men are motivated to support and defend 
their in-group in particular when threatened by another group. There is also “ethnographic 
and primatological evidence that suggests that human societies had stronger kinship ties 
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among men, rather than women” (see also Wrangham and Peterson, 1997; McDonald, 
Navarrete and Van Vugt, 2012). Of course, such perceived risk could go in line or lead to 
increased in-group identification. Here the experimental design allows to test whether this 
is the case. Without elevating it to a formal hypothesis, I suspect that males show stronger 
reactions to the long video with regard to in-group commitment and out-group derogation.  
Group heterogeneity and social justice.  Finally, one of the major concerns of both 
the proponents and critics of the national identity argument is that ethnic diversity 
decreases solidarity. There are various publications spanning political science, economics 
and sociology that show that not only immigrant but religious, ethnic or cultural 
heterogeneity can shape preferences on redistribution or the actual institutions (Alesina 
and Giuliano, 2011; Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2013), but at least the relationship 
between ethnic diversity and public spending or individual attitudes/behaviour although 
mixed was negative in the majority of the cases. Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) show 
that citizens usually favour conditional access of immigrants to the social welfare based on 
citizenship or paying taxes and that this is more strongly the case in countries with higher 
shares of immigrants.  
I experimentally induce group heterogeneity by randomly asking questions about 
immigration before the battery on social justice preferences. Merely thinking about 
immigration should lead to a reduction then reduce support of social justice principles. As 
the experiment does not prime an inclusive form of national identity, I expect that the 
heterogeneity treatment is not weaker for the treatment groups of the first experiment, but 
probably the video inducing threat might even strengthen the negative effect of the 
heterogeneity treatment. Moreover, I expect that those groups which have a stronger 
preference for group homogeneity, e.g. nativists, high identifiers, as well as conservative 
voters, to reduce support more after being asked about immigration first.  
SAMPLE, EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT  
Sample. The sample consists of 934 respondents who participated in a survey, conducted 
in the United Kingdom in April 2018. Respondents received a small payment for the 
completion of the survey and the correct response to two attention filter questions. 
Respondents in the sample are usually younger and more educated than the average 
population. 44% of the sample are male, 55% are female. 49% have an academic degree, 
16% a higher education below degree level, 22% A-level or equivalent, an 12% a GCSE 
A-C/O-level, equivalent or less. The sample consists disproportionately high of voters for 
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the Labour party (47%), followed by voters for the Conservative party (20%). The 
responses were answered by the microtasking platform clickworkers and the survey was 
conducted with the survey platform questionpro. The survey was designed to take about 
10 minutes to answer and respondents received a small remuneration for the successful 
completion of the survey, i.e. having correctly responded to the two main attention filters. 
The average time for completion of the survey was slightly more than ten minutes, the 
median time slightly less than 12 minutes, and only 1% of all respondents spend less than 
three minutes or less on the survey.  
Intervention Description. The first treatment consists of a video that positively 
frames the United Kingdom in order to increase national attachment. The first-order 
treatment consists in testing a video against no video. The second-order treatment is the 
display of a short and a long version of the video in order to better evaluate the effects of 
the video’s content. As shown in Figure 5.3, for the first minute of the video respondents 
see landscape scenes. Subsequently, the longer video additionally shows images of a British 
aircraft carrier and fighter jets, a modern production site, as well as the city of London. In 
both videos, besides instrumental music, short statements are occasionally faded in in on 
the bottom right of the screen with content such as “You come from a land steeped in 
History” or “You come from a land steeped in Culture”. In the additional scenes of the 
longer video the phrases read “A land of free thinkers and risk takers” and “A land of 
advanced design and technology” are shown. This is followed by a scene of members of 
the royal family in a church with the subtext “A land of tradition and monarchy”. Here 
ends the additional scene of the longer video. Towards the end of both videos another 
sequence of landscape scenes is displayed with a final text “A land of glorious beauty and 
wonder”. The videos play just slightly less than two/three and a half minutes. No text or 
video is shown to the control group. After both videos, respondents are asked to mention 
three reasons why they like to live in the UK. 
The aim of the intervention is to increase predominantly exclusive forms of national 
pride and consequently response levels of the battery on national pride (nine questions 
with five levels). The second video also aims to prime an external threat with the help of 
historical scenes from Second World War.  
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Figure 5.3. Image of Video Treatment in Online Survey 
Both videos do not show any scene that promotes ethnic, religious, or cultural diversity, 
thus rather emphasizing elements of national attachment that are usually considered as 
conservative: landscapes, a common history and culture, as well as economic or military 
strength. Here, I am interested in whether priming homogenous views on national identity 
already leads to out-group derogation, increased nationalism or decreased support for the 
protection of minorities, as suspected by the political left. 
In addition to two main attention filters, questions towards the final part of the survey 
are designed to test whether respondents have fully watched the video, whether they 
watched the video with sound.  
The second treatment consists of changing the block order of the outcome variables 
on social justice and on anti-immigrant sentiments of the first treatment. The aim of 
displaying questions on immigration first, is to investigate whether merely thinking about 
immigration weakens the hypothesized link between national belonging and preferences 
for social justice - at least for the group of individuals that is highly concerned about 
immigration. 
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Experimental Design. Table 5.1 displays the experimental design which follows a 3x2 
factorial design. Prior to the intervention, baseline covariates (age, education, gender, etc.) 
are gathered. Random assignment is established by the randomizer algorithm on the survey 
platform “questionpro”. The different versions of the video allow me to measure what 
impact the additional military scenes have on the outcome measures. 
Table 5.1. Experimental Design  
  Experiment 2 
  Immigration 
DVs first   
Social Justice 
DVs First  
Experiment 
1 
Short Video: Landscapes only   
Long Video: Additional military 
scenes and Churchill speech 
 
 
  
 Control   
 
The survey experiment was tested with a pilot study and pre-registered via the Evidence 
and Governance and Politics (EGAP) platform. EGAP is the leading cross-disciplinary 
network of researchers and practitioners to generate and disseminate evidence based on 
rigorous research on topics of governance, politics, and institutions.  
MEASUREMENT AND ESTIMATION 
The post-treatment/outcome measures include questions on national pride, anti-
immigrant sentiments, and preferences on social justice (Table 5.2). All questions and 
batteries are based on survey questions of the ISSP 2013 and EVS 2008 datasets. I 
construct a national pride indicator with aggregated indicator of all nine dimensions asked 
in the pride battery. I also test models that only include the traditional dimensions of 
national pride as the objective of the treatment was to prime these dimensions.  
To reduce measurement error, I test the average effect on the respective indicator of 
the outcome variable. The national pride indicator consists of nine items, the democracy 
indicator of five, the battery on social justice on three, the anti-immigrant sentiments 
indicator of three dimensions, and the EU indicator of four dimensions.  
To test alternative hypotheses, outcome variables on life satisfaction, optimism and 
perception of economic security are included. All outcome variables lean on the variables 
used in other papers that use observational data to compare the results. 
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Table 5.2. Outcome Measures 
 Indicator and Question Type Question Scale 
P National Pride Indicator   
P1  How proud are you of 
being British? 
4 point scale: very 
proud – not 
proud at all 
P2 How proud of Britain are you in 
each of the following? (for P2-P9) 
 
The way democracy 
works 
4 point scale: very 
proud – not 
proud at all 
P3  Britain’s economic 
achievements 
4 point scale: very 
proud – not 
proud at all 
P4  Britain’s scientific and 
technological 
achievements 
“ 
P5  Britain’s achievements 
in sports 
““ 
P6  Britain’s achievements 
in the arts and literature 
“ 
P7  Britain’s armed forces “ 
P8  Britain’s history “ 
P9  Britain’s fair and equal 
treatment of all groups 
in society 
“ 
N National Identity Indicator   
  How important is being 
British to you? 
4 point scale (very 
important –not 
important at all) 
  When talking about 
British people, how 
often do you say “we” 
instead of “they”? 
4 point scale (very 
often – not often 
at all) 
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I Anti-Immigrant Indicator   
I1  Immigrants are a strain 
on a country’s welfare 
system 
10 point scale: 
Fully disagree – 
Fully agree 
I2  Britain’s culture is 
generally undermined 
by immigrants 
“ 
I3  In the future the 
proportion of 
immigrants will become 
a threat to society 
“ 
I4  The government spends 
not enough money 
supporting immigrants 
“ 
S Social Justice Indicator   
S1  Income inequalities 
are too big, and 
government should tax 
high earners in order to 
reduce them. 
10 point scale: 
Fully disagree – 
Fully agree 
S2  The government 
must ensure that 
everyone has sufficient 
resources to meet their 
basic needs. 
“ 
S3  It’s unfair if some 
people are able to buy 
higher quality health 
care than others. 
“ 
D Democracy Indicator   
D1  Democracy may have 
problems but it’s better 
10 point scale: 
Fully disagree – 
Fully agree 
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than any other form of 
government 
D2  In a democracy the 
economic system runs 
badly 
“ 
D3  Democracies are 
indecisive and result in 
too much squabbling 
 
D4  Democracies aren’t 
good at maintaining 
order 
“ 
 Minority Dem Check    
M1  In democracies majority 
rule should be limited in 
order to protect 
minority rights 
“ 
EU EU fears Indicator  10 point scale: 
Very much afraid 
- Not afraid at all 
=10 
EU1 Some people may have fears 
about the European Union. Here 
are a number of things which 
people say they are afraid of. For 
each tell me if you - personally - 
are currently afraid of: 
 
The loss of social 
security 
“ 
EU2 “ The loss of national 
identity and culture 
“ 
EU3 “ A loss of power in the 
world for Britain 
“ 
EU4 “ Job losses in Britain “ 
 Alternative Mechanisms    
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 Economic Security How would you 
describe the economic 
situation in Britain? 
10 point scale: 
Very bad =1 – 
very good=10 
 Optimism How optimistic are you 
about Britain’s future? 
10 point scale: 
Not at all 
optimistic = 1  
Very optimistic= 
10 
 Life Satisfaction When you consider your 
life in general, how 
happy or unhappy 
would you say you are? 
10 point scale: 
Completely 
unhappy = 1  
Very happy = 10 
 Trust  Generally speaking, 
would you say that most 
people can be trusted? 
10 point scale: 
Completely No = 
1  Yes = 10 
 
Estimation. First, I am pooling the two treatment conditions (long and short video) and 
compare with them with the control group (no video). In a second step, to test hypothesis 
H1c, I compare all three conditions against each other. For estimation, I will use ordinary 
least square regressions of the indicator outcomes.   
In a first step, I estimate simple bivariate regressions of the outcomes on the treatment 
condition without control variables and graph coefficients from these regressions in simple 
coefplots with 95% confidence intervals (unadjusted models). Second, to increase 
precision and to test balance, I will control for the baseline covariates, listed below, in a 
second specification (adjusted models). For the hypotheses about heterogeneous treatment 
effects, I will assign respondents to groups based on their baseline covariates in the 
following way: Respondents that score above 2 on the 4-point scale on the nativism scale 
are considered “nativists”, the others “non-nativists”. Respondents without an advanced 
degree are considered low education, the rest high education. I will distinguish between 
male and female respondents based on the baseline responses. If respondents respond that 
they would vote Labour/Tory in the next parliamentary election, they are treated as 
Labour/Tory voters.  
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RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
My results of the treatment effects on the main outcome measures are displayed in Table 
5.3 and Figure 5.4. Table 5.3 only reports the results of the unadjusted models. Using OLS 
regressions I confirm that both videos increase the national pride indicator. The coefficient 
size of the long video is more than 50% larger than for the short video. Moreover, the 
effect on national identity is not significant for the short video treatment. This all suggests 
that creating an abstract external threat is more effective in fostering national pride and 
national identity. The long video increases in-group commitment, but against my 
expectations not through the social justice mechanism, but via an increase in pro-
democratic attitudes. At the same time my results make clear that the external-threat video 
increases nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiments (significant at the 10% level for the 
unadjusted models), but not the video without military scenes. In short, using external 
threat to foster national solidarity comes at the cost of out-group derogation.  
Table 5.3. Regression results of OLS models: (without adjusted models) 
 
Long Video 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES tradid4 attachment sj4 demopos natio wchauv4ind 
       
videotreat 0.241*** 0.206** -0.00822 0.121** 0.158* 0.232** 
 (0.0591) (0.0808) (0.0850) (0.0542) (0.0897) (0.104) 
Constant 3.183*** 2.794*** 2.860*** 2.913*** 2.454*** 1.474*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0512) (0.0536) (0.0345) (0.0561) (0.0656) 
       
Observations 405 393 405 393 391 404 
R-squared 0.040 0.016 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.012 
 
Short Video 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
tradid4 attachment sj4 demopos natio wchauv4ind 
      
0.101* 0.117 0.00569 0.0545 0.00147 0.0394 
(0.0586) (0.0825) (0.0819) (0.0533) (0.0858) (0.0965) 
3.183*** 2.794*** 2.860*** 2.913*** 2.454*** 1.474*** 
(0.0387) (0.0537) (0.0541) (0.0352) (0.0564) (0.0636) 
      
432 408 432 416 419 430 
0.007 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5.4. Treatment Effects on Main Outcome Measures 
 
Figure 5.5 allows a closer look at the treatment effects for each dimension of national pride. 
In line with Figure 5.4 the general the treatment effects are larger for the long video than 
for the short video. The long video leads to an increase in the pride of being British, the 
economy, arts and literature, the Armed Forces, and British history. At the same time civic 
dimensions of national pride, i.e. fair and equal treatment of all groups in society, scientific 
and technological achievements or the way democracy works have not increased. This 
suggests that the long video fosters a traditional form of pride with an emphasis on the 
military, the economy, and in one’s citizenship and not of political institutions.  
For the short video only the pride indicator, consisting of all nine dimensions, is 
statistically significant. Consequently, creating an external threat through military images 
and historical memory of war, does not only lead to an increase in military pride, but also 
to an increase in conflict-unrelated dimensions of national pride such as the economy.  
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Figure 5.5. Treatment Effects on National Pride  
 
In contrast to my expectations the treatment effect on national pride is not stronger for 
nativists, male respondents and the lower educated (Figure 5.6). This could be due to the 
higher baselines of national pride for nativists and the lower educated. As the baseline 
differences between male and female respondents in the control group are very small and 
invert in both treatment groups, such absolute differences should not be the reason for 
heterogeneous treatment effects. At the same time high identifiers, i.e. respondents who 
feel close or very close to Britain, also show stronger levels of national pride in the control 
groups and react more strongly to the treatment. 
I also find heterogeneous treatment effects for all respondents who do not intend to 
vote for the Conservative or Labour party for both the long and the short video treatment. 
Finally, the treatment effects are not different conditional on formal education.  
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Figure 5.6. Treatment Effects on National Pride Indicator 
 
In line with total effect on national pride, the treatment effect on national identity is higher 
for the long video (Figure 5.7). However, the differences between the short and the long 
video are larger than for national pride. No subgroup shows a statistically significant 
change in national identity after having watched the short video. Female respondents, 
Conservative voters strongly respond to the long video, and those who do not vote for 
Labour, and the higher educated strongly respond to the video. Again, against my 
expectations respondents who do not embrace an ethnic form of national identity (non-
nativists) increase levels of national identity, but not nativists. 
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Figure 5.7. Treatment Effects on National Identity 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the treatment effects on the social justice indicator. Three results stand 
out: first the video treatments are not statistically significant for the sample; second, the 
video treatment increases preferences for social justice for the higher educated (49% of 
the sample) and the control group baselines are not statistically different for the lower and 
higher educated; third, male respondents increase their support for social justice. As the 
treatment effects on in-group identity are statistically and substantially insignificant for 
male respondents, this suggests that this boost in solidarity is attributed to a different 
mechanism. Overall treatment effects on national identity are only weakly correlated with 
experimentally induced increases in solidarity.  
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Figure 5.8. Treatment Effects on Social Justice 
 
As displayed in Figure 5.9 the long, but not the short video, overall increases anti-
immigrant sentiments. Against my expectations, the effects on anti-immigrant sentiments 
are rather homogenous and with regard to the subgroup of Labour voters, are unexpected. 
Figure 5.9. Treatment Effects on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments 
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Figure 5.10 displays the treatment effects of the video treatments on the democracy 
indicator. Although the effect for all videos for the whole sample is statistically at the 10% 
significance level, the positive effect of the overall video treatment is mainly driven by the 
long video. In particular, high identifiers (63% of the sample), nativists (38%), and 
Conservative voters (17%) strongly react to the long video treatment, whereas labour 
voters react both on the long and the short video (labour voters constitute 40% of the 
sample).  
Quite surprisingly female, but not male respondents, increase pro-democratic attitudes 
after having watched the video priming military threat. This is in line with the hypothesis 
of an additional risk mechanism: a subjectively perceived threat by an out-group increases 
male solidarity but does not increase democratic attitudes. 
Figure 5.10. Treatment Effects on Pro-Democratic Attitudes 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.11 this overall increase in outcome-related pro-democratic 
attitudes does not translate into the willingness to limit majority rule to protect minority 
rights – if at all respondents become more illiberal. For example, those who do not intend 
to vote for labour (including non-voters) show a negative effect size of -0.18 at the 10% 
level of significance. 
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Figure 5.11. Treatment Effects on Protection of Minority Rights  
 
In particular, the long video treatment reduces trust levels for male respondents by 0.75 
corresponding to a significance level of less than 1% (Figure 5.14 in the appendix). At the 
same time trust increases for female respondents. The increase of male respondents in 
solidarity is not associated with an increase in-group identity. This negative association of 
trust and social justice contrasts with social identity theory and the national identity 
argument that emphasizes increased depersonalized trust within the in-group as key 
element of increasing support for social justice principles.   
Finally, Figure 5.12 displays the treatment effects of asking questions on immigration 
first. First, support on social justice decrease if respondents are asked about immigration 
questions first; second, solidarity decreases more for high identifiers, the lower educated 
and those who would not vote for one of the largest political parties; third, the 
heterogeneity effect by far the largest for the group that has watched the video with military 
scenes (ATE:-0.47, p-value=0.057) and statistically and substantially insignificant for the 
group that watched the small video (ATE:0.11 p-value=0.620). This suggests that the long 
video does not only increase levels of out-group derogation, but that it also decreases in-
group solidarity more strongly with increased levels of ethnic heterogeneity.  
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Figure 5.12. Thinking about Immigration: Effect on Social Justice Preferences 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
First, I report balance tables to demonstrate covariate balance across treatment conditions. 
Second, I display survey completion rates across conditions to assess attrition. As an 
additional robustness check on how attrition could impact average treatment effects, I 
calculate “Lee trimming” bounds for all outcomes. Third, I rerun all results, subsetting 
only on respondents who correctly answered the attention filter questions. This is different 
so the baseline specification, in part because attention might be affected by the treatment.   
Balance. I test balance of the baseline covariates, which had been used for the adjusted 
models, over the combined treatment of both videos as well as the over the long and short 
video separately. For all three tests, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment 
model balanced the covariates. Regressing all baseline covariates on treatment groups also 
confirms successfully established balance (Table 5.4).   
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Table 5.4. Balance test: regressing treatment groups on baseline covariates  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES All Videos Long Video Short Video 
    
High identifiers 0.0490 0.0597 0.0481 
 (0.0340) (0.0437) (0.0417) 
Nativists 0.0275 0.0207 0.0353 
 (0.0347) (0.0460) (0.0439) 
Education -0.0182 -0.0190 -0.0190 
 (0.0324) (0.0422) (0.0402) 
Gender -0.0339 -0.0577 -0.0192 
 (0.0322) (0.0420) (0.0400) 
Voting conservative -0.0334 -0.0126 -0.0560 
 (0.0465) (0.0603) (0.0581) 
Voting labour -0.00951 -0.000131 -0.0208 
 (0.0356) (0.0461) (0.0442) 
Constant 0.675*** 0.503*** 0.517*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0826) (0.0785) 
    
Observations 904 580 645 
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.005 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition to that, balance plots allow an even closer look at the distribution of relevant 
covariates across treatment groups (Raw). In Figure 5.13, I exemplarily display the 
distribution of political ideology, which is almost identically distributed over treatment and 
control groups. All other controls follow the same pattern. Overall, all evidence supports 
the assumption that all treatment groups had been randomly assigned.   
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Figure 5.13. Visualization of additional balance test: density plots of political ideology 
across treatment groups 
 
ATTRITION AND LEE TRIMMING BOUNDS 
As expected, attrition rates are very low, as respondents were only paid after having 
answered all questions, including correctly passed attention filters. Attrition for the control 
group is slightly higher (2.45%) than for the short (1.23%) and long video (1.15%). 
Although the assignment of each treatment is perfectly random, estimated treatment 
effects could suffer from bias, if the available sample is subject to partially non-random 
sample selection or partially non-random sample attrition. This is why I display leebound 
estimates for the main models, displayed in Table 5.6, as additional robustness check. 
Leebounds assume that the treatment status affects attrition only in one direction. The 
displayed lower and upper bounds correspond to extreme assumptions about missing data 
that is still in line with the observed data (Tauchmann, 2014). All lower trimming bounds 
are above zero, suggesting that the coefficient size of all outcome measures would be 
positive even if attrition biased results negatively in the most extreme way.   
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Table 5.5. Lower and upper treatment effect bounds (leebounds) for main outcome 
measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES National 
pride 
National pride 
(long video) 
National 
identity 
National 
identity (long 
video) 
Nationalism 
      
Lower bound 0.0977** 0.127*** 0.0896 0.146** 0.0709 
 (0.0391) (0.0454) (0.0593) (0.0705) (0.0648) 
Upper bound 0.132*** 0.162*** 0.130** 0.189*** 0.118* 
 (0.0407) (0.0457) (0.0616) (0.0732) (0.0667) 
      
Observations 913 587 868 561 886 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Nationalism 
(long video) 
Anti-
immigrant 
sentiments 
Anti-immigrant 
sentiments (long 
video) 
Social 
justice 
Social 
justice 
(long video) 
Support for 
democracy 
Support for 
democracy 
(long video) 
       
0.126 0.0578 0.0922 0.0477 0.0659 0.0479 0.0827* 
(0.0777) (0.0569) (0.0695) (0.0609) (0.0718) (0.0404) (0.0480) 
0.175** 0.104* 0.140** 0.0921 0.112 0.0872** 0.123** 
(0.0800) (0.0545) (0.0670) (0.0631) (0.0740) (0.0414) (0.0490) 
       
570 906 582 913 587 884 568 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
PASSED FILTER SUBSET 
In the following, I shortly discuss all previous graphs for the subset of respondents who 
have successfully passed attention filters (all included in the appendix). In general, the 
results for the subset of respondents who have correctly answered the two main attention 
filters are robust and become even more pronounced. One exception denotes the outcome 
measure on social justice preferences, which becomes completely significant for all 
subgroups at the 5 per cent level. The treatment effects of the long video on the different 
dimensions in national pride (Figure 5.16) also become more pronounced, as being British, 
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pride in Britain’s armed forces, as well as pride in Britain’s history turn significant at the 
5% level. Only the statistical significance of pride in the economy is decreases slightly.  
Moreover, the pride indicator battery now increases at the 5% level for high identifiers 
and the higher educated both after having watched the short and long video (Figure 5.17). 
The effects on nationalism remain statistically insignificant except for women who have 
watched the long video.  
The results remain unchanged for anti-immigrants and remain statistically significant at 
the 5% per cent level for the entire group who has watched the long video. At the same 
time the treatment effects on nationalism remain statistically insignificant.  
The effect sizes on democratic attitudes also remain stable. High identifiers and nativists 
show the same positive effect after having watched the long video (Figure 5.21). The 
overall treatment effect for having watched a video on pro-democratic attitudes remains 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The strong positive effect for labour voters after 
having watched both videos has increased even more. The strong positive effect for 
conservatives after having watched the long video also increases. Finally, the overall 
negative effect of the heterogeneity treatment is also robust if at all more pronounced, 
including the negative effect for high identifiers, female respondents and those who do not 
vote for the Labour party (Figure 5.23).  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
By having experimentally induced a traditional form of national attachment with two video 
treatments under a threat and a no-threat condition in a pre-registered randomized online 
survey experiment  (N=934), I have provided evidence for three main findings that 
contribute to the literature on social identity, intergroup threat, and on national attachment: 
first national attachment only increased out-group derogation in the case of an out-group 
threat; second, out-groups unrelated to the threat were derogated; third, against my 
expectations, the effect was homogenous for all sub-groups, e.g. unconditional on lower 
formal levels of education or strength of in-group attachment.  
All three findings support the centrality of threat for the relationship between in-group 
attachment and out-group derogation and consequently contrast with the main claim of 
social identity theory that in-group attachment has to go in line with out-group derogation.   
These results highlight one of the key innovations and contributions of this paper: 
developing a research design that explicitly separates and manipulates national attachment 
and a threat scenario. 
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Moreover, the treatments increased support for outcome-oriented beliefs in democracy, 
but the effect on social justice was mixed. With regard to social justice preferences, higher 
educated respondents were more willing to share resources after the treatment. Male 
respondents only displayed more social justice preferences after having watched the long 
video showing military scenes from the Second World War, suggesting a particular defence 
mechanism in times of threat that is not associated with higher levels of trust. In contrast 
to most extant evidence, increased willingness to cooperate was not positively, but 
negatively, associated with trust. This might reflect different associations with the “most 
people” mentioned in the survey question. In any case, the strong boost in solidarity 
preferences cannot be explained with any of the alternative mechanisms, including national 
attachment, as male respondents did not react to the video treatment.  
The long video including military scenes also led to higher levels of national attachment 
and pro-democratic attitudes, suggesting that out-group threats increase in-group identity 
in the form of national attachment. 
At the same time, increased support for democracy did not translate into a higher 
willingness to protect minorities – if at all the opposite. Consequently, priming national 
attachment could lead to stronger support for majoritarian politics as in “illiberal 
democracies”, which is also in line with social identity theory: being more convinced about 
the performance and the moral superiority of democratic systems does not have to go in 
line with being more considerate of minorities. This also connects with George Klosko 
(2004) who has identified such an illiberal potential of the American electorate by showing 
that a large share of citizens who strongly express their support for democratic principles 
and for the protection of individual rights are not necessarily against restricting liberties 
for unpopular minority groups. Whether that, as Klosko argued, can be ascribed to the 
factual high level of disagreement on how to interpret basic political rights is another 
debate, but the experimental results in this paper provide strong evidence that an increase 
in beliefs in the overall merit of democracy is rather a result of following commonsensical 
group norms or the conviction that the majority in democracies have more to say, even at 
the cost of minorities.  
Critics might argue that it is the length of exposure to treatment and not the video’s 
additional content that leads to out-group derogation and higher levels of national 
attachment. Two arguments refute this objection: first, respondents’ attention is higher at 
the beginning of video treatments and not at the end. As the long video is only 25% longer 
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than the short video, the additional length should have a minor effect on outcome 
measures. Second, even if the length of exposure mattered, the coefficients of the measures 
on out-group derogation would not have to be statistically significant, but should at least 
deviate from zero in the shorter video, which is not the case.   
On a more applied note, the results reveal the mechanisms behind how political leaders 
sometimes successfully secure political power by increasing the salience of an external 
threat and are able to gain support for their political purposes: external threat increases in-
group attachment and strengthens the disposition to support group norms, such as support 
for the present political system while simultaneously having a lower willingness to accept 
minorities or minority positions. For example, this mechanism might be able to explain 
the “Falklands effect”, or what some have argued was increased support of Margaret 
Thatcher’s policies after the successful Falkland war in 1982. The war is often considered 
as a turning point of Thatcher’s career. Before the military conflict with Argentina, 
significant parts of the Conservative party openly conspired against her, while most 
believed that Thatcher would not survive the next national election. By some accounts at 
least, British victory led to increased support for Thatcher and set the foundation for the 
“Thatcherism” of the 1980s (Reicher and Hopkins, 1996). 
The results also contribute to the understanding on why illiberal political leaders such 
as Vladimir Putin or Viktor Orbán successfully use external threats as a fundamental part 
in their political narratives to justify oppressive popular rule in the name of a rather 
homogeneous nation.   
At the same time priming a more inclusive form of national attachment does not have 
to lead to lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments or prejudice (Hewstone, 1996; 
Branscombe et al., 1999; Hewstone, Rubin and Willis, 2002; Jetten, Spears and Postmes, 
2004; Waldzus and Mummendey, 2004), as inclusive forms of in-group attachment might 
threaten existing identities (Esses et al., 2006, p. 657) and even perceived positive 
interdependence with another out-group might threaten intergroup differentiation of high 
identifiers with an exclusive form of national attachment. As a consequence, inclusive 
elements of national attachment should probably be moderately primed.  
As expected, the second “heterogeneity treatment” led to lower support of social justice 
principles and more so for high identifiers. Against my expectations, this was not the case 
for nativists. The lower educated reduced support of social justice, but the effect became 
insignificant after subsetting for those who passed attention filters. Moreover, women – 
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not men – reduced support for social justice. The experimentally induced type of external 
threat, military conflict, can explain this pattern, as male responded might feel to be more 
likely to be affected by such threat and hence show more solidarity among co-nationals. 
Surprisingly, conservative voters did not reduce support, but those who would not have 
voted for the Labour or the Conservative party. Probably, group heterogeneity has a 
stronger effect on those individuals who do not feel sufficiently represented in the political 
spectrum. Finally, the heterogeneity treatment was the strongest for those who have 
watched the long video, but statistically insignificant for the short video group. This 
suggests that priming an out-group threat, does not only increase out-group derogation, 
but strengthens the corrosive effect of group heterogeneity on preferences for social 
justice. Of course, heterogeneity could be understood in many different ways, e.g. religious, 
ethnic or linguistic, and asking questions on migration first could result in priming all these 
different forms of heterogeneity separately. Consequently, further research could more 
closely identify which forms of heterogeneity exert the strongest decrease on preferences 
for social justice.  
Lastly, priming traditional forms of national attachment without the use of an out-
group threat had only limited beneficial effects on preferences for social justice although 
it increased levels of national pride and support for democracy. Further research should 
test whether priming moderately inclusive forms of national pride, e.g. by displaying 
positive images of ethnic diversity of the citizenry, have the potential to increase in-group 
commitment without increasing out-group aggression. If such a moderate inclusive 
national identity treatment also reduced the experimentally induced decrease of social 
justice principles by the heterogeneity treatment across all national subgroups, this would 
provide strong evidence that an inclusive form of national attachment could not only 
increase solidarity but also reduce the corrosive effect of ethnic diversity on social 
cooperation at the national level.  
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APPENDIX  
Figure 5.14. Treatment Effects on Trust 
 
Figure 5.15. Treatment Effects on Main Outcome Measures (Passed Filter Subset) 
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Figure 5.16. Treatment Effects on National Pride (Passed Filter Subset) 
 
Figure 5.17. Treatment Effects on National Pride Indicator (Passed Filter Subset) 
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Figure 5.18. Treatment Effects on National Identity (Passed Filter Subset) 
 
Figure 5.19. Treatment Effects on Social Justice (Passed Filter Subset) 
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Figure 5.20. Treatment Effects on Anti-Immigrant Sentiments (Passed Filter Subset) 
 
Figure 5.21. Treatment Effects on Pro-Democratic Attitudes (Passed Filter Subset) 
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Figure 5.22. Treatment Effects on Alternative Outcome Measures (Passed Filter 
Subset) 
 
Figure 5.23. Thinking about Immigration: Effect on Social Justice Preferences (Passed 
Filter Subset) 
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Figure 5.24. Treatment Effects of Long Video on Democratic Attitudes 
 
ONLINE SURVEY 
We would like to learn more about your perceptions of the United Kingdom. Please note 
that you should not use your browser’s back button as this will invalidate your answers. 
Please do not forget to click on the “Submit” button at the very end of the survey. All of 
your responses will be kept strictly confidential and never associated with your name. 
Please start the survey now by clicking on the “Next” button below.  
 
In politics, people talk of ‘‘the Left’’ and ‘‘the Right’’. How would you place your 
views on this scale, generally speaking? 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t 
know 
             
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If there was a general election tomorrow, would you vote? 
Yes, I would vote 
No, I would not vote 
Don’t know 
No answer  
I do not have voting 
rights in my country of residence 
 
Which party would you vote for? 
Conservative 
Labour 
Scottish National Party 
Liberal Democrats 
DUP 
Sinn Féin 
UKIP 
Green Party 
Other party 
No answer 
Don’t know 
 
Which party appeals to you most? 
Conservative 
Labour 
Scottish National Party 
Liberal Democrats 
DUP 
Sinn Féin 
UKIP 
Green party 
Other party 
No answer 
Don’t know 
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There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of the country should be for 
the next ten years. Some of the goals which some people would rate a top priority, 
are listed on this card. If you had to choose, what would you rate as most important. 
Please mark the most important aim with “1” and the least important with “4”. 
Maintaining order in the nation __________ 
Giving people more say in important government decisions __________ 
Fighting rising prices  __________ 
Protecting freedom of speech __________ 
 
Please select which statement best describes the financial situation of your 
household. 
It is very difficult at the moment 
We / I have a lower income than we would like but we get by 
We / I have a good income but are not wealthy 
We / I have a sufficient income to meet our needs and can save for the future 
 
Some people say the following things are important for being truly British. Others 
say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? 
 Very 
important 
Quite 
important 
Not 
important 
Not 
important 
at all 
Don’t 
know 
To have been born in Britain      
To respect Britain’s political 
institutions 
     
To have British ancestry      
To have lived for a long time in 
Britain 
     
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How close do you feel to... 
 Very 
close 
Close  Not 
very close  
Not 
close at 
all 
Don’t 
know 
your town or city?      
your county?      
Britain?      
Europe?      
 
Are you.. 
Male 
Female 
No answer  
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
No secondary qualifications  
Skills for Life (including Basic Skills, Key Skills, Entry Level Certificates) 
GCSE D-G/CSE or equivalent 
GCSE A-C/O-level or equivalent 
A-level or equivalent 
Higher education below degree level 
Bachelor’s degree 
Master’s degree 
Doctoral degree  
 
How old are you? 
18-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
over 70 
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[First Experiment: Random Selection of one of the Three Groups] 
[Display of Short Video] 
Please watch the whole of the video with sound as questions with regard to the 
content may be asked later. 
or [Display of Long Video] 
Please watch the whole of the video with sound as questions with regard to the 
content may be asked later. 
or [Display Control Group] 
Please click on “Next”. 
 
[End of Video Experiment] 
 
How proud are you of being British? 
Very proud 
Somewhat proud 
Not very proud 
Not proud at all 
Don’t know  
I am not British 
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How proud of Britain are you in each of the following? 
 Very 
proud 
Somewhat 
proud 
Not very 
proud 
Not 
proud at 
all 
Don’t 
know 
The way democracy works      
Britain’s economic achievements      
Britain’s scientific and technological 
achievements 
     
Britain’s achievements in sports       
Britain’s achievements in the arts 
and literature 
     
Britain’s armed forces      
Britain’s history      
Britain’s fair and equal treatment of 
all groups in society 
     
 
How important is being British to you? 
Very important 
Quite important 
Not important 
Not important at all 
Don’t know 
I am not British 
 
When talking about British people, how often do you say “we” instead of “they”? 
Very often 
Quite often 
Not often 
Not often at all 
Don’t know 
I am not British 
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[Experiment 2: Random Order of Immigration and Social Justice Battery] 
There are differing opinions concerning immigrants in the United Kingdom. (By 
‘immigrants’ we mean people who chose to settle in Britain). How much do 
you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N/A 
Immigrants are a 
strain on a country’s 
welfare system 
           
Britain’s culture is 
generally undermined 
by immigrants 
           
In the future the 
proportion of 
immigrants will become 
a threat to society 
           
The government 
spends not enough 
money supporting 
immigrants 
           
 
There are differing opinions concerning social justice in the United Kingdom. How 
much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Income inequalities 
are too high and the 
government should tax 
high earners in order to 
reduce them. 
          
The government must 
ensure that everyone has 
          
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sufficient resources to 
meet his or her basic 
needs. 
It’s unfair if some 
people are able to buy 
higher quality healthcare 
than others. 
          
 
The following statements are often made about a democratic political system. 
Please indicate if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly. 
 Agree 
strongly 
Agree  Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
Democracy may have problems but 
it’s better than any other form of 
government 
     
In a democracy the economic system 
runs badly 
     
Democracies are indecisive and 
result in too much squabbling 
     
Democracies aren’t good at 
maintaining order 
     
In democracies majority rule should 
be limited in order to protect minority 
rights 
     
 
How would you describe the economic situation in Britain? 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t 
know 
             
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The United Kingdom is a better country than most other countries. 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t 
know 
             
 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted? 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t 
know 
             
 
Some people may have fears about the European Union. Here are a number of 
things which people say they are afraid of. For each tell me if you - personally - are 
currently afraid of: 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t 
know 
The loss of social 
security 
           
The loss of 
national identity and 
culture 
           
A loss of power in 
the world for Britain 
           
Job losses in 
Britain 
           
 
How optimistic are you about Britain’s future? 
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t 
know 
             
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When you consider your life in general, how happy or unhappy would you say you 
are?  
 1
  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Don’t 
know 
             
 
If you were one of those who watched a video clip, what was not shown? 
Landscape images 
A red RAF plane 
Images of the Royal Family 
The national soccer team 
I have not watched a video clip 
 
Have you watched the video with sound? 
Yes 
No 
 
What did you think or feel when you were watching the video? 
 
 
 
 
 
Generally, are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Britain? 
Very satisfied 
Rather satisfied 
Not very satisfied 
Not at all satisfied 
Don’t know 
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Recent research has shown that decisions are influenced by context. Differences in 
the way people feel, their experience, as well as their environment can influence 
their decisions. In order to better understand how people make decisions, please 
select only the two fields, angry and relaxed, in order to show that you have read 
the question completely. Please do not pay attention to the rest of the question. 
Please choose all the feelings that best describe your emotional state. 
uncertain 
sad 
restless 
disappointed 
in a hurry 
angry 
relaxed 
bored 
uncertain 
none of the above 
I don’t know  
 
We want to ensure that all the participants of the study have read all the questions. 
So please choose very satisfied. 
Very satisfied 
Rather satisfied 
Not very satisfied 
Not at all satisfied 
Don’t know 
 
[Display of feedback whether attention filters have been successfully passed] 
[…] 
Thank you very much for answering the survey and your time. The questionnaire will only 
be used for purely scientific purposes and is completely anonymous. If you have any 
further questions about the study, please send me a note 
(julian.zuber@economics.oxon.org). Please do not forget to click on the “Submit” button 
down below. In addition, you can leave general feedback. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This dissertation has sought to contribute to research on the effects of national attachment 
on in-group solidarity as well as out-group derogation. To frame the empirical analysis, 
Chapter 2 has discussed the political theory of John Rawls and introduced a realist critique 
of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, arguing that empirical research on national attachment and 
social justice, as provided by this dissertation, can help substantiate a “Rawls for Realists.” 
Chapter 3 has used observational data to investigate the relationship between national 
attachment and support of social justice principles. I have shown that national attachment 
increases support for redistribution, but only among individuals with lower levels of 
“Openness to Experience” (a core personality trait). To my knowledge, this is the first 
study to combine datasets on personality, national attachment, and redistribution. This 
suggests that national attachment increases motivational support for liberal principles of 
social justice, which ensures the stability of a Rawlsian political community, for citizens 
rather opposed to higher levels of cultural or economic change.  
Chapter 4 has analysed observational data of two datasets to investigate the relationship 
between national pride and anti-immigrant sentiments. I have argued that, 
counterintuitively, national pride does not increase and may, in fact, even decrease anti-
immigrant sentiments among nativists, the social group most opposed to immigration. I 
have explained this by arguing that nativists perceive immigrants as a symbolic threat to 
their values and norms, and not as an economic threat. However, as national pride 
increases group esteem among nativists, it reduces the perception of symbolic threats. The 
perception of immigrants as symbolic threat is in line with overestimating the total number 
of immigrants across the board and the conviction that immigrants are culturally and 
religiously more distant from them as well as economically weaker. (Alesina, Miano and 
Stantcheva, 2018). The groups the most prone to this perception bias are citizens who 
embrace an ethnic form of national attachment. Thus, reducing the levels of anti-
immigrant sentiments is essential for the functioning of liberal democracies as it increases 
the willingness of nativists to cooperate in increasingly multi-ethnic societies.  
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As a consequence, in line with concerns developed in Chapter 2, ethnic heterogeneity can 
reduce the motivational basis with to support social justice principles, as immigration is 
believed to increase the share of groups that are negatively prejudiced. However, it is very 
important to emphasise that symbolic threat going in line with the overestimation of the 
magnitude and composition of migrants drives this negative relationship, not ethnic or 
cultural heterogeneity as such. The prejudices on immigrants and the related concerns pose 
a factual constraint on the support of principles of social justice, such as the preferences 
for redistribution. In that sense the relationship between national attachment and out-
group derogation matters for ensuring stability in Rawls’ theory of justice, thus constitutes 
a methodological realist critique, i.e. “Rawls for Realists”.  
Chapter 5 has used original experimental data from a survey experiment to explore the 
relationship between in-group commitment and out-group derogation. A first video 
treatment primes only national attachment, a second treatment primes national attachment 
and a perception of threat. I have shown that only the second treatment increases anti-
immigrant sentiments and nationalism, suggesting the centrality of perceived threat for 
out-group derogation. This perceived threat treatment also increases respondents’ belief in 
democracy, but does not affect preferences for social justice. At the same time, increased 
support for democracy translates into a higher willingness to protect minorities, if at all the 
opposite. Consequently, priming national attachment with external threats could lead to 
stronger support for majoritarian politics as in “illiberal democracies”. Thus, the 
experimental results in this paper provide evidence that an increase in beliefs in the overall 
merit of democracy is rather a result of following commonsensical group norms or the 
conviction that the majority in democracies have more to say, even at the cost of minorities. 
This indicates that a society with a long and deeply engrained tradition of political 
liberalism, in this case the intellectual pioneer of political liberalism, is not necessarily 
immune to the temptations of illiberal thought. In this context, it was surprising that all 
socio-economic groups bear the same potential of out-group derogation if primed with an 
external threat. Moreover, just thinking about immigration reduced overall support for 
social justice principles. This suggests that group heterogeneity in combination with the 
promotion of merely nativist or exclusive forms of national attachment or, even worse, 
establishing national narratives of external threat, can be detrimental for large-scale 
cooperation. Future experimental study should prime an inclusive form of national 
attachment to test whether national attachment can reduce or even inverse the corrosive 
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effect of group heterogeneity. If that was the case, this would be a strong case that modern 
societies should actively promote inclusive forms of national attachment to be stable in the 
way that I interpreted Rawlsian stability in Chapter 2.  
I hope that the research provided in this dissertation will motivate more empirical social 
science research on the realist foundations of political theory, in particular in a time when 
many core social justice principles of the nation-state appear to be under threat. This could 
help to better empirically ground political philosophy, which, as Michael Sandel has 
remarked, “seems often to reside at a distance from the world. Principles are one thing, 
politics another, and even our best efforts “to live up” to our ideals typically founder on 
the gap between theory and practice” (Sandel, 1984, p. 81). 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
I want to conclude by considering some of the policy implications of the research findings 
presented in this dissertation, although it is of course inherently difficult to make 
recommendations how policy should best be formulated on the basis of public opinion 
research.  
One main takeaway of the second chapter is that, beyond questions about averages in 
the population and the correlations between attitudes at the aggregate level, heterogeneity 
in responses between citizens is very important. I have used the Big Five character traits 
as a plausibly fixed aspect of someone’s character and show that they mediate the 
relationship between national pride and social justice preferences. While this is an 
important perspective from a social science perspective, an emphasis on heterogeneity and 
mediation by pre-existing dispositions also has direct practical implications. 
Consider for example a hypothetical policymaker developing an education and 
information programme about the dangers of nationalism (or about the promise of 
inclusive national attachment) in a region recently afflicted by civil war. On the one hand, 
policymakers want to expose as many individuals as possible to the programme. On the 
other hand, budgets are often scarce and populations hard to reach, and so who the 
programme should really focus on becomes a question of practical importance. Pre-
screening participants based on their Big Five scores, in order to maximise the expected 
total behaviour or attitude change, could be a good way of dealing with resource constraints 
in this context. To the extent that these scores really are fixed at an early age, they could 
be used throughout a person’s life, while avoiding typical issues of self-selection into 
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programmes based on interest, motivation and so on. Developing such a pre-screening 
programme of course is ethically debatable. Policy makers could also target groups that 
very likely score low on Openness to Experience, such as conservative political clubs or 
political organizations, as they might be more responsive to a “solidarity boost” after being 
exposed to forms of national attachment that try not to emphasize nationalist ideology but 
balance traditional and progressive forms of national attachment or narratives that 
combine traditional values with the merits of immigration and cultural diversity. 
In Chapter 4, I studied how different conceptions of “ethnic” versus “civic” 
interpretations of what it means to belong to one’s country drive out-group derogation. 
One key implication from my findings, though by no means new to the debate, is that, in 
order to promote inclusive societies, it is important to reduce the prevalence of “ethnic” 
understandings of national attachment. However, my findings also point to an important 
caveat: labelling the subgroup of individuals who do adhere to an “ethnic” interpretation 
as backward is likely to increase their desire for out-group derogation, as it diminishes their 
group esteem. As a direct implication, those intent on strengthening inclusiveness in 
today’s democratic polities need to not only spread “civic” interpretations, they also need 
to be careful to find, generate and/or maintain sources of group esteem for those 
individuals that will continue to adhere to “ethnic” views, even if they are in the minority.  
This strain of argument is related to a somewhat similar interpretation of recent 
nationalist election victories in the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries 
that has recently gained traction in media analysis of voter behaviour. While there are many 
debates to be had about the political virtues of “appeasing” versus “antagonizing” some 
anti-immigrant tendencies, this research points to a much more practical question, the 
answer to which is necessarily empirical: if out-group derogation is to be reduced, what are 
alternative and “benign” sources of group esteem for those individuals that would 
otherwise be likely to engage in out-group derogation? While admittedly still an open 
question, this way of approaching the challenge might lead to some new ideas that surpass 
the traditional divide between “appeasement” and “conflict” as strategies against out-
group derogation. At least the results suggest that accepting ethnic forms of national 
attachment as a legitimate political emotion does not imply to appease with anti-immigrant 
sentiments, but rather the opposite. To slowly promote more inclusive forms of national 
attachment that are not short-lived, such attempts should not threaten to deprive 
individuals of valued social identities. For example, with regard to nativists it might be 
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misleading to deny the importance of historical or cultural elements to use those elements 
of essentialist national attachments that are more likely to be compatible with increasing 
levels of ethnic heterogeneity. Regarding Rawls’ implicit assumption that some form of 
national attachment is a precondition for the stability of a political community, empirically, 
contradictory conceptions of national attachment between social groups seem to be less 
of a problem than systematically labelling conservative interpretations of nationhood as 
“nationalistic” or even “racist”. In contrast to political questions on the (re)distribution of 
economic and political resources, discourses on national attachment are emotional by 
definition that cannot be solved via a rational discourse but reflect contrasting and 
hegemonic interpretations of what it “truly” means to be part of a political community. As 
there is no rational solution to such debates, they are political in the best sense. The absence 
of a rational solution to political conflicts on national attachment makes the recognition 
that such contrasting expressions of national attachment are legitimate, independent of 
whether one necessarily agrees with them, critical for the functioning of increasingly 
diverse democracies. This creates a delicate balance, as the limits of free speech are more 
difficult to define. In the most extreme, case any interpretation of national attachment 
would be legitimate, even it was completely absurd.  
At the same time, as long as some form of a functioning “global democracy” is not on 
the horizon, forms of national attachment defining on who belongs and who does not 
belong to the respective political community, are legitimate, as democracies can only 
function if a clear subgroup that constitutes the political community, is clearly defined. 
Here, it seems to completely legitimate to establish inclusive but demanding naturalisation 
processes, including integration tests. Such naturalisation policies are of course not justified 
because of the superiority of the members of the respective political community, but 
because of their imperfections. As the electoral gains of many right-wing populist parties 
in France, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Hungary, or Germany, have demonstrated: no 
modern democracy is safe from dysfunctional or antidemocratic ideologies that claim that 
the community of those who “truly” a member of the respective community is slowly 
abolished. 
I have emphasized the heterogeneity of perspectives on national attachment within 
countries as well as how citizens might “need” national attachment to very different 
degrees. This explains why national attachment is so contested, in democracies that are 
exposed to economic and social transformations, but calls for the need to find common 
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national narratives that actively promote inclusive but national narratives. The outcome of 
successful is always a compromise and as national attachment is highly political, it needs 
to be subject of such a political struggle. However, the tendency of both the left and the 
right to create increasingly particularistic political group identities increases the tendency 
to avoid such a political struggle. For example, in October 2017, the civil society alliance 
“#indivisible”33 mobilized more than two hundred thousand to demonstrate for a tolerant 
and diverse society. However, the display of the German flag was not welcomed with the 
argument that “it is politically occupied by the right” (Lau, 2018). After the demonstration 
the German flag as a sovereign symbol will continue to decorate national sports teams, 
prominently wave on state missions and over the German Parliaments. At least in the short 
to medium term, taking up the political struggle of the political symbols seems to be more 
promising to increase tolerance, especially if it was only politicized by the extreme right. 
Although the political cultures between France and Germany are extremely different 
regarding symbolic patriotism, it is worth mentioning how the political strategy to retreat 
from national symbol contrasts with Macron’s approach to use both extensively the French 
and the European flag during election campaign events. This strategy aimed at emphasizing 
that a distinct French national identity is fully compatible with a stronger European 
identity. At least empirically, there is no evidence that a national sovereign symbol cannot 
be used to promote more inclusive forms of national attachment that connect to larger, 
not smaller political communities 34 . This strategy to avoid existing political national 
symbols increases the possibility of political polarization, or even worse, of the withdrawal 
from the political sphere, a new Biedermeier period. 
The third empirical chapter uses experimental treatments in order to induce certain 
modes of thinking in the minds of respondents. On the one hand, the finding of increased 
national attachment and national identity and pride for those respondents who were shown 
the pro-UK video, in particular when the video displayed the challenges of World War 2, 
supports the conventional wisdom that “dangers from outside unite” (also known as the 
“rally around the flag effect”). On the other hand, it is not clear from this study that at 
least traditional forms of national attachment increase support of social justice principles 
without causing out-group derogation. In fact, such a negative “side-effect” fully is 
                                               
 
33 The original German motto is “#Unteilbar”. 
34 For example, at the individual level national pride is positively correlated with support for the 
European Union.   
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consistent with the data. At least with regard to traditional forms of national attachment 
my empirical evidence suggests that the alleged conflict-reducing effect of such patriotic 
sentiments on intergroup attitudes does not exist. However, this does not imply that this 
holds for inclusive forms of national attachment. Therefore, the findings seem to suggest 
that policymakers seeking to instil “benign nationalism” should not rely on appeals of an 
external threat, but on appeals to positive virtues, even if they are less effective at raising 
in-group commitment and national attachment. 
Finally, the experimental findings help to understand how governments in illiberal 
democracies can create wide support for policies that restrict minorities in times of a 
perceived threat. The flip side of this pattern is that a convincing narrative stressing an 
illiberal threat to progressive societies that carefully integrates existing forms of national 
attachments, might unfold the same potential to support group norms of democracy and 
solidarity without generating new antipathies against any out-groups. For now, however, 
this merely remains a suggestion for further research.  
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